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466 PART  1 
The space activities in the United States 1o  INTRODUCTION 
Space activity,  like nuclear activity,  is a  technical legacy 
of the  Second  World  War.  In  the  immediate  postwar  decade  the 
stimulus,  in both  cases,  was  exclusively military.  Interest 
in civil and scientific applications  came  later,  when  the 
destructive potential of the  V2  and  the  atomic  bomb  had  been 
developed  by  the  military and  combined  in the  first strategic 
missiles with nuclear warheads. 
The  Russians  were  four years behind the  US  with their first 
atomic  bomb  (1949)  and,  unlike  the us,  they had no  fleet of 
intercontinental bombers;  this handicap  led Russia  to  develop 
strategic missiles before  possessing nuclear  warheads.  With 
their first thermonuclear  explosion  (1953)  the Russians  were 
only a  year  behind  the  Americans,  but  they  were  already ahead 
in missile  development. 
In  1957  the  US  position can be  summarized as  follows. 
Military missiles:  the  Army  possessed,  in the  Redstone,  the 
sole operational tactical missile and  was  developing the 
Jupiter IRBM;  the  Air Force  was  developing the Thor  IRBM  and 
the  Atlas and Titan  ICBMs;  the  Navy  was  developing  the solid-
fuel Polaris  IRBM  for  launching  from  nuclear-powered submarines. 
Scientific space  research:  in 1955  President Eisenhower  had 
promised  government  support  for  American participation in the 
International Geophysical  Year  (1  July 1957  to  31  December 
1958);  projects included the  launching of space  probes and 
putting a  small research satellite into orbit  (Project Vanguard, 
entrusted to the  US  Navy  laboratories). 
Aerospace:  the  National Advisory  Committee  for  Aeronautics 
(NACA),  created in 1915,  when  America  possessed 23  military 
aircraft as against 3500  in Europe,  was  developing the  super-
469 sonic X15  rocket  plane  for heights  of  up  to  100  km,  in con-
junction with  the  Navy  and  Air Force.  At  the  end  of 1957 
the  NACA  had  a  budget  of $117  million  (for the  financial 
year 1957-58 = FY  1958)  and  equipment  worth  $300  million, 
mainly  concentrated in the  laboratories at Langley,  Virginia, 
founded  in 1917,  Ames,  California,  founded in 1940  and Lewis, 
Ohio,  founded  in 1941,  with  a  total personnel of  some  8000. 
The  US  therefore  had  no  unified and  coordinated space  programme 
when  the first Russian Sputnik heralded in the  space  age  on 
4  October 1957. 
Space  activity in the  US  will be  briefly described,  with 
particular stress on  those aspects  most  pertinent to  the 
comparison with European activity in the  same  sector. 
The  attached Tables 2/B-1  - 2/B-7  show  US  space  expenditure 
from  1957  to  1967  (totals and  by recipient agencies)  and  the 
figures  for  NASA  employees. 
This serves as  a  general reference,  as  the  tables are not 
specifically referred to in Part  1  of this report. 
2.  FIRST  PERIOD  OF  SPACE  ACTIVITY 
For  the  purpose  of  comparison  with Europe it is interesting 
to analyze  how  the  American  decision-making  and  organizational 
machinery  reacted to  the  stern technical and political chal-
lenge  launched  by  Russia  in 1957. 
The  US  immediately realized the  political and  strategic im-
plications of  the first Russian successes in space. 
Their reaction  was  prompt  and radical: 
- on  7  November  1957  the President's Scientific Advisory 
Committee  (PSAC)  was  set up  at the  White  House  to  develop 
an aggressive  coordinated space  programme; 
470 
• - on  9  January  1958  the  Advanced  Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA)  was  set up  at  the  Department  of Defence(DoD)  to 
coordinate at last the missile  and  space activities of 
the  three Services; 
- on  31  January  1958  a  Jupiter vehicle put  into orbit the 
first US  satellite, Explorer 1;  six weeks  later came  the 
first successful Vanguard  launching  (17  March  1958); 
- on  6  February  1958 and  5  March  1958  the  space  and astro-
nautics  committees  of the  Senate  and  the House  of Repre-
sentatives were  set up;  together with the PSAC,  DoD  and 
NACA  the  Committees  critically reviewed  the  space  programmes 
and prepared the  Space  Act,  which passed through Congress 
and  was  signed  by  the President  on  29  July 1958  (Public Law 
85-568,  85th Congress,  HR  12575,  28  August  1957). 
Under  the provisions  of  the  Space  Act: 
(a)  The  National  Aeronautics  and Space  Administration  (NASA)  was 
created as  an  exclusively civil agency,  taking over  the tech-
nical apparatus  of NACA  and all the  civil space  programmes 
initiated by  the military; 
(b)  All space activities were  to  be  coordinated by  the  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Council  (NASC),  consisting of the 
President,  the Secretary of Defence,  the Secretary of State, 
the  Administrator of  NASA,  the  Chairman  of the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  (AEC),  one  more  public servant  and  a  maximum  of 
three private  members; 
(c)  NASA  was  set up  as  an  "Administration" and  not  an  Advisory 
Committee  like  NACA;  the  Administrator has  very  wide  powers 
regarding agreements and  contracts with industry and the 
.  . t•  1 
un~vers~  ~es • 
1  His annual salary is $22,500  and  the  job is full-time;  in 
contrast with previous regulations he is empowered  to pay 
salaries of up  to $19,000  to  a  maximum  of  260  executives 
and up  to $21,000  to  a  further  13 executives. 
471 (d)  All inventions  and patents arising from  the  use  of  NASA 
resources,  whether internally or by  the  industrial supplier, 
were  to remain  government  property;  the  same  rule applied to 
the  AEC;  the  DoD  applied less strict rules,  claiming only 
royalities  for  the  use  of patents already obtained under its 
contracts; 
(e)  The  technical knowledge  gained through  space activity was  to 
be  published as  widely as permitted by  security limitations, 
which are  much  more  liberally interpreted in the  US  than in 
Europe; 
(f)  The  President of  the United States  was  to have  a  temporary 
right for  four  years  to transfer to  NASA  all the  space 
activities of other agencies,  subject to the veto of Congress, 
which  must  be  exercised within  60  days  of any transfer pro-
posal. 
In August  1958  K.T.  Glenman  was  appointed Administrator of  NASA, 
while  the  former  NACA  Director,  H.  Dryden,  was  appointed Deputy 
Administrator.  The  Mercury  programme  for  the first  manned sat-
ellite was  launched straight away,  giving an  immediate  sense 
of purpose  to  the  nascent  organization. 
On  1  October 1958,  a  year after the first Sputnik flight,  NASA 
commenced its official activities. 
For FY  1959  NASA  had  a  budget  of $305  million,  including $235 
million for  space activities.  The  sources  of finance  were:  30% 
from  the regular  NACA  budget;  45%  transferred  from  civil activ-
ities of the  DoD;  25%  specific appropriations  for  NASA.  The 
three basic items in the  budget  were: 
*  S&E  (Salaries and Expenditures),  subsequently  AO  (Administra-
tive Operations), 
*  CoF  (Construction of Facilities), 
472 *  R&D  (Research and Development). 
From  the  outset,  the  financial policy of  NASA  was  to spend 
most  of its R&D  money  outside  so as  to  spread the  acquisition 
of space  technology  throughout  the national industry,  avoiding 
duplication of effort.  To  permit  the  utmost  flexibility in 
budget  spending,  the  CoF  and  R&D  appropriations did not  expire 
annually but  could  be  carried over to subsequent years. 
The  NASA  budget  for FY  1959  ($305  million was  160%  more  than 
the preceding NACA  budget  ($117  million);  the  DoD  space  budget 
for  FY  1959  ($490  million)  was  even higher than NASA's  and  was 
137%  up  on  the previous year's  ($206  million);  the  AEC 1s  space 
budget  for FY  1959  ($34 million)  was  62%  more  than the previous 
one  ($21  million). Total expenditure  on  space  rose  from  $344 
to 829  million;  such was  the  American  financial reaction to 
the first Soviet successes in space. 
As  regards missiles,  the  first Polaris  IRBM  was  tested before 
the  end of 1958,  with a  contribution  from  the  DoD's  non-space 
budget;  Boeing  was  selected,  out  of a  field of 14;  to develop 
the solid-fuel Minuteman  ICBM,  to  be  launched  from  underground 
silos. For reasons  of quick reaction time  and  safety,  solid 
propellants were  henceforth preferred for strategic nuclear 
missiles. 
The  liquid-fuel Jupiter and Thor  IRBMs  were  subsequently 
assigned to US  bases in Europe  (Britain,  Italy,  Turkey).  The 
Thor  IRBM  was  steadily perfected and increased in power,  to 
become  a  widely-used launching vehicle  for satellites. The 
liquid-fuel Atlas  and Titan  ICBMs  were  gradually perfected 
to become  launching vehicles  for the  Mercury  and  Gemini 
capsules respectively,  and also for satelliteso 
Missile expenditure,  which  had  been over $1000  million annually 
since  1954,  reached $5000  million in FY  1959. 
473 The  period 1959-60  was  one  of organizational shake-down  for 
NASA,  which  was  heavily engaged  on  the  Mercury project.  The 
world-wide  system  of  tracking and  telemetry stations was 
developed;  the  plans  for military and  civil launchers  were 
rationalized and  shared between  the  DoD  and  NASA.  The  start 
was  made  on  the  development  of the Scout  four-stage  solid-
fuel civil rocket  launcher,  the  study  of nuclear propulsion, 
in conjunction with  AEC,  and  the  development  of the  Centaur 
stage for perfecting the  use  of liquid oxygen  and hydrogen, 
which  was  to  be  essential to  the  success  of the Saturn rockets. 
In 1959,  NASA  took  over  control of the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory  (JPL)1  which  had successfully collaborated in the Jupiter-
Explorer project with  the  Army  Ballistic Missile  Agency  (ABMA)2• 
In 1960  ABMA,  too,was  incorporated in NASA  along with all its 
staff, activities and  equipment,  including the first Saturn 
project,  initiated by  the  DoD  in August  1958. 
The  transfer of  the Navy's  Vanguard project to  NASA  at the 
end  of 1958  had  created the  nucleus  of the  Goddard Space Flight 
Centre  (with a  staff of 1900  at the  end  of 1960).  The  transfer 
of  ABHA  from  the  Army  to  NASA  in 1960  created the nucleus of 
the Marshall Space Flight Centre  (with a  staff of 54oO  at the 
end  of 1960). 
1  Founded  by T.  von  Karman  at the  California Institute of 
Technology in 1953,  the  JPL  had a  staff of 2800  in 1959. 
2  Founded in 1956  and  directed by  w.  von  Braun,  the  ABMA 
employed  4600  people  in 1959. 
474 In the  two  years up  to the  end of 1960  the  NASA  staff was 
thus  doubled  (from  8000  to about  16,000).  On  a  purely civil 
basis,  NASA  succeeded in fusing together the  most  advanced 
skills in the  field of aeronautics and propellants;  only an 
organization with a  vast range  of skills could ensure efficient 
management  of such a  highly interlinked activity as that of 
space. 
By  the  end  of 1960,  NASA  was  able  to produce its first ten-
year plan of post-Mercury programmes,  already aiming at man's 
exploration of the  moon,  together with systematic projects 
for satellite applications in the  fields of communications, 
meteorology  and navigation.  This plan,  involving a  total ex-
penditure  of $12,000-15,000 million,  was  substantially accepted 
and amplified by President Kennedy,  though  only after Gagarin's 
first flight in orbit  (12  April 1961). 
In FY  1961,  for  the first time,  NASA's  budget  ($964 million) 
exceeded the  DoD's  space  budget  ($814 million),  even  though 
the  1960 electoral campaign  once  more  gave  prominence  to the 
military aspects of space activities and to the missile  gap 
between  the  US  and the Soviet Union. 
The  transfer of space activities from  the  DoD  to  NASA  was  not 
unruffled;  at the  beginning of  1961  NASA  went  through a  time 
of uncertainty,  while  the  DoD  hoped  for  a  more  favourable 
treatment  from  a  non-military President than it had received 
from  a  military one.  The  latter,  on  leaving office,  had given 
a  warning:  "In the  councils of government  we  must  guard 
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence  whether 
sought  or unsought,  by  the military-industrial complex. 
The  potential for  the disastrous rise of misplaced power 
exists and will persisto•••  We  must  never let the weight 
of this combination  endanger our liberties or democratic 
prooesses ••••  u 
475 At  the  beginning of Kennedy's  presidency,  J.E.  Webb  and 
R.S.  McNamara  became  NASA  Administrator and Secretary of 
Defence respectively.  LoB•  Johnson  became  chairman of  the 
rehabilitated NASC,  and  the  NASA  and  DoD  space  programmes 
were  once  again critically re-appraised.  While  American  space 
policies wavered  between  NASA  and  the  DoD,  the Russians 
launched the first man  into space:  Gagarin's orbital flight 
ushered in the  second  chapter of  the  space  age. 
Space activity in  the  first period may  be  summarized as 
follows:  the  Russians  put  10 Sputniks into orbit  (one  of  them 
launched a  probe  towards  Venus)  and  three  lunar probes  (one 
of which  photographed the  hidden side  of  the  moon),  while 
the  Americans  launched  two  Pioneer space  probes  and  orbited 
39  light satellites with greatly varied missions;  15  were 
scientific  (radiation,  magnetism,  geodesy);  14 were  techno-
logical  (separation,  guidance,  re-entry);  10  were  applications 
satellites,  of  which  seven  were  military  (one  Midas  and  one 
Samoa  for reconnaissance,  three navigational Transits,  one 
Score  and  one  Courier  for active  communications)  and  three 
were  civil  (two Tires  for  meteorology and  one  Echo  for pas-
sive  communications). 
This  preponderance  of military over non-military satellites 
continued in the  second period. 
3.  SECOND  PERIOD  OF  SPACE  ACTIVITY 
This  was  America's  response  to  the  new  Soviet  challenge: 
- after three  weeks,  the  sub-orbital flight  by Sheppard 
(5  May  1961),  followed  by  Grissom's sub-orbital flight 
(27 July 1961); 
- after six weeks,  the  initiation of the  Apollo  programme, 
already prepared by  NASA,  to land a  man  on  the  moon  by 1970. 
476 President Kennedy's  decision  (25  May  1961)  to  take  ''longer 
strides",  in full awareness  that no  space project could be 
more  difficult or costly,  had its effects on  NASA. 
NASA's  1961  FY  budget  of $946  million was  almost  doubled in 
FY  1962,  reaching $1825 million of which  $1797  million  were 
for  space activities.  Other notable increases in space  budgets 
were  those  of the  DoD  (from $814 million in FY  1961  to $1298 
million in 1962)  and  AEC  (from $68 million in FY  1961  to $148 
million in FY  1962.  Total US  expenditure  on  space  went  from 
$1808  million in FY  1961  to  $3295  million in FY  1962,  rising 
to $5400  million in FY  1963  and  to about  $7000 million in the 
following  years. 
The  number  of NASA  employees  steadily increased,  from  16,000 
in 1960  to about  33,000 in 1965. 
The  agency's  management  organization was  modified to  meet 
the  new  aims until it reached its present  shape,  which is 
shown  on  the  following page. 
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 In  summer  1961  work  began  on  expanding  the  Manned  Space  Centre 
(Houston,  Texas)  and  the  launching  base at Cape  Canaveral 
(Florida)  (later re-named Cape  Kennedy)  so that it could take 
the gigantic Saturn 5;  the  plant for building the first stage 
of the Saturn series was  set up  at New  Orleans,  and also the 
statio test base at the  mouth  of the Mississippi. 
Thus  the  network  of  NASA  centres,  scattered over a  large part 
of the US,  came  into being  (see  figure  below). 
NASA  Centres  ------
(in 1968) 
479 Still in  1961,  there  was  a  re-crganization of  NASA  involving 
coordination with the  DoD  for  the Saturn launch vehicle, 
better quality control and reliability,  improved contracting 
procedures in order to achieve  prompt,  efficient and  controlled 
collaboration with industry. 
On  1  September  1961  the Program  Evaluation and  Review Techniques 
system already used by  the  Navy  for  the Polaris programme  was 
adopted to set up  NASA-PERT  in an effort to achieve efficient 
and logical management  of  complex projects.  In 1962  the  costing 
side  was  included to  form  the  "NASA-PERT  and  Companion  Cost 
System11 :  this systematic integration of  time  and  cost  factors 
provided an effective instrument  for  the  comprehensive  mar-age-
ment  of space projects. 
4.  SPACE  PROGRAHHES  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
4.1  Military Programmes 
Military interest in space,  which  was  almost  the  sole spur to 
initial action,  remained absolutely predominant in the  US, 
even in the sector of unmanned  terrestrial satellites.  While 
NASA's  financial  commitments  for  the  Apollo  programme  were 
already tapering off,  the  DoD  was  heavily  committed in the 
Manned  Orbiting Laboratory  (MOL)  project  which began in 1965, 
with a  completion date in the  early seventies;  a  military 
Titan III launch vehicle  was  chosen and  the  capsule,  with 
two  astronauts  a~oard,  is to  complete  a  30-day flight  to 
investigate the  military possibilities of space  use. 
On  the  military side,  with the  support  of non-space  funds 
from  the  DoD,  the  second  space  period featured the  operational 
development  of new  land-based ballistic missiles  (Atlas F, 
Titan 2  and  3C,  Minuteman  2)  and  submarine-launched missiles 
(Polaris A2  and  A3);  at the  end  of 1968  the  US  had 1054 
480 land-based  ICBMs  (as against  the Soviet Union's  900-1000) 
and  656  SLBMs  (USSR  125)  carried by  41  nuclear-powered sub-
marines  (USSR  38),  together with 500  intercontinental bombers 
(USSR  150). 
The  Soviet Union had  outstripped the  US  in medium-range  stra-
tegic weapons  (750  IRBMs  or  MRBMs  and  1050  medium-range  bomb-
ers). 
In 1967  Secretary of Defence  R.S.  McNamara  launched the 
Sentinel programme  (about  $5000 million for the  development 
of the anti-missile missiles  (ABMs)  Sprint and Spartan,  in-
tended to deter future attacks by  China,  who  had already 
embarked  on  ICBM  projects. 
In August  1968,  the first tests were  made  on  the Poseidon  C3 
and Minuteman 3,  both capable  of carrying multiple nuclear 
warheads  aimed at different targets  (MIRV:  Multiple Individ-
ually-targetable Re-entry Vehicles).  The  nuclear-powered 
submarine  fleet  had  reached the  total of  41  units planned 
in 1961;  31  of these  were  to  be  modified for  launching Poseidon 
instead of Polaris missiles.  New  military missile  programmes 
were  under  way  to  counter the  new  fractional orbit Soviet 
weapons  which  can reach almost  any target on  earth  (FOBS: 
Fractional Orbit Bombardment  System). 
The  strategic nuclear missiles race brings no  improvement  to 
the effective security of the  super-powers. 
481 4.2  Civil Unmanned  Programmes 
4.2.1  General  summary 
The  main  achievements  in civil unmanned  space  projects in 
the  decade  1957-67,  after the initial Explorer and  Vanguard 
programmes,  are as  follows: 
(a)  NASA  weather satellites:  ESSA,  Nimbus,  Tires; 
(b)  NASA  communications satellites:  ECHO,  Relay,  Syncom, 
Telstar; 
(c)  NASA  scientific research satellites OAO  (Orbiting Astro-
nomical Observatories),  OGO  (Orbiting Geophysical Observ-
atories),  OSO  (Orbiting Solar Observatories); 
(d)  NASA  satellites for  automatic  lunar exploration  (Orbiter, 
Pioneer,  Ranger,  Surveyor)  and  planetary exploration 
(Hariner); 
(e)  NASA  universal  ATS  (Applications Technology Satellites) 
on  geostationary orbit acting as  communications,  weather 
and navigational satellites and  for  analysis of  the  earth's 
resources; 
(f)  the  Scout  four-stage  solid-propellant launch vehicle; 
(g)  the  Saturn launch vehicles  with their objective  "man  on 
the  moon". 
An  overall comparison  of Soviet  and  American  unmanned  projects 
in space  from  1957  to 1967  shows  the  following: 
USA 
USSR 
Earth 
satellites 
468 
212 
Hoon 
probes 
15 
9 
482 
Planetary 
probes 
10 
10 
Total 
493 
231 Whereas  the  percentage  of successful  launches during the 
first period  (1957-60)  was  46%,  in the  second  period  (1961-
67)  this rose  to  88%. 
At  the  end  of 1967  the  surviving satellites in earth orbit 
numbered  245  American  out  of 468  and  51  Soviet  out  of 212. 
Breakdown  of the  468  US  earth satellites:  about  4o/fo  security-
classified military satellites;  about  33%  unclassified mili-
tary satellites (in  order  of  importance:  technological,  sci-
entific,  communications,  reconnaissance,  navigational);  only 
about  18%  civil (in order  of importance:  scientific,  weather, 
communications).  In 1965  alone,  no  less than  70  of the  94 
satellites orbited were  military. 
4.2.2 Civil application satellites 
In view  of their interest to European activities,  an analysis 
is given  of American  progress in  communications  and  weather 
satellites from  the  beginning of  the  space  age.  Such 
satellites were  developed  experimentally by  NASA  and  then 
produced  commercially by  other agencies. 
Weather satellites 
The  National  Academy  of Science  estimates  that long-term 
weather  forecasts  could avert  at least $2000  million of 
damage  annually in the  US  alone.  On  1  April 1960  NASA  launched 
the  first Tiros satellite;  another nine  satellites in this 
series were  launched  by  the  end  of 1965;  the  last two, 
equipped  with  APT  system  (Automatic  Picture Transmission)  for 
transmitting 400  TV  pictures a  day direct to  simple  and 
economical  stations  on  earth,  were  put  into an  orbit syn-
chronized with  the  sun  so that  they could  survey the  whole 
earth in 24  hours  by daylight. 
On  28  July 1964  NASA  launched  the first Nimbus  satellite on 
a  polar orbit,  capable  of surveying  by night  using the  HRIR 
483 system  (High Resolution  Infrared Radiometer);  at present  two 
are  in orbit. 
When  the  experimental phase  under  the  guidance  of NASA  ended 
in February  1966,  responsibility for the weather satellite 
service  passed to  the Environmental Science Service  Adminis-
tration  (ESSA)  of the  Department  of Commerce,  while  NASA 
continued to  supply launch vehicles and  launch facilities. 
With  an annual  expenditure  of less  than $30 million ESSA  has 
already put  up  six weather satellites (first launch  on  3 
February 1966). 
To  date,  a  total of at least a  million pictures have  been 
taken of cloud formations,  cyclones,  typhoons,  sandstorms 
and  iceberg  formation;  the  accurate  weather  forecasts  were 
of great value  to  the  Mercury  and Gemini  programmes,  as  they 
will be  to  the  Apollo  programme,  and  likewise  to air navigation, 
especially when  supersonic air transport arrives. 
At  present  more  than  150  stations in some  thirty countries 
receive accurate  weather data  from  the  American satellites. 
Future plans  envisage  a  network of  synchronous satellites, 
investigation of air pollution and  a  start on active meteor-
ological measures  to  modify  local weather. 
Communications satellites 
Both  NASA  and  the  DoD  have  had  an  interest in space  communi-
cations  from  very early on. 
On  the  military side  the  DoD,  after the  first tests with the 
active satellites Score  (18  December  1958)  and  Courier  (4 
October  1960) 1  started on  the  IDCSP  programme  (Interim Defence 
Communication Satellite Programme).  From  mid-1966  to  mid-1967, 
three Titan III launch vehicles sufficed to put 18  satellites 
into almost  synchronous orbit  (17  of  them  functioning).  The 
484 high capacity of this network  (about  80  channels instead of 
the  30  initially planned)  and  the  expected length of active 
life (four years instead of the  expected  two)  caused the 
subsequent  ADCSP  programme  (Advanced  Defence  Communication 
Satellite Programme)  to  be  put off  from  1969  to  1971. 
NASA•s  civil programme  began in 1959.  Echo  1,  a  spherical bal-
loon  (diameter 30  m,  weight  85  kg)  acting as  a  passive reflec-
tor of radio signals,  was  launched  on  12  August  19601•  On  10 
July 1962,  on  behalf of ATT,  NASA  launched the active satel-
lite Telstar 1  which linked Europe  with  the us.  On  13  December 
1962  NASA  launched another such satellite,  Relay 1,  which 
tested TV  transmission  between North  and South America  for 
two  years. 
Further experiments  followed  in 1963  and  1964  with Telstar 2 
(7  May  1963),  Relay  2  (21  January 1964)  and Echo  2  (25  January 
1964).  The  latter satellite effected the first link-up between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The  two  Telstar satellites cost  ATT  a  total of some  $53  million. 
Meanwhile,  with  the Syncom  satellites built by  Hughes,  NASA 
turned its attention to synchronous  or geostationary satellites. 
Syncom  1  was  launched  on  14  February 1963  in a  synchronous 
orbit,  but  remained silent;  Syncom  2  was  launched  on  26  July 
1963  and,  though not  perfectly synchronous  on  the  equator, 
was  used  from  October 1963  linked up  to Relay 1  for  trans-
mission  between  the  US,  South America  and  Africa. 
On  19  August  1964,  Syncom  3  was  launched perfectly and  guided 
to the  preestablished synchronous  point over the Pacific;  in 
1  Not  until after 1961  was  NASA  allowed to work  on  active 
satellites,  which  were  previously the  exclusive  concern 
of the  DoD. 
485 the  following  October it enabled the Tokyo  Olympics  to  be 
televised direct to the  US.  The  advantage  of a  synchronous 
orbit,  with fixed-direction stations  on  the  earth,  were  now 
confirmed.  In April 1965,  Syncom  2  and  3  were  handed  over to 
the  DoD  for  military communications. 
Syncom  3  ended the  NASA-led  experimental phase  of civil com-
munications satellites.  NASA  retained responsibility for 
launcher vehicles and launchings but  the  worldwide  communi-
cations service  now  passed  on  a  commercial  basis to  COMSAT, 
the US  representative in the international organization 
INTELSAT1• 
4.3 Civil Manned  Programmes 
For  the  purposes  of  comparison with possible  space activity 
in Europe  up  to 1980  there is no  need to analyse in detail 
the  development  of the  grandiose  manned  space  programmes. 
We  note  only the  following: 
~~~~~~~-~~~~~~!= began in August  1959  and  concluded in May 
1963  after two  sub-orbital flights  (1961)  and  four  orbital 
flights  (three in 1962  and  one  in 1963);  these latter used 
the single-stage military vehicle Atlas  (built by General 
Dynamics)  and  the  one-man  Mercury  capsule  (built by McDonnell/ 
Douglas);  the  total cost  was  about  $400  million. 
~E~J!~~-~~~!~!: started in December  1961  as  a  forerunner  of 
Apollo  and  ended in November  1966  after 10  orbital flights 
(five in 1965  and  five  in 1966);  use  was  made  of the  two-stage 
military vehicle Titan 2  (built by  Martin)  and the  two-man 
Gemini  capsule  (built by McDonnell/Douglas);  the total cost 
was  about  $1300  million. 
1  See Part 2  below. 
486 ~~~~~~~-~~~~~: started in May  1961,  and  required above all 
the  painstaking development  of the gigantic Saturn launch 
vehicles under  the direct control of NASA. 
The  following vehicles were  built and tested: 
-Saturn 1:  nine  successful launches  from  1961  to 1965; 
17-ton payload put into earth orbit in January 1964. 
- Saturn 1B:  four  successful launches  from  1966  to 1968;  pay-
load of 26  tons put into earth orbit in February 1966. 
- Saturn 5:  two  successful launches  from  1967  to  1968;  payload 
126  tons  put  into earth orbit in November  1967;  Saturn 5 
stands  110  m high and  can  send a  payload of some  50  tons 
out  of the earth's gravitational field. 
Main  contractors are as  follows: 
- Boeing:  first stage of Saturn 5 
- North  American:  second stage  of Saturn 5 
- Chrysler:  first stage of Saturn 1  and  1B 
- Douglas:  third stage of Saturn 5  (=  second stage of Saturn 1B) 
-IBM:  instrumen~unit 
- Grumman:  lunar module 
- North  American:  service  module  and  command  module 
- Lockheed:  recovery  system. 
The  intensive experimental phase  (1961-68)  was  followed  by  a 
quick succession  of  manned  operational flights with  crews  of 
three astronauts: 
Apollo  7  (Saturn 1B)  in earth orbit in October  1968; 
- Apollo  8  (Saturn 5)  circumnavigated the  moon  in December 
1968; 
- Apollo  9  (Saturn 5)  in earth orbit in March  1968; 
- Apollo  10  (Saturn 5)  in lunar orbit,  descending  to  15  km 
above  the  moon's  surface,  in May  1969; 
- Apollo  11  (Saturn 5)  culminating in the  grandiose  success 
of man's  first landing on  the  moon  in July 1969. 
A further nine Saturn 5  vehicles are already in preparation 
to effect two  moon  landings  a  year after 1969-73,  conducting 
progressively more  advanced  missions  of direct lunar explora-
tion. 
487 The  total cost of the Apollo Project is estimated at $25,000 
million. 
The  manned  space  flight  programmes  created an  extensive pool 
of skilled labour  which at one  time  reached a  peak of 300,000 
workers  employed  by 20,000  concerns,  as  shown in the  following 
diagram: 
Employment  on Manned  Space  Programmes 
Units 
3 
300.000 
250  .. 000 
200,000 
150.000 
1(}~  .• 000 
50.000 
0~--,...L...---~==-===--
1961  1952  1963  i%4  1965  1966  19-:;?  1~S3  1959  1~00 
1 0  First flight  of Gemini,  unmanned 
2. First flight  of Gemini,  manned 
3. First flight  of Apollo  Saturn 1B,  unmanned 
4. First flight  of Apollo Saturn 1B,  manned 
5. First flight  of Apollo Saturn v,  unmanned 
6. First flight  of Apollo Saturn v,  manned. 
488 4.4  NASA  Joint Programmes 
As  regards civil space activities,  the  second  American period 
also showed  an  increasing willingness  to  collaborate  on  inter-
national programmes  for the  peacful use  of space. 
NASA's  rules  on  such collaboration are as  follows: 
(a)  Designation,  by  each participating government,  of a 
civil agency responsible  for negotiation and  super-
vision of the  joint programme; 
(b)  Agreemen~ on  precise and specific projects rather than 
general scientific or technological collaboration; 
(c)  Acceptance  of financial responsibility by  each par-
ticipant for  the  share undertaken in the  joint 
project; 
(d)  Scientific validity of projects and  mutual interest; 
(e)  Publication of scientific results. 
On  this basis agreements  were  made  with 83  countries by  the 
end of 1967.  We  shall deal only with  cooperation between 
NASA  and the  EEC  countries and between  NASA  and the UK. 
The  international Intelsat agreement will be  treated sepa-
1  rately  • 
NASA's  collaboration with Europe  comprises: 
(a)  Making  launching vehicles available  free  of  charge  to 
orbit:  three  UK  Ariel satellites (already launched in 
1962,  1964,  1967);  three Italian San Marco  satellites 
(two already launched in 1964  and  1967);  two  French FR 
satellites (one already launched in 1965);  one  German 
satellite  (planned for 1969);  two  ESRO  satellites  (both 
launched in 1968). 
1  See Part 2. 
489 (b)  Accommodating  scientific experiments  on  its own  satellites: 
11  UK  (five already carried out);  five French  (two  already 
carried out);  one  Italian;  one  Dutch. 
(c)  Launching  of sounding rockets  (11  for  the UK,  22  for 
Germany,  11  for  France,  eight  for  Italy,  five  for  the 
Netherlands). 
(d)  Agreements  to  use  ~K,  French and  ESRO  networks  for tele-
metry and  tracking of American satellites and reciprocal 
facilities on  the  US  network. 
5.  CURRENT  PROSPECTS 
After reaching its peak of $5250  million in FY  1965,  NASA's 
budget  has  steadily dwindled as  the  Apollo  programme  neared 
completion and  doubts  arose  as  to  future  space  programmes 
and  investment priorities in the seventies. 
The  attitude  of  Congress  towards  NASA  became  critical after 
the  first fatal accident  when  three astronauts  were  burned 
to death in their Apollo  cabin at Cape  Kennedy  (27  January 
1967).  This disaster,  which  was  followed  by  the  death of 
Komarov  during re-entry over the Soviet Union  (24 April 1967), 
slowed  down  the  Apollo  programme  and  imposed stricter speci-
fications  on  the  supply of the  command  module  (North  American) 
and  the  lunar module  (Grumman),  at an  increased cost  of $100 
million. 
After that,  Congress  and  the  Johnson Administration were  led 
to look more  favourably  on  the  application of aerospace  techno-
logies in the  solution of  the earth's industrial,  economic 
and social problems  and  to support  a  wider variety of pro-
grammes  rather than a  few  extremely costly projects. 
NASA  drew up,  and  began developing in 1967,  the  Apollo  Appli-
490 cations Programme  (AAP),  aimed at fully exploiting the skills 
achieved in the  Apollo  programme  and ensuring that the  country 
profited financially by  them;  NASA  is now  arguing that the 
AAP  is also applicable in the  military field. 
Congress had already tried to  combine  into a  single programme 
the  AAP  and  MOL  projects,  for  which  NASA  and  the  DoD  had re-
quested $440  and $630 million respectively for FY  1969. 
Previously the  DoD  had succeeded in  justifying the  independence 
of the  MOL  programme. 
Unlike  NASA,  the  DoD  has never suffered any reduction of its 
space  budget,  which is still rising, if only slowly.  If the 
present trend continues there will be  an  equal distribution 
of space  budgets  between  NASA  and  the  DoD  within the next  five 
years,  for  a  total of  below $6000 million. 
On  the  analogy of  the  10-year programme  drawn  up  in the 1960-61 
crisis,  NASA  is now  trying to put  through  a  five-year plan re-
quiring a  budget  that rises  from  $4500 million in 1970 to  $5500 
million in 1975.  ~ASA 1 s request for $4370  million for  FY  1969 
was  cut to $3900 million by  Congress in 1968,  but the  final 
authorization is expected to  be  $3850  million. 
These  budget  reductions  form  part of the general cutback of 
$6000  million  on  public  expenditure  which President Johnson 
asked Congress  to approve  for  FY  1969  as  a  result of the in-
creasing cost of  the  war  in Vietnam. 
The  slashing of  space  funds  and  the doubts  cast on  post-Apollo 
activity led to  the  resignation of J.E.  Webb  as  NASA  Administra-
tor on  7  October  1968,  less than a  year after the resignation 
of R.s.  McNamara. 
NASA's  string of successes in the  Apollo  programme  caused 
Congress  to cancel the  DoD's  military MOL  programme  at the 
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AAP  programme. 
This  programme  is already well-founded and above all it 
advances  further into the  new  frontiers  of  technological 
progress,  thus offering greater prospects of economic  and 
industrial fall-out. 
The  recent  decision puts an  end  to  the  twin-rule  by  civil and 
military agencies in space affairs which  had already been e-
roded by  the  creation of  NASA  in 1958.  It should lead to use-
ful  economies  and  even  more  efficient management;  the  DoD's 
space activities will supplement  NASA's  and not  compete  with 
them,  at least in the  forthcoming seventies in the US. 
Longer-term uncertainties as to the  civil post-Apollo programmes 
are  now  diverting the attention of industry and  the  research 
centres to various post-space possibilities  (oceanography, 
urban planning,  traffic,  pollution,  hospital organization, 
etc.)  which  Europe  should soon begin studying if we  are not 
to fall badly behind in these  new  advanced technologies also. 
6.  US  SPACE  AGENCIES  ADDITIONAL  TO  NASA  AND  THE  DoD 
Apart  from  NASA  and  the  DoD  the  following  agencies participate 
in particular sectors of  space activity,  with smaller budgets: 
~~~~!~-~~~~~~-~~~~~~~!~~ (AEC):  collaborates with  NASA  on 
nuclear propulsion projects  (Rover  programme,  Nerva  exper-
imental reactor)  and nuclear power  systems  on  board,  through 
the  Space  Nuclear Propul8ion Office  (SNPO);  also develops 
its own  electrical propulsion projects in the  Space Electric 
Power  Office  (SEPO).  Total  AEC  expenditure is shown  in 
Table  2/B-8  and  space  expenditure in Table  2/B-9. 
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(NBS)  and  collaborates specifically on  space  with the Environ-
mental Science Service Administration  (ESSA),  in which  were 
merged  the  Weather  Bureau,  the  Coast  and Geodetic Survey and 
the  Central Radio Propagation Laboratory  (of NBS)  in 1965. 
This unified administration is responsible  for the  ESSA  and 
TIROS  weather satellites and  the  PAGEOS  geodetic satellites. 
~~~~~!= responsible  for  the  operation of space  communications, 
by now  all commercial,  which will be  dealt with in detail in 
Part 2  below. 
~~!~~~~!-~~~!~~=-~~~~~~~~~~ (NSF):  supports basic research 
in the universities and non-profit-making establishments; 
scientifically responsible for  American participation in 
the International Quiet Sun  Year  (IQSY);  NSF  runs  the National 
Radio  Astronomy Laboratory  (West  Virginia), Kitt Peak National 
Observatory  (Arizona)  and Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observ-
atory  (Chile);  these  observatories collaborate in space re-
search with their powerful telescopes. 
~~!!~~~~~~~-~~~~~E~l~!~~!-~~~!~!~!~~l:  founded  in 1890 at 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  and  has  a  world-wide  network of observers 
for  watching satellites,  studying meteorites and  comets  and 
observing the planets and solar activity. 
~E~~=-~~~=~~=-~~~~~: the  space  section of the National Academy 
of Sciences,  a  private research organization used as scientific 
advisor to the Federal Government.  It represents American  space 
science at the Committee  on  Space  Research  (COSPAR)  which  was 
set up  by  the  International Council of Scientific Unions  (ICSU) 
in 1958. 
It coordinates space  research contracts awarded  by  NASA  to the 
universities and directs American participation in international 
scientific space activities. 
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tioned in connection with the  1958  Space  Act;  politically 
responsible  for superintending the  entire aerospace activity; 
participates in the  preparation of budgets  and drafts the 
"President's Annual Report  to Congress  on  Aeronautics and 
Space  Activity". 
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The world space agencies 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since  1958  UN  has  taken an interest in exclusively peaceful 
uses of space in order to promote  world  space  cooperation for 
the  benefit of all mankind. 
In 1961  the  Committee  for  the Peaceful Use  of Outer Space  was 
created,  with 28  member  states including the  US,  the Soviet 
Union and the  EEC  countries.  In August  1968  the  UN  held the 
World  Space  Conference in Vienna. 
Organizations  which actively cooperate  with the  UN  are: 
- ITU  (International Telecommunications Union) 
- WMO  (World Meteorological Organization) 
- UNESCO 
- ICAO 
- I~A 
From  the  outset they  extended their traditional fields of 
activity to include  space. 
Apart  from  these  inter-governmental agencies there are  some 
private scientific bodies  that operate internationally. 
These  are: 
- COSPAR  (Committee  on  Space  Research),  set up  in 1958  by 
ICSU  (International Council  of Scientific Unions)  and used 
as scientific arbiter in space  matters  by  the  UN;  32  inter-
national scientific bodies  belong to  COSPAR; 
- IAF  (International Astronautical Federation),  set up  in 
1960  as a  grouping  of space institutions and industries; 
50  companies  from  33  countries belong to  IAF. 
Economically speaking the  major  world  space  organization is 
INTELSAT,  which  therefore merits a  detailed analysis,  con-
sidering also the vital European interests in space  communi-
cations.  In view of  COMSAT 1a  vital role within INTELSAT,  these 
two  bodies will be  dealt with together. 
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2.1  Introduction 
World interest in space  communications  was  manifested at the 
UN  as far  back as  20  December  1961,  in connection with  the 
programmes  for  the  peaceful use  of space.  Resolution No.  1721 
(XVI),  para.  D,  outlines a  system of  communications via satel-
lite "on a  world-wide  basis and without  discrimination",  to 
be  worked  out in agreement  with  ITU  (International Telecom-
munications Union). 
In the us,  the  move  for  a  world  system practically coincided 
(June  1961)  with the  launching of the  Apollo  programme  by 
President Kennedy.  On  31  August  1962,  after technical and 
legal studies lasting about  a  year,  Congress  passed the  Com-
munications Satellite Act  authorizing the  creation of a  private 
commercial  space  communications  company,  to represent America's 
share in future  ~orld systems. 
On  4 October 1962,  the  preliminary  committee started work  on 
the Statute of  COMSAT  (Communications Satellite Corporation). 
COMSAT  was  officially set up  on  1  February 1963 with a  capital 
of $200  million,  representing 10 million shares,  half of them 
subscribed by  private shareholders and  the  other half by inter-
national communications  companies  {ATT,  ITT,  RCA,  WUI). 
COMSAT  is run by  15  directors,  of  whom  three  are  nominated  by 
the President  of the United States and approved by  the Senate, 
six are  elected by  private shareholders and six by industrial 
shareholders.  It is authorized to  construct,  own,  plan and 
operate,  either alone  or in collaboration with foreign  govern-
ments,  a  commercial  system  of satellite communications,  to 
supply services to  American  and  foreign distribution agencies 
of ground  communications;  to instal its own  ground stations 
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Commission  (FCC). 
By  the  timely creation of  COMSAT,  the  US  anticipated and 
influenced the  development  of other possible enterprises; 
it should be  noted that  COMSAT  was  set up  a  year before  the 
entry into operation  of ELDO  and ESRO,  i.e., the agencies 
which,  albeit slowly and  behind time,  were  to develop  Europe's 
space  capability. 
European reactions to  the  Communication Satellite Act  and 
COMSAT  were  in the  form  of uncoordinated national planning. 
In the  second half of 1962,  the  UK,  hoping to intensify com-
munications  with the  Commonwealth,  discussed with Australia 
and  Canada  the  creation of a  satellite system to  be set up 
in four years,  but  doubts  on  investments and profitability 
deterred Australia;  the  UK  and  Canada  approached the us,  who 
had  meanwhile  started negotiations with France  and  Germany. 
In December  1962,  the  US  explained their policy and  programmes 
to the  European  Conference  of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations  (CEPT). 
Following the  creation of COMSAT,  on  22  May  1963,  nineteen 
European  countries set up  the  European  Conference  on Satellite 
Communications  (CETS),  open  to all member  countries of CEPT. 
To  counter a  strong private  commercial  corporation,  promoted 
and  supported by  the  US  Government,  Europe  set up  a  purely 
coordinative ministerial conference  without  any supranational 
powers. 
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In these  circumstances international negotiations were 
rapidly  conducted at: 
- Rome  (February 1964) 
- London  (April 1964) 
-Washington  (July 1964). 
On  20  August  1964  the  International Communication Satellites 
Consortium  (INTELSAT)  was  set up  as an  international agency 
regulated by  two  agreements,  provisionally valid until the 
end  of 1969,  when  they were  to  be  reviewed and  made  permanent 
as  from  1  January 1970: 
- the  first agreement  was  intergovernmental and defined 
the general principles of the  organization; 
- the  second agreement  was  concluded between the  agencies 
responsible  for  communications,  as  designated by  each 
participating government. 
The  second agreement  was  signed by  COHSAT  and by  the national 
agencies  of each  European  country,  not  collectively by  GETS. 
The  initial and  current contributions to the  financing  of the 
INTELSAT  system are  shown  in the  following  table  (as percent-
ages): 
June  1964  June  1968 
Number  of  member  countries  19  61 
Germany  6.1  5.4 
Belgium  1 .1  1.0 
France  6.1  5.4 
Italy  2.2  1.9 
Netherlands  1.0  0.9 
EEC  16.5  14.6 
UK  8.4  7.4 
Europe  30.5  27.0 
us  61.0  53.5 
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traffic;  the European share is about half that of  the  US. 
Between 1964  and  1968,  as  the  world  membership  rose  from  19 
to 611,  the  contributions listed were  reduced  by  about  12%. 
Membership  of INTELSAT  is open  to all 122  member  states of 
ITU;  each new  member  lowers  the  contribution rates of existing 
members,  but  an absolute  majority  (at least 50.5%)  is guaranteed 
to  COMSAT2• 
It is interesting to note  that the  INTELSAT  agreement  was 
signed on  20  August  1964,  i.e.,  the  day after the  launching 
of Syncom  3,  built by Hughes  and  destined to prove,  once  and 
for all,  the  superiority of geostationary and  synchronous 
satellites;  without  these satellites there  could have  been  no 
development  of regional systems,  thoug~ these are  not  mentioned 
in the  INTELSAT  agreement. 
This  agreement  reserves  to  COMSAT  the  running of the satellite 
system. 
INTELSAT  is directed by  the  Interim Communications Satellite 
Committee  (ICSC),  comprising 18  representatives  from  countries 
whose  contributions exceed 1.5%:  it has  a  Secretary and  three 
subcommittees  (Financial,  Technical and  Contracts). 
The  EEC  is represented on  the  ICSC  by  Germany,  France  and 
Italy. 
ICSC  decisions are  normally  by  simple  majority;  more  important 
questions require a  majority of 12.5%  above  the  share  of votes 
possessed by  the  major  contributor nation (i.e., 73.5%  when 
1  European  membership  rose  from  15  to 19  in this period. 
2  This  guarantee  was  obtained  by  COMSAT  in 1964. 
501 the  US  share  was  61%;  63%  when  the  US  share  falls to 50.5%). 
In practice this clause entails a  necessity for clear agree-
ment  among  the  Europeans. 
Article 10  of the  second INTELSAT  Agreement  suggests that 
the  Committee  should share  out  contracts between  member 
countries in proportion to their contribution if possible. 
Article  9  of the  first Agreement  provides  for a  general review 
before  1  January 1970: 
- to improve  the  agreements in the light of experience; 
- to  enable all states who  have  in the  meantime  acquired 
experience  of  space  to participate in INTELSAT  contracts; 
- to achieve  a  truly international operating company; 
- to revise  the  contribution rates of member  states. 
The  financial situation of  INTELSAT  at the  end of 1968 may 
be  summarized as  follows:  total contribution paid by  member 
states in the  period 1964-68  amounted  to  $128  million,  in-
cluding $68  million by  the  US  and  $35  million by Europe 
(EEC  $19  million). 
In  1968 the  revenue  from  INTELSAT  operations  began  to  exceed 
expenditure. 
2.3  INTELSAT  Activities 
The  INTELSAT  satellites are all synchronous  (geostationary or 
on  a  24-hour orbit)  and  they  operate in the 5.9 - 6.4 Gc/s 
band to  the  satellite and  the 3.7 - 4.2 Gc/s  band earthwards. 
!~!~~~~!_!= This initial system  consists of a  single Early Bird 
satellite fixed at 36,000  km  above  the Atlantic. 
Developed by Hughes,  on  the  model  of Syncoms,  it weighs  42  kg 
and provides  up  to  240  telephone  channels or one  TV  programme. 
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service  on  28  June  1965. 
The  incomplete utilization of the  128-channel TAT  4 trans-
atlantic cable  between  the  US  and France initially prevented 
saturation of the satellite telephone  service.  The  high tele-
vision charges also restricted the  use  of the  TV  service via 
satellite  (some  30  hours in the  second half of 1965 and about 
80  hours  in 1966). 
From  mid-1965  to  the  beginning of 1967,  the  INTELSAT  charge 
for annual lease  of a  two-way  telephone  circuit via satellite 
fell from  $64,000  to $46,000. 
!~~~~~~!-~: This  system consists of three satellites  (two  fixed 
over  the Pacific and  one  over the Atlantic). 
Developed  by Hughes,  they  weigh  95  kg;  they still provide  240 
telephone  channels,  but  with multiple access,  or else  one  TV 
programme. 
They  were  launched between January  and September 1967,  after 
a  launching failure in October 1966. 
In 1967,  the  four  INTELSAT  satellites  (two  over the  Atlantic 
and  two  over the Pacific)  totalled about  200  hours  of TV 
transmission,  and this rose  to about  700  hours  in 1968  owing 
to intensive use  by  NASA  for  the  Apollo  programme;  NASA  in 
fact  used about  60%  of the  INTELSAT  2  capacity,  almost  covering 
its cost. 
The  INTELSAT  2  programme,  which  got  under  way  at the  end  of 
1965,  cost a  total of $27  million,  divided up  as  follows: 
$12  million  for  the  four satellites 
$10.5 million  for launch vehicles and  launchings 
$4.5 million  for transportable antennas  on  the  ground. 
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the  Mexico  City Olympic  Games  across the Pacific and  the 
Atlantic. 
!~~~~~~!-~:  Aimed  at achieving  the  first "global system". 
In Nay  1966  a  contract for  $32  million was  awarded  to  TRW 
for  the  construction of six satellites to  be  placed over the 
Atlantic,  Pacific and  Indian Oceans  so as  to achieve  world-
wide  cover. 
The  eate~lites weigh  150 kg  and  can provide  1200 multiple-
access  telephone  channels or  four  TV  programmes  simultaneously; 
the average life of the satellites will be  five  years. 
For the first time  ever,  the  contract prescribed that at least 
50%  of the  work  on  the  last two  of  the six satellites should 
be  sub-contracted to European  companies. 
After a  launching failure  in September  1968  (damage  costing 
about  $12  million),  the first  two  INTELSAT  3  satellites were 
launched:  one  in December  1968  over  the  Atlantic  (to supplement 
INTELSAT  1  and 2)  and  one  in February  1969  over the Pacific 
(to supplement  the  two  INTELSAT  2's).  The  system will be  fully 
operational  by  the  end  of  1969;  it is estimated that,  together 
with the earlier systems,  it will total about  1300  hours of TV 
transmission  during 1969.  The  charge  for annual lease  of a 
telephone  circuit might  be  reduced to $40,000. 
!~~~~~~!-~:  Already in 1967,  so as  to be  able  to  meet  com-
munications  requirements after 1970  with a  technically more 
advanced and  capacious global system,  Hughes  and Lockheed 
began  competitive studies on  the  INTELSAT  4 system using 
satellites providing 5,000  to 10,000 channels.  In addition, 
TRW  started work  on  an intermediate  system,  INTELSAT  3~, 
using simpler satellites with 3,500  channels.  These  three 
great  American  corporations vied with each other in sub-letting 
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for  a  fair return on  their INTELSAT  investments and also to 
maximize  their international content  for  the  benefit of  the 
ICSC  (one  rule of INTELSAT  is that,  other things being equal, 
preference will be  given to  the  most  international tender). 
- For  INTELSAT  3%,  TRW  collaborated with European 
industries already working  on  the  INTELSAT  3  pro-
gramme:  LCT  Matra,  SAT  (French);  Erno  and Lorenz 
(German);  HSD  (British);  Bell  (Belgian);  Contraves 
(Swiss). 
-For INTELSAT  4,  Hughes  collaborated with  CFTH  (French); 
Telefunken  (German);  BAG  (British);  Selenia  (Italy). 
- For  INTELSAT  4,  Lockheed  collaborated with  LCT  and 
SAT  (French);  Teldix  (German);  Ferranti,  IMI,  HSD, 
Elliot  (British);  Bell and  MBLE  (Belgian);  Selenia 
(Italian);  Contraves  (Swiss). 
In May  1968,  the  choice  fell on  the  INTELSAT  4  system proposed 
by  Hughes,  which  should be  operating  by  1971. 
The  contract is for  $72  million for  four satellites weighing 
500  kg,  providing 6000  telephone  channels  or else  12 simulta-
neous  TV  programmes;  the  average life of the  satellites will 
be  seven years. 
Whereas  the  INTELSAT  1,  2  and  3  satellites,  with their less 
powerful  transmitters,  required ground antennas measuring 
25-30  metres across and  costing currently about  $4 million, 
the  INTELSAT  4 satellites,  thanks  to their 3000  W transmitters, 
only need antennas  measuring  9-12  m across  and  costiug about 
$1  million. 
As  satellites are  perfected,  ground  costs fall and use  of space 
communications  increases,  it is estimated that the  annual 
505 lease of a  telephone  circuit might  drop  to 10 1000  dollars in 
1975  as against 64,000 dollars ten years previously. 
Ground stations 
At  the  end  of 1968  there  were  22  ground stations operating 
in the  INTELSAT  system,  comprising ei8ht  on  the Pacific side 
and  14  on  the  Atlantic side.  The  latter include Goonhilly 
Downs  in the  UK,  Pleumeur-Bodou in France,  Raiating in Germany 
and Fucino  in Italy. 
A total of  41  stations are  envisaged by  the  end of 1969,  and 
66  by  the  end of 1971,  for  an  investment  of about  $100  million 
yearly.  The  potential market is still big,  and should also 
interest the  European electronics industry. 
2.4 Current Situation and Prospects 
CONSAT  was  set up  in 1963  with a  capital of $200  million,  in 
the  expectation that this would  be  the  probable  investment  cost 
of the  global system. 
After  joining INTELSAT,  with an initial contribution of 61%, 
COMSAT  gained a  surplus of about  $80  million representing the 
contribution of  the  other member  states of INTELSAT. 
Furthermore,  in 1964 it was  thought  that the  global system 
would  require  a  large  number  of random  orbiting satellites 
instead of a  few  relatively cheaper synchronous satellites. 
As  a  result  COHSAT  found itself with an  uninvested capital 
of $132  million at the  end  of 1968. 
This  large amount  of available capital led  COJviSAT  to  expand 
its activities towards  other applications and  towards  the 
creation of its own  space  R&D  laboratories. 
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(a)  As  a  private  corporation  competing  with  American  com-
munications  companies,  and  on  the  way  to  becoming  an 
R&D  centre,  with its own  laboratories,  in competition 
with those  of  American  industry; 
(b)  As  America's representative in INTELSAT,  backed by  the 
State Department,  staunchly upholding  the principle of 
sharing by  volume  of traffic and  having  no  truck with 
political sharing  (one  country,  one  vote);  opposed 
therefore  to  the  non-discriminatory system  open  to 
the  world as desired by  UN,  and also by  the  1962  Space 
Communication  Act; 
(c)  As  manager  of  INTELSAT,  with predominant  power  of decision 
in the  ICSC  and  with the  right of absolute veto,  but a 
staunch supporter of  free  competition  for  INTELSAT  con-
tracts. 
COMSAT  was  set up  before  Syncom  3  had  finally demonstrated 
the  superiority of synchronous satellites and therefore,  as 
has  been said,  before  any  moves  could  be  made  to develop 
regional systems  (each region with its own  satellite). 
Having ascertained the  existence  of this possibility,  and 
wanting  to maintain its monopoly  of space  communications not 
only internationally but also inside the us,  COMSAT  prop~sed 
at the  end  of 1967  to instal the  internal system which  was 
becoming  indispensable in the  US;  the  estimated cost  was  $57 
million. 
This move  by  COMSAT  raised much  doubt  and  concern in the 
United States. 
Were  it to  be  put  into effect, it is obvious  that: 
- other regions,  first and  foremost  Europe,  might  claim the 
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COMSAT  could no  longer represent  the  US  in INTELSAT, 
nor  could it manage  INTELSAT; 
- COHSAT's  two  roles,  national and  international,  would 
have  to  be  clearly separated,  but  this would  enable 
COHSAT  to trigger off the proliferation of regional 
systems  to  the  detriment  of INTELSAT,  a  result that  would 
be  more  displeasing to the State Department  than to US 
industry,  which  views  the regional systems as a  potential 
market. 
COMSAT 1s  move  was  given a  very hostile reception by  the  great 
communications  companies,  ITT  and  ATT,  which  were  concerned 
over their shares of the  home  market;  COMSAT  tried to propose 
a  merger  with  ITT,  RCA  and  WUI  so  as  to split all internal 
and intercontinental communications 50-50  with  ATT.  Further-
more,  ATT  is concerned,  as are  the  military for reasons of 
security,  in the  laying of the  new  TAT5  transatlantic cable 
between  America  and Portugal  (as  a  link with the Mediter-
ranean);  it provides  750  channels at an  estimated cost of 
$90  million,  though  a  satellite with twice  the  capacity would 
now  cost about  $15  million.  COMSAT's  proposal for  a  regional 
system in the  US  is not strictly a  violation of the  INTELSAT 
agreements  (nor are  the similar European  moves),  but  the 
effect will be  to  weaken  and  perhaps  jeopardise the  powers 
of INTELSAT. 
A more  open violation of the  clause  whereby  INTELSAT  must 
"contribute  to world  understanding and  peace" is the  military 
use,  by  the  DoD,  of  45  channels  of the  two  INTELSAT  2  satel-
lites over  the Pacific,  even  though  for strategic and classi-
fied services  the  DoD  prefers to  use  the satellites of its 
Initial Defence  Communication Satellite Program  (IDCSP). 
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loyally with the  INTELSAT  agreements is therefore not  backed 
by  exemplary loyalty on  the  American·side. 
To  conclude,  the  INTELSAT  agreements  should be  thoroughly 
overhauled as  they were  negotiated at a  time  when  there  was 
complete  disparity of space  knowhow  between  the US  and Europe. 
The  technical and political troubles of ELDO,  the  purely 
scientific approach  of ESRO  and above all the  failure  to 
start work  on  the  CETS  programmes  unfortunately weaken 
Europe's position in re-negotiating the  INTELSAT  agreements. 
I 
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The European space agencies 1.  INTRODUCTION1 
Europe at present possesses  three distinct civil space 
agencies: 
- ELDO  (European Launcher  Development  Organization)  for 
the  development  of  space  launchers; 
- ESRO  (European  Space  Research Organization)  for  the 
development  of scientific satellites and  space  tech-
nology; 
- CETS  (European  Conference  on Satellite Communications). 
19  European  countries  belong to CETS;  10  of these  belong to 
ESRO  and six of  them  belong to ELDO,  together with Australia 
(see  table  below). 
The  three separate agencies  were  functioning  in 1964;  the 
need to coordinate their activities became  clearly urgent 
in 1966  when  the  European Space  Conference  (ESC)  was  set up, 
comprising the Ministers of Research  from all the  countries 
belonging to ELDO,  ESRO  or  CETS. 
The  three European Space  Conferences  have  taken place at: 
- Paris  (December  1966) 
- Rome  (July 1967) 
-Bad Godesberg  (November  1968). 
The  decisions  of these  conferences will be  discussed  when 
dealing with European  space agencies. 
The  fourth  ESC  is planned to  take  place in Brussels in January 
1970  and will be  particularly important  for  the  unification 
1  The  activities of EEC  countries and  the  UK  within the 
European space  agencies are  described in detail in the 
respective national reports  (which see). 
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C E T S  E S R 0  E L  0  0 
Austria  X 
Belgium  X  X  X 
Denmark  X  X 
France  X  X  X 
Germany  X  X  X 
Greece  X 
Ireland  X 
Italy  X  X  X 
Liechtenstein  X 
Monaco  X 
Norway  X 
Netherlands  X  X  X 
Portugal  X 
Spain  X  X 
Sweden  X  X 
Switzerland  X  X 
Turkey  X 
UK  X  X  X 
Vatican  X 
514 of  the European  space agencies and  for  the  final coordination 
of their long-term  programmes. 
At  the  industrial and banking level,  the  EUROSPACE  group  was 
formed  in September  1961;  this is a  non-profit making  body 
which  promotes  space  research and studies,  with special at-
tention to the  economic  and industrial implications,  and 
which has  organized three  joint conferences  between  Europe 
and  the  US,  held at: 
- Rome  (June  1964) 
- Philadelphia  (April/Hay 1965) 
-Munich  (June  1968). 
At  present 150  companies  from  nine  European countries belong 
to EUROSPACE;  American  companies  figure  as  corresponding mem-
bers.  EUROSPACE  has  for  years argued  the  need  for  a  European 
mixed-economy  company  (EUROSAT),  acting as the operative 
agency  for  space  programmes  under  the  control of member·  gov-
ernments;  EUROSAT  was  in process  of being  formed at the  be-
ginning of 1969. 
EUROSPACE  is now  pursuing technical and  economic  studies on 
European meteorological satellites on  behalf of the EEC.  At 
the political level,  the  coordination and  aims  of European 
space activities have  been systematically discussed and 
furthered: 
- by  the  Council  of Europe,  through its Science and Techno-
logy  Committee,  since 1961; 
- by  the  Western European Union,  which in 1962  created a 
special committee  on  space affairs,  now  formally  con-
stituted as  the  Committee  on Scientific,  Technological 
and  Aerospace  Questions. 
515 2.  ELDO  (European Launcher  Development  Organization) 
2.1  Aims  and Constitution 
ELD0 1s  basic purpose is to  provide  Europe  with her  own  space 
launcher  equipment  for  peaceful uses.  This  independence  does 
not  mean  competing  with the  US  and  the  Soviet Union  but  only 
the possibility of developing  fully independent European pro-
grammes  for space  research and applications. 
In April 1960,  the  UK  cancelled her Blue  Streak liquid-fuel 
strategic missile  programme  and in September offered it to 
Europe  as  the  first stage  of a  non-military satellite launcher. 
After political soundings  by  the  UK  and industrial soundings 
led by Hawker  Siddeley  (UK)  and SEREB  (France),  the  groundwork 
for  ELDO  was  laid at the  Strasbourg Conference  (30  January 
to 2  February 1961,  held under  the auspices  of the  Council  of 
Europe)  and  the Lancaster House  Conference  (30  October  to 3 
November  1961). 
The  Strasbourg Conference  established the  following principles: 
(a)  ELDO's  first project was  to  be  the  development  of a 
three-stage launcher with appropriate  experimental 
satellites (first stage British,· second stage French, 
with test firing at the Woomera  range  in Australia); 
the possibility of further projects was  envisaged; 
(b)  ELDO  would  have  purely peaceful aims  and  would  further 
the  progress of advanced technologies in member  coun-
tries; all technical information relating to  ELDO 
operations would  be  made  freely available to all 
member  governments; 
(c)  The  British and French governments  would  freely  give 
to  ELDO  the results of previous  work; 
516 (d)  There  would  be  close  collaboration with ESRO,  which 
was  also in a  preliminary phase; 
(e)  The  estimated cost  of  developing the  launcher  was 
$196  million spread over  five  years; 
(f)  Contribution rates of member  countries  would  be 
based  on  their respective Gross  National Products 
(except  that  the  UK  agreed to  pay  above  this rate: 
33.33%  instead of 25%). 
This British concession  (Point  f  above)  was  decisive  in getting 
ELDO  started. 
The  Lancaster House  Conference  reviewed and amplified the prin-
ciples laid down  at Strasbourg: 
(a)  The  distribution of projects  (Point a  above)  was  completed 
by  assigning the  third stage to Germany,  the satellites 
and  heat shields to Italy,  the  ground  control stations to 
Belgium,  the  long-range  telemetry systems  to the Netherlands. 
(b)  Free  circulation of technical information  (Point  b  above) 
was  restricted to the  needs  of member  countries in the 
sector of  space  technology only; 
(c)  The  first doubts  were  expressed about  the  adequacy  of the 
financial  ceiling (Pointe above); 
(d)  Budget  approval procedures were  established,  the requisite 
majority being two-thirds  of member  countries,  provided 
they represented at least 85%  of ELD0 1s  contributions. 
In  these  two  conferences,  work  was  shared between  member 
countries  on  a  purely political basis;  each  country then 
normally awards  contracts to its own  industries  on  the 
basis  of general  competence,  without  any  specific  call for 
bids. 
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contradicts the  principle  of general technological progress. 
At  Lancaster House,  the politicians failed to assert their 
rights as sole and public  financers  of the  enterprise,  whereas 
they  could have  appealed  to  the strict American practice;  as 
a  result the  rigid rules  of European industry regarding patents 
eventually prevailed. 
The  Lancaster House  Conference  drafted the  Agreement,  which 
was  later signed  by  five  EEC  countries,  the  UK  and Australia 
by 30  April 1962.  It also set up  the Preparatory Group  with 
interim powers  pending  government  ra~ification of the  Agree-
ment,  which  was  not  completed until 29  February 1964. 
Being  ~thout juridical status,  the  Preparatory Group  had  to 
make  unanimous  decisions  and rely on  the  cooperative attitude 
of member  countries. 
As  Austria,  Denmark,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden  and Switzerland 
did not  sign the  Agreement  (after having attended the  two 
conferences), it was  necessary  to  amend  the  contributions 
of the  member  countries;  Germany,  France  and  the  UK  agreed 
to  share  the  uncovered  11.~b.  Contributions  were  then shared 
as  follows: 
Belgium  2.85% 
France  23.93%  (instead of 20.57%) 
Germany  22.01%  (instead of 18.92%) 
Italy  9.78% 
Netherlands  2.64% 
UK  38.79%  (instead of 33.33%) 
Australia  use  of the  Woomera  range 
Compared  to a  proportionate sharing  on  the  basis of GNP,  the 
UK  pays  34%  more;  France  and  Germany  11%  less;  Belgium,  Italy 
and  the  Netherlands  23%  less. 
518 This division remained  unchanged  for  the  three-year period 
1964-66;  it was  modified in 1966  and again in 1969. 
2.2 Organization and  Budget 
From  the start the  organization of ELDO  has  been as  follows: 
Financial 
Committee  Council 
Director 
The  Council is the legislative and political organ.  It meets 
at least twice  a  year.  Each  member  country has  two  represent-
atives on it. The  President  (General  Aubiniere in 1968)  is 
elected by  the  Council,  and  cannot  be  re-elected for  more 
than  two  consecutive  terms* 
Since 1965,  the President has  reported on  ELD0 1s  activity an-
nually to the  Council of Europe. 
The  Secretary General has  executive  functions  and is the 
highest  permanent  official of ELDO  (Mr  R.  di  Carobbio  since 
1964);  he  has  a  private secretariat,  which r.as steadily in-
creased;  the Public  Information Service in now  flanked  by  a 
Legal and Foreign Affairs Service and  a  Financial Comptroller 
Service. 
The  administrative and technical directors act as Deputy 
Secretary General;  their departments  have  progressively been 
developed to  cope  with ELDO•s  growing activities. 
519 The  Secretariat staff numbered 53  in 1962,  130  in 1964  and 
320  in 1968. 
Headquarters  of the Secretariat:  Neuilly-sur-Seine,  Paris. 
After the  initial period,  ELDO's  budget  has  remained almost 
stationary,  as  shown  in the  following  table  (in millions of 
dollars): 
1961-64  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
125  85  83  85  95  81 
During  1961-64 the  funds  were  divided up  roughly as  follows: 
$21  million in 1961-62,  $36  million in 1963,  $68  million in 
1964.  A ceiling of $626  million was  established in 1966  and 
re-confirmed in 1968;  this would leave  $72  million available 
for  the  final  two  years  (1970-71). 
2.3 Activity of ELDO 
2.3.1  In 1964  and 1965 
ELDO's  official life,  under  the  eight-year Convention,  began 
at the  end of February 1964  and should  continue until the 
end  of  1971. 
When  official activity began,  it became  clear that the plans 
made  in 1961  were  unrealistic.  These  had  envisaged a  total of 
ten launchings  in four  years at a  total cost  of $196  million, 
as  follows: 
- 1962-63:  four  launchings  (F1,  F2,  F3,  F4)  of first stage 
alone; 
- 1964:  three launchings  (F5,  F6,  F7)  with live first stage 
and inert upper stages; 
- 1965:  three orbital launchings  (F8,  F9,  F10)  with  complete 
vehicle. 
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plan was  prepared in 1964  for  11  launchings in seven years1, 
at a  cost of $400 million,  as  follows: 
I 
- 1964-65:  three  launchings  (F1,  F2,  F3)  of  the  first stage 
alone; 
- 1966-67:  four  launchings  (F4,  F5,  F6/1,  F6/2),  comprising 
two  with  both upper  stages inert,  one  with only 
the  third stage inert,  and  one  with  three live 
stages; 
- 1968-70:  four  orbital launchings  (F7,  F8,  F9,  F10)  of the 
complete  vehicle  to put satellites of increasing 
complexity and  weight  (up  to 1000 kg)  into a  low 
orbit  (500  km). 
This  slow-down in the  programme  led certain countries to 
speed  up  their own  development  of more  advanced  launchers, 
capable  of meeting  European  requirements  in communications. 
1964  saw  the  first successful US  experiments  with geostation-
ary satellites  (apogee  36,000  km),  but  ELDO  took another  two 
and  a  half years  (mid-1964  to  end  of 1966)  before  getting 
started in this vital field. 
Meanwhile  research continued  on  advanced  techniques  (liquid 
oxygen/liquid hydrogen  propulsion,  inertial guidance,  apogee 
motors,  utilization of an  equatorial launching range). 
Economic  and  legal studies also proceeded  concerning the 
supply  of launchers  to possible  users  (member  countries,  other 
countries,  European organizations  such as  ESRO  and  CETS). 
In 1964-65,  the  three  launchings  of  the  first stage alone 
took place  successfully at Woomera:F1  (June  1964),  F2  (October 
1964)  and F3  (March  1965).  This  concluded  the  first phase  of 
operations,  confirming  the reliability of Blue Streak. 
1  The  1964 plan provided  for  a  maximum  of  two  launchings  a  year. 
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The  Convention ratified at the start of 1964  had specified 
that the  progress of  work  should  be  reviewed after the  first 
two  years of activjty. 
The  beginning of 1966  coincided with  a  period of serious 
crisis for  ELDO,  which  was  temporarily resolved in 1967,  but 
returned  even  more  severely in 1968,  despite high-level inter-
vention at three  European  Space  Conferences  (1966,  1967  and 
1968)  which  met  to  coordinate  the  entire field of European 
space activities. 
Since  1965,  France  had  pressed  for  the  development  of advanced 
launchers  capable  of putting application satellites into  geo-
stationary orbit,  whereas  the  UK,  at the  beginning of 1966, 
sent  a  memorandum  to  the  other members  of  ELDO  expressing  con-
cern at the  increasing costs,  the  delays  experienced and  the 
impossibility of producing European  launchers at a  cost  to 
compete  with  the  Americans. 
The  first  two  points,  though valid industrially,  took  no  ac-
count  of the  lack of European  experience  in space;  the  third 
overlooked  the  fact  that without  independent  launchers  one 
must  follow  the  space  policy dictated by  those  who  supply  the 
vehicles. 
In 1966  there  was  the  first Ministerial Conference  of ELDO 
member  countries,  held in  four  sessions  (April,  June,  July, 
December). 
The  following  basic resolutions regarding ELDO's  future  were 
approved: 
1.  Continuation of  the  Initial Programme  (Europn  1)  with 
certain improvements:  starting of  a  Supplementary Programme 
(Europa  2)  for  development  of a  launcher derived  from 
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(PAS),  capable  of putting  communications  satellites weighing 
150  kg  into geostationary orbit.  ELDO's  expenditure up  to 
the  end  of 1966  (about  $295  million)  was  to be  supplemented 
by  about  $331  million for  the  development  of these  programmes 
up  to  the  end  of 1971;  a  limit of $626  million was  thus set 
for all ELDO's  activities until completion of the Initial 
and Supplementary  programmes  (1971). 
2.  Contributions  to ELDO  were  modified as  from  1  January 1967, 
as follows: 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
UK 
from  2.85% 
from  23.93% 
from  22.01% 
from  9.78% 
from  2.64% 
from  38.79% 
to  4.5% 
to 25.0% 
to 27.0% 
to 12.0% 
to  4.5% 
to 27.($ 
Member  countries  were  also guaranteed work  worth: 
- at least 80%  of contributions  on  the  programmes  overall; 
- at least 50%  on  the  supplementary programme  alone. 
3•  The  budget voting rules  were  modified:  a  majority of  two 
thirds of member  countries was  still required,  but their 
contributions only had to total 66.66%  (instead of 85%), 
so as  to avoid  the possibility of veto  by  a  single  country. 
4.  To  improve  programme  management  the Secretary General's 
powers  were  extended and it was  recommended  that an inter-
national industrial group  be  set up  to give  technical sup-
port to the Secretary General and  ensure  the  coordination 
and integration of activities relating to the Supplementary 
Programme. 
523 The  Supplementary  Programme  provided for  three  launchings 
(F11,  F12,  F13)  into geostationary orbit,  to  be  completed 
by  the  end  of  1971;  the  work  was  distributed as  follows: 
Great Britain 
Inertial guidance.  Modifications  and  improvements  to  Blue 
Streak.  Construction  of  the first stage  for orbital launching. 
(Propulsion  of  experimental satellite in orbit). 
France 
Construction of  equatorial launching range  at Kourou  in 
French Guiana.  Perigee stage. 
Construction of second stage  for  orbital launchings.  (Four 
suborbital launchings  with French vehicles.) 
Germany 
Construction and  improvement  of third stage  for orbital 
launchings.  (Instrument  capsule  for  suborbital launchings.) 
Italy 
Heat shields for  orbital launchings.  (Apogee  motor.) 
(Experimental satellites.) 
Belgium 
Auxiliary ground  equipment.  (Ground installations for 
launchings  into geostationary orbit.) 
Netherlands 
Telemetry  equipment.  (Checking attitude of experimental 
satellites.) 
Projects given in parenthesis are  those  which  were  to  be 
cancelled  by  the austerity plan of 1968,  which  banned  further 
increases in expenditure  over the  ceiling established in 1966. 
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Conference  of Ministers also  recommended  (at its June  and 
July sessions)  that a  European Space  Conference  be  called, 
open to all member  countries of ELDO,  ESRO  or CETS,  in order 
to  coordinate  and plan all European space activity. 
The  first European Space  Conference  took place in Paris in 
December  1966;  it arranged to meet  again in 1967  and estab-
lished a  Working  Party under  Mr  Bignier  (Franoe)  to  draw  up 
a  list of cooperative space  programmes,  national space pro-
grammes  and  European resources  and  requirements in the  field 
of  space activities. 
In  1966,  the  three  firings  of the  complete  vehicle,  with  only 
the first stage  live,  were  successfully accomplished at Woomera: 
F4  (May  1966),  F5  (November  1966). 
The  last launching successfully tested the  separation between 
first and  second stages. 
The  halfway point in the  second operational phase  of the 
Europa  1  launcher  was  thus  reached without  mishap. 
The  Bignier report  formed  the basis of discussion at the 
second European Space  Conference  in Rome  (July 1967). 
The  Conference  set itself up  as  a  permanent  coordinating 
agency,  to  meet  annually. 
The  need  to  coordinate  the activities of ELDO,  ESRO  and  CETS 
and to avoid wasteful duplication of space  enterprises  (and 
also of national programmes)  led to  the  creation of a  Consult-
ative  Committee  on  Programmes,  chaired by  Mr  Causae  and 
charged with the  preparation of  a  coordinated long-term 
European Space  programme.  The  Causae  Report,  published in 
December  1967,  recommended: 
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annually in the  decade  1968-77; 
(b) 
(c) 
a  constant annual  budget  of $90  million for  ELDO,  with the 
developmer.t  of a  Europa  3  launcher  throughout  the  decade 
and  a  start on  a  Europa  4  launcher by  about  1972  (after 
completion of the  Europa  2  supplementary  programme); 
all the  extra investment  should  be  devoted to scientific 
satellites in the  first  five  years,  up  to  a  ceiling of 
about  $60  million,  as part of ESR0 1s  activities; 
(d)  all the  extra investment  should  be  devoted to application 
satellites in the  second  five  years,  up  to a  ceiling of 
about  $40 million,  as part of  the activities of  GETS; 
(e)  in the  applications  programme,  top priority should  be 
given to  communications satellites;  the  Europa  3  launcher 
should put  a  payload of 500  kg  into geostationary orbit 
and  meet  the  needs  of semi-direct  TV  broadcasting;  the 
Europa  4,  to be  operative  by about  1980,  would  have  to 
lift 2000  kg  into position and  permit  direct telecast 
tests; 
(f)  lastly, all European  space  agencies  should be  unified 
under  the  aegis of  the  European Space  Conference. 
The  report  on  ELD0 1s  activities in 1967,  which  came  out in 
June  1968,  confirmed  the  rules of  financial return estab-
lished in 1966  and  gave  the  following  estimate of the 
situation at the  end  of 1971  (in millions of dollars): 
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r1)  IF  15.62  109.68  107.61  47.82  15.03  155.03  450.79 
Contrib.  (2)  SP  6.46  35.89  38.77  17.23  6.46  38.77  143.58 
(3)  Total  22.08  145.57  146.38  65.05  21.49  193.80  594.37 
f(4)  IP  15.50  67.26  150.68  34.31  8.02  144.70  375.47 
Contracts  (5)  SP  3.53  44.95  24.52  15.80  7.78  26.61  122.74 
(6)  Total  19.03  112.21  130.20  50.11  15.80  170.86  498.21 
Ratio  (6)/(3) 
(8096  rule)  o.86  0.77  o.89  0.77  0.74  0.88  0.84 
Ratio  (5)/(2) 
(50%  rule)  0.55  1.25  0.63  0.92  1.20  o.67  0.85 
IP = Initial Programme 
SP  = Supplementary Programme 
The  report  envisaged  the  placing of further  contracts  for 
$7.57  million in France,  Italy and  the  Netherlands  to  reach 
the  overall return of 80%  established in  1~66. 
At  the  end  of  1~67 it was  thus  estimated that contracts  for 
a  total of  $498.21  +  7.57  =  505.78  million  would  be  awarded 
in the  member  countries;  the  remainder  (about  19.2%  of  the 
$626  million ceiling)  went  partly for  operating expenses 
during eight years  of activity,  and  were  partly put aside 
for  contingencies. 
In  1967,  France  and  Germany  initiated their  joint project 
Symphonie,  for  which  they will require  two  Europa  2  (ELDO/PAS) 
launchers  for  use  in 1971-72,  thus  becoming  ELD0 1s  first 
customers. 
The  need  to use  a  European  launcher will further strengthen 
French and German  support  for  ELDO's  programmes. 
While  work  was  being started on  the  supplementary programme, 
the  two  final launchings  in the  second  operational phase  of 
Europa  1  took  place. 
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stages  were  live and  the  third inert;  the  first stage  functioned 
and separated properly but  the  second stage  failed to ignite. 
The  launching  of F6/2  (December  1967)  was  a  repetition of  the 
first;  again the  second stage  failed  to  ignite,  owing  to a 
failure  in its sequencers. 
2.3.4  In  1968 
1  January 1968  saw  the  inauguration of SETIS  (Societe  d'etudes 
et d'integration de  systemes  spatiaux),  set up  as  recommended 
by  the  first European  Space  Conference  (1966)  to  give  technical 
support  to  the  Secretary of ELDO  in the  coordination,  super-
vision and integration of  the  supplementary ELDO/PAS  programme. 
The  initial capital of $0.5  million  was  shared among  11  com-
panies  or consortia of the  six member  countries as  follows: 
Belgium  6%  (2%  MBLE,  2%  ACEC,  2%  Bell) 
France  29%  (SEREB) 
Germany  24%  (12%  ERNO,  12%  Bolkow) 
Italy  1%  (CIA) 
Netherlands  ~  (3.2% Philips,  0.8%  Fokker) 
UK  24%  (12%  HSD,  12%  Rolls-Royce) 
The  President and Secretary of SETIS  are  those  of SEREB, 
which is the  major  shareholder. 
In mid-1968,  the staff numbered  85,  including 50 highly skilled 
technicians  and  engineers. 
In January  1968,  the  ELDO  Council  and  the  Technical Committee 
unanimously  approved  the  Causse  Report;  in the Finance  Committee 
the  UK  made  some  reservations. 
On  April 1968,  the  UK  sent  to all members  of  the  ESC  a  message 
expressing  disagreement  with  the  proposals  contained in the 
528 Causae  Report: 
(a)  further extension of ELDO's  activities after the Europa  2 
launcher (i.e., after 1971)  was  not accepted,  being  con-
sidered uneconomical; 
(b)  participation in the  CETS  programme  for  experimental TV 
satellites was  refused on  the  grounds  that they would not 
be  profitable  enough; 
(c)  extension of ESR0 1s  scientific activity was  accepted,  with 
an annual budget  increase  of  6%  in the  three  years  1969-71. 
At  the  same  time  ELDO  was  faced  with  increased budget require-
ments  of about  $100 million to  complete  the initial programme 
(Europa  1)  and  supplementary programme  (Europa  2)  by  the  end 
of 1971. 
The  ELDO  Conference  of Ministers  met  in three sessions  (11-12 
July,  1-2 October,  11  November. 
Having  acknowledged  the  need  to sacrifice  programmes  in order 
to keep  within the  ceiling of $626  million approved in 1966, 
thus retaining the  full collaboration of all member  states, 
the  Conference  entrusted the  Chairman,  Mr  T.  Lefevre  (Belgian 
Minister of Scientific Policy and Planning),  with  the  task 
of restoring agreement  between  the  first and  second sessions. 
In the  second session a  group  of senior officials,  led by 
Dr  J.  Spaey  (Belgium),  was  appointed  to  draw  up  in broad 
outline a  10-year European  space  programme  in time  for  the 
third session.  At  the  third session,  after note  had  been 
taken that the  UK  undertook to  supply  the  Blue Streak stage 
to  ELDO  or its members  until 1976,  for scientific and appli-
cation projects, it was  resolved that  the  existing programme 
would  be  solidly pursued within  the  limit of  $626  million 
and  would  terminate  with  the  three  launchings  of Europa  1 
529 from  Woomera  (F7,  F8,  F9)  and  the  two  launchings  of Europa  2 
without  the  apogee  stage  from  Guiana  (F11,  F12). 
This austerity programme  cancelled the  final  launchings  (F10 
and F13)  and  reduced  the  work  of  member  countries  on  the 
supplementary  programme  (Section 2.3.1). 
These  programme  cuts  had  the  effect of further  weakening 
European  cooperatione 
Owing  to the  cancellation of  the  PAS  sub-orbital launchings, 
~ranee decided to  use  the  Amethyste  launcher  for  the  national 
PEOLE  (Preparatoire a Eole)  programme  and  for  the  joint Franco-
German  DIAL  programme. 
In this latter programme,  Germany  would  make  up  for  ELD0 1s  can-
cellation of the  work  on  the  instrument  capsules. 
Italy reacted to  the  cancellation of the  apogee  motor  and  the 
experimental satellite by starting the  national communications 
programme  Sirio,  using an  American  launcher. 
The  third session of  the  ELDO  Council  of Ministers  was  followed 
by  the  Third European  Space  Conference  (Bad  Godesberg,  12- 14 
November  19681  which passed the  following resolutions: 
(1)  Space  programme 
ESRO:  three-year ceiling of $172 million for  1969-71. 
GETS:  programme  of experimental TV  satellites,  costing 
$103  million. 
ELDO:  programme  drawn  up  by  the  Conference  of Ministers 
to  be  pursued in 1969. 
(2)  Institutions 
Study  on  the  amalgamation  of European space agencies  en-
1  The  text is  given in the  annexes. 
530 trusted to  a  Committee  of Senior Officials,  to be  sub-
mitted by 1  October 1969. 
(3)  Europa-Intelsat 
Member  states recommended  to instruct Intelsat negotiators 
in conformity with  the attitude of  CETS. 
(4)  European Space  Cooperation 
Need  to  draw  up  a  minimum  programme  whose  acceptance  would 
be  a  condition of membership.  Practical aim:  space  tele-
casts direct to  the  individual users.  Scientific aim: 
projects beyond national possibilities. 
(5)  Production of launchers 
Continued production of launchers  for application and 
scientific purposes,  on  the assumption of two  launchings 
a  year  for the  five  years 1972-76;  determination of the 
price of European  launchers,  excess  in price  over  equiva-
lent non-European launchers to  be  split 50-50  between 
manufacturing  country and  buyer;  the latter would  in no 
case  pay  more  than  25%  above  the price of  the  non-European 
launcher. 
On  19  and  20  December,  the  ELDO  Council  met  to approve  the 
1969  budget. 
The  contrary votes  of the  UK  and Italy prevented approval. 
At  the  end  of 1968  the  European space effort was  split in two: 
the  group  consisting of France,  Belgium,  Holland and Germany 
collaborated,  after April,  in a  study of possible alternatives 
to Blue  Streak for  future  European  launchers;  the  UK  and  Italy, 
on  the  other hand,  were  beginning to pull out. 
On  15  April 1969,  a  new  ELDO  Conference  of Ministers  took note 
of this situation and agreed that Italy's total contribution 
531 to  the  ceiling amount  of  $626  million would  be  $57.60  million 
(9.2%),  the  UK  would  pay  $187.93  million  (30%)  and  the  other 
four  members  would  share the  remaining  $380.47  million by 
mutual agreement. 
On  this condition,  with proportionally diminished voting 
rights for  the  UK  and Italy,  the  1969  budget  of $81.4 million 
was  belatedly approved. 
On  30  November  1968  the  complete  Europa 1  vehicle  was  launched 
at Woomera  (F7). 
The  first and  second stages  functioned  and separated properly 
but  the  third stage failed.  This first launching in the third 
and  final phase  of Europa  1  tests could  be  reckoned an  80% 
success. 
2.4 Contributions of  ELDO  Member  Countries 
Excluding Australia's  commitment  (provision of the launching 
range  at Woomera  for  Europa  1  tests),  the progressive European 
contributions  to  ELDO  up  to  the latest decisions of 15  April 
1969  have  been  tabulated.  Since  ELD0 1s  annual reports  do  not 
show  budget  progress or the  contributions received  from 
individual member  states,  the  table  is an approximationo 
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 3. ~  (European Space  Research Organization) 
3.1  Origins and Purpose 
The  organization  was  created with the  aim  of ensuring and 
developing European  collaboration in the  field of space re-
search and  technology,  for purely peaceful purposes. 
The  European Preparatory Commission  for  Space  Research  (COPERS) 
was  created at Meyrin  on  1  December  1960  on  the initiative of 
European scientific groups  working  with  CERN. 
A Convention was  drawn  up  envisaging a  period of activity of 
eight years;  it was  approved  by  a  plenipotentiary conference 
on  14 June  1962  but not ratified by  the  governments until 20 
March  1964. 
The  Convention provided for  the wide  publication of ESRO's 
scientific,  technical and  technological results so as to give 
member  countries  the  maximum  benefit  from  space  experience. 
3.2 Initial Programmes 
ESR0 1s  programmes  were  intended to accomplish projects that 
were  beyond  the  means  of national space  programmes.  As  the 
budget  was  limited to  $306  million over eight years,  the 
Convention had already been  forced  to  cut  the  over-ambitious 
programmes  envisaged by  COPERS. 
The  Convention provided for: 
(a)  the  creation of European  space  research facilities, 
consisting of  two  technical centres,  a  laboratory, 
a  scientific institute,  a  launching range  for 
sounding rockets,  a  satellite tracking and tele-
metry network; 
(b)  the  launching  of 50  sounding rockets in the  two 
years  1964-65;  then 65  launchings a  year in the 
534 period 1966-71  (44o  in all); 
(c)  the  launching of  two  small scientific satellites 
a  year  from  1967  to 1971  (10  in all); 
(d)  the  launching of two  large scientific satellites 
a  year  from  1969  to  1971  (six in all),  including 
at least one  Large  Astronomical Satellite  (LAS). 
3.3 Organization and Personnel 
Since  the  1967  overhaul,  carried out at the  suggestion of 
the  Bannier report,  ESRO's  structure has  been as  follows: 
Scientific and  I 
Technical  Committee!  Council 
nfrector  Gener~l 
(Paris) 
Administrative  and 
Financial Committee 
(Noordwijk) 
J..rector~f-­
ESOC 
(Oar-.nstadt) 
With  the  1967  reorganization ESRO  gave  greater authority, 
responsibility and  speed  of decision to  the  peripheral agencies, 
eliminating the  initial rigid and  over-centralized machinery 
that had  been  too  slow-moving  for a  scientific body  with 
agencies  spread all over Europe. 
The  Council is the  legislative and political organ.  It meets 
at least twice  a  year  and  each  country has  two  representatives 
on it. 
535 The  President  (Prof.  H.C.  Van  de  Hulst in 1968  and 1969)  is 
elected by  the  Council and  may  not  be  re-elected more  than 
twice  consecutively. 
Dr  A.  Hocker,  who  was  President  from  1966  to 1967,  is an 
honorary  member  of  the  Council. 
The  Director General  (Prof.  H.  Bondi  since  1  November  1967) 
is the  highest permanent  official in ESRO. 
Headquarters:  Neully-sur-Seine,  Paris. 
ESRO  comprises  the  following  agencies  and facilities: 
(1)  ESTEC  (European Space Research Technology Centre),  with 
its headquarters at Noordwijk  (NL),  responsible  for  the 
study and  development  of space  vehicles and  the  useful 
payloads  on  sounding,rockets,  as  well as applied research 
on  space  technologies. 
Under  ESTEC  comes  ESLAB  (European Space  Research Laboratory), 
also based at Noordwijk,  which acts as  a  link between  ESTEC 
and scientific bodies  in the  ESRO  countries. 
(2)  ESOC  (European Space  Operations  Centre)  with headquarters 
at Darmstadt  (Germany)  coordinates  the activites of: 
- ESRANGE  (European Sounding  Rocket  Launching  Range) 
located at Kiruna,  Sweden; 
- ESDAC  (European Space  Data  Centre),  also located at 
Darmstadt and  equipped for space  data processing and 
as  a  computing  centre; 
- ESTRACK  (European Satellite Tracking,  Telemetry and 
Telecommand  Network)  consisting of four stations: 
Fairbanks  (Alaska),  Ny-Alesund  (Spitzbergen),  Port 
Stanley  (Falkland Islands)  and Redu  (Belgium),  with 
a  common  control central at Darmstadt; 
(3)  ESRIN  (European  Space  Research Institute),  with head-
quarters at Frascati,  Italy,  responsible  for basic reseach, 
particularly on  plasma  physics. 
536 A breakdown  of ESRO  personnel,  by  year and  by  agency,  is 
given below. 
At  year's end  1964  1965  196~  1967  1968 
Central 
headquarters  1~  170  18~  184  189 
ESTEC  2~  364  483  548  ~5 
Eroc  ~  76  ~~  187  2~ 
ESRIN  - 4  21  34  57 
T 0 T A L  449  614  an  953  1,119 
A total staff of 1347  is planned  for  the  end  of 1971. 
3.4 Budget  and Contributions 
The  Convention provided for  a  total expenditure  of $306  million 
over eight years,  within the  following  limits:  $78 million for 
the  three years  1964-66;  $122  million for  the  three  years 
1967-69;  $120  million for  the  two  years 1970-71. 
In  the  three years  of initial activity only $62.8  million 
were  spent,  but  unanimous  agreement  was  not  obtained to  carry 
the  difference  over into the  next  three years;  the  budgets 
for  1967  and  1968  were  approved year  by  year  ($48  million for 
1967,  $50  million for 1968);  only after the third European 
Space  Conference  (November  1968)  ,~as it possible  to establish 
a  commitment  of $172.million for the  three years  1967-71 
($52 million in 1969,  $56  million in 1970  and  $64 million in 
1971). 
The  total commitment  up  to  the  end  of  1971  was  thus  $332.8 
million. 
But  the  withdrawal  of Italy from  special projects TD1  and the 
reduction in contributions obtained  from  Spain brought  the 
537 total commitment  down  to $321  million,  i.e.,  only 5%  over the 
initial estimate. 
As  the  progress  of activities increasingly revealed the 
inadequacy of the  estimated budget,  and  no  agreement  on 
budget  increases  was  reached,  it became  necessary to  delay 
and  then substantially cut  the  programme  of operations. 
At  the  end  of 1968  ESRO's  total expenditure  broke  down  as 
follows: 
Running  expenses  30% 
Capital expenditure  31% 
Operations  39% 
The  second item  corresponds  to the  notable initial expenditure 
on facilities.  At  the  end  of 1971  the  breakdown of total ac-
cumulated expenditure  should  be  more  in line with the  1964 
estimate: 
Running  costs  30% 
Capital expenditure  12% 
Operations  58% 
but without really being able  to reach. 
Percentage  contributions of member  countries,  revised every 
three years  on  the basis  of GNP,  was  established as  follows 
by  the  ESRO  Council:  1964-66  1967-69  1970-?1 
Belgium  4.42  3.72  3.71 
France  19.14  20.17  19.60 
Germany  22.56  24.31  22.93 
Italy  11 ,17  11 • 72  12.70 
Netherlands  4.24  4.04  4 .. 36 
UK  25~00  23.13  21.44 
Denmark  2.21  2.15  2.23 
Spain  2,66  3.29  5.36 
Sweden  5.17  4.23  4.52 
Switzerland  3.43  3.24  3 .. 15 
538 The  contribution  from  EEC  countries  went  from  61.53%  (1964-
66)  to 63.96%  (1967-69)  then  down  to 63.30%  (1970-71). 
Allowing  for  the  reduction granted to Spain  and  the  with-
drawal  of Italy from  the special TD1  project,  the actual 
contributions are as  shown  in  the  following  table: 
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 3.5 ESRO  Contracts 
The  cumulative totals for  contracts distributed by  ESRO 
are  shown  in the  following  table  (in millions of dollars): 
~ontracts placed in  % 
member  :non-member  TOTAL  in non-member 
countries  countries  countries 
31  Dec.  1965  38.3  3.5  41.8  8.4 
31  Dec.  1966  54,1  7.4  61.3  12.0 
31  Dec.  1967  81.7  18,3  100.0  18.3 
31  Dec.  1968  92.8  20,5  '\13.3  18.1 
Procurements in non-member  countries reached a  peak in 1967, 
for an  amount  of  (18.3- 7.4)/(100- 61.5)  = 28.3%. 
By  far  the  major  non-member  country  was  the  US. 
ESRO,  however,  applies  weighting  factors  to  the  value  of 
contracts,  as  follows: 
- 100%  on  High Technology  contracts  (space activities, 
advanced  equipment,  etc.). 
- 25%  on  Low  Technology  contracts  (construction,  etc.). 
This  modifies  the  preceding  table as  follows  (in millions 
of dollars): 
~on  tracts placed in 
iroTAL  ~ 
1ember  non-member  in non-member 
;;ountries countries  countries 
31  Deco  1965  28.6  3.0  31.6  9.5 
31  Dec.  1966  42.7  6.7  49,4  13.6 
31  Dec.  1967  69.1  16.4  85,5  19,2 
31  Dec.  1968  76.0  17.4  93.4  18.6 
541 Peak procurements  in non-member  countries is still in 1967, 
reaching  (16.4 - 6.7)/(85.5 - 49.4)  = 26.9%. 
The  results of these  two  tables differ little in their 
indication of the large  amount  spent in the US. 
Of  the  total volume  of  contracts  up  to  the  end of 1968,  76% 
were  high  technology and  24%  low  technology. 
At  the  end  of 1965  the  proportions  were  67  and  33%  respectively. 
This  shows  the  heavy initial commitment  of  ESRO  in building up 
infrastructure,  and  the  subsequent  progress  to  more  advanced 
activities. 
3.6 Geographical Distribution of Contracts 
The  table  below  shows  the  cumulative  returns obtained by  the 
various member  countries: 
- the  upper part gives  the  "real" ratio between total 
contracts received and  contributions paid; 
the  lower part gives  the  "corrected" ratio using  the 
following  ESRO  procedures: 
(1)  applying weighting  factors  of  100 and  25%  to high 
or  low  technology contracts respectively; 
(2)  dividing the  contract percentage relative to  member 
countries alone  by  the  contribution percentage. 
The  first procedure  levels  down  the  average  return,  especially 
in countries receiving a  large  number  of  low  technology  con-
tracts:  thus  the  Netherlands,  where  ESTEC  and  ESLAB  are  located, 
drop  from  first place in the  "real" classification to  fourth 
place  in the  "corrected" classification at the  end  of 1968. 
The  second procedure,  by  basing the  percentage  on  contracts 
distributed in member  countries alone,  raises the  average 
return but totally ignores  the  purchases  made  in the US. 
In  1967,  because  of  the  disparity in returns up  to  the  end 
542 of 1966,  the  Council  decided  to  guarantee  a  "corrected" 
return of at least 70%  to all member  countries by  the  end 
of 1971. 
Under  ESRO  procedures this  can  be  done  without  placing any 
limit  on  procurements in the  US,  which  do  not  enter into 
the  calculation. O
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 3.7 Projects Completed 
By  the  end  of 1967  ESRO  had  completed its basic facilities 
(centres,  laboratories,  telemetry network  and bases);  in 
1968  work  began  on  building the  ESRIN  institute. 
The  satellite and  sounding rocket  launching  programmes  had 
to be  considerably reduced  below  the  estimates of the initial 
Convention: 
3.7.1  Sounding rockets 
By  the  end  of 1968  only  76  rockets  had  been  launched  out  of 
the  245  planned in the initial Convention;  it is hoped  to 
launch a  total of 195  rockets  within 1971,  out of the origi-
nally planned total of  440. 
Of  the  76  rockets  launched  up  to  the  end  of 1968,  43  were 
purchased in France  (Sud-Aviation series),  25  in the  UK 
(Skylark)  and  eight in the  US  (Areas);  of  the  52  scientific 
experiments  performed  with these  launchings,  25  were  British 
and  only  three French. 
As  regards  sounding rockets,  France  and the  UK  were  the  most 
active  members,  as  shown  below: 
Sounding  rockets  France  UK 
Rockets  supplied 1964-68  57%  33% 
Scientific experiments 1964-68  3%  48% 
- France  was  the  major  supplier of ESRO  rockets but  a 
sparse scientific user;  both  facts are  explained by 
the  national research programme  under  way  in this 
field since 1961; 
- the  UK  was  the  second biggest supplier of ESRO  rockets, 
but  the  biggest scientific user. 3.7.2 Satellites 
Construction  was  awarded  by  competitive  tender  to  European 
companies,  with ESTEC  responsible  for specifications, 
costing and  technical supervision. 
The  Convention specified the  launching  of  four  small satel-
lites by  the  end  of  1968;  three  were  actually launched. 
ESRO  2:  scientific satellite weighing  83  kg;  launching 
offered free  by  NASA,  with  a  Scout vehicle;  after one  abor-
tive launching  (29  May  1967)  due  to  failure  of  the  American 
launcher,  it went  into orbit  on  17  May  1~68 with the  oper-
ational name  of  IRIS;  after feasibility studies carried out 
by  ACEC  and  the  Zurich Polytechnic in 1963,  a  call for  bids 
was  issued in June  1964.  Tenders  were  submitted  by  31  Euro-
pean  companies  grouped  into 12  consortia. 
In  November  1964,  the initial contract  for  $4  million  was 
awarded  to  the  group  led by  Hawker  Siddely Dynamics  (UK), 
formed  of HSD  (56%)  and  the French  company  HATRA  (44%). 
HSD  collaborated with  the British firms Ferranti and Sperry 
and  was  assisted by  TRW  (US);  MATRA  collaborated with  the 
French  firms  Air-Equipement,  Intertechnique,  CSF,  CFTH  and 
IER. 
Test  equipment  and batteries were  supplied  by  the  American 
firms  Gulton  and Dynatronics.  The  Italian firm  LABEN  pro-
vided  the  monitoring  equipment  for  the  telemetry package. 
The  total cost  of the  satellite was  about  $6.2 million. 
Of  the  seven  experimental  flight sets carried on  the  satel-
lite IRIS,  five  were  British,  one  French and  one  Dutch. 
ESRO  1:  a  scientific satellite weighing  85  kg;  free  launching 
offered by  NASA  on  the Scout  launcher;  went  into orbit  on 
546 3  October 1968  with  the  operational  name  of  AURORA. 
After feasibility studies  by  SAAB  (Sweden)  and  CRA  (Italy)  in 
1963,  bids  were  called for in November  1964;  there  was  a 
response  from  44  European  firms  in 13  groups.  In March  1965 
the initial contract  of $4.2 million  was  let to  the  group  led 
by  LCT  (France)  and  formed  of  LCT  (57%) 9  the Swiss  firm 
Contraves  (33%)  and  the Belgian  firm Bell  (10%).  LCT  collab-
orated with  the French  firms  Compagnie  des  Compteurs,  CFTH, 
SAT,  CSF,  IER,  SAFT  and Sud-Aviation. 
The  batteries,  test equipment  and solar grids  were  supplied 
by  the  US  firmsGulton,  Dynatomics  and  Adcole. 
Total cost of the satellite was  about  $6.6  million. 
Of  the eight experimental flight sets carried on  AURORA,  five 
were  British,  two  Danish and  one  Swedish. 
HEOS-A:  a  sonde  weighing 108  kg  with  a  highly eccentric orbit; 
launching  by  a  Thor Delta vehicle,  to  be  paid to  NASA;  orbited 
on  5  December 1968. 
After feasibility studies by  ESTEC  and  ESLAB  in 1964,  tenders 
were  invited in June  1965;  44  European  firms  took part,  in 
eight groups. 
In November  1966  the  initial contract  for  $5.8  million was 
awarded  to the  group  led by  Junkers  (Germany)  and  made  up  as 
follows:  40%  by Junkers 
32%  by  ETCA  (ACEC)  (Belgium) 
11%  by  SNECMA  (France) 
8%  by  BAC  (UK) 
9%  by  Lockheed  (US)  providing technical assistance. 
This  was  ESRO's  first contract of the  "cost plus interest" 
type.  The  distance  of the  apogee  from  the  earth  (225,000  km) 
imposed strict specifications  for  telemetry. 
547 In 1965  a  separate  contract  of $1.1  million  was  awarded  to 
CFTH  (France),  selected  from  six bidders,  for  the  telemetry 
encoders. 
The  Italian firm  LABEN  supplied  the  monitoring  equipment. 
The  total cost  of  the  probe  was  $9.4 million,  plus  the  $4 
million spent  on  the  launching and vehicle. 
Of  the  eight  experimental flight sets carried on  HEOS/A,  three 
were  British,  one  German,  one  French,  one  Italian and  one 
Franco-Italian. 
As  regards  ESRO  satellites up  to  the  end  of 1968,  France  and 
the  UK  once  again played  the  main  part,  as  shown  below: 
Satellites 
Value  of contracts 
Scientific experiments 
France 
39?6 
11% 
UK 
16% 
57% 
As  in the  case  of the  sounding rockets it may  be  stated that: 
(a)  France  was  the  major  supplier for  ESRO  satellites but  only 
a  minor  scientific user:  both  facts are  explained by  the 
national research  programme  already  conducted in this 
sector since  1965; 
(b)  the  UK  was  the  second  biggest  supplier  for  ESR~ satellites, 
and  the biggest scientific user. 
The  position of France,  with  the  benefit of  a  strong national 
programme  for both sounding rockets and satellites,  explains 
her lion's share  of  the  "returns". 
The  industrial story of the  first  three  ESRO  satellites, all 
launched in 1968,  indicates  the  large-scale mobilization of 
industrial consortia promoted in Europe  by  ESRO. 
548 The  Convention  provided the  launching of six medium  or large 
satellites in the  final  three  years  1969-71. 
These  would  be  the  first projects that really exceeded  the 
national possibilities of member  countries. 
In  1964  the  plans included  two  medium  TD  scientific satellites 
and  one  Large  Astronomical Satellite  (LAS);  the TDs  were 
scheduled for  launching  by  NASA  with Thor Delta vehicles,  but 
the  LAS  was  to be  the  first European satellite to  be  orbited 
with  the  ELDO  launcher. 
Satellites TD1  and  TD2:  weight  450  kg,  carrying a  total of 
18 scientific experimental sets. 
After preliminary studies,  tenders  were  invited in March  1966: 
in June,  five  European  consortia responded,  and  were  then re-
duced  to  the  three  shown, below: 
MESH 
BAC 
EST 
Belgium  France  Germany  Italy 
ETCA 
Matra 
Nord 
CFTH 
ERNO 
Boelkow  Fiat 
Dornier 
Netherlands  UK 
HSD 
BAC 
Sweden 
Saab 
Fokker  Elliot  ASEA 
Germany,  France  and  the  UK  were  represented in all three  con-
sortia.  In January 1967  the  MESH  tender  was  selected. 
The  initial contract  for  $22  million  was  distributed as  follows: 
83%  to  MESH  (33%  Matra,  23%  ERNO,  9%  Saab,  18%  HSD),  4%  to 
Belgian industry and  13%  to  TRW  (US).  The  cost of launching 
and  the  two  launchers  came  to  $8 million. 
In April  1968  the  expenditure  on  the satellites had already 
risen to $15  million and it seemed  likely that the  total cost 
would  be  twice  the  estimate. 
On  25  April  1968  the  TD1  project  was  cancelled by  the  Director 
General of ESRO. In October  1968  the  TD1  programme  was  resumed,  but  without 
Italian participation,  thus  creating an  ESRO  precedent;  the 
possibility of preparing  "spacial programmes"  without  the 
participation of all members.  The  TD/special satellite was 
to  be  built  by  the  MESH  consortium;  the  expenditure  ceiling 
for  the  satellite was  set at $39  million;  the  launching  cost 
was  estimated at $4 million;  the satellite,  which is the  most 
complex  yet  designed in Europe,  will  carry seven experimental 
sets for  solar astronomy and  cosmic  rays and will  be  launched 
in February  1972. 
LAS  satellite:  the  most  ambitious project of ESRO,  for astro-
nomical  research on  a  competitive level with that of the  US. 
Starting in 1964,  preliminary studies  wereconducted by  the 
Culham  Laboratory  (UK),  the Franco-Belgo-Swiss  consortium 
"Groupe  d'Etudes Spatiales" and  the  "German-Dutch Group". 
In  1967  Dr  W.G.  Stroud of  NASA  worked  for  six months  as  con-
sultant to  the  Director General  to establish a  realistic 
estimate. 
When  it appeared  that  the  LAS  programme  would  take  up  40%  of 
ESR0 1s  operating resources  for six years  the project  was  sus-
pended and  deferred until after 1971. 
This  meant  the  cancellation of  the  sole European  ESRO  project 
that  would  have  used a  European  ELDO  launcher. 
Communications  satellites: at the  end  of 1966,  CETS  awarded 
ESRO  a  contract  worth  $0.3 million  for  preliminary studies 
of  the  prospects  for  experimental  European  communications 
satellites;  the  study  was  concluded in June  1967  and set forth 
two  alternatives  (CETS/A  and  CETS/B)  to  be  achieved in three 
or  four  years at  a  cost not  exceeding  $104 million. 
The  Franco-German  Symphonie  programme  necessitated a  review 
of the  situation to avoid useless and  costly duplication. 
In July  1967  CETS  gave  ESRO  a  contract  worth $0.2 million to 
550 conduct  further  studies;  in December  1967  ESRO  submitted the 
CETS/C  project  for  the  geostationary satellite EURAFRICA, 
whose  purpose  was  determined  by  EBU:  to carry two  TV  programmes 
to  two  areas  - Europe  and  Africa. 
The  estimated cost of the  project  was  $90  million over five 
years,  for  a  satellite weighing  210  kg,  i.e.,  just within the 
possibilities of a  stepped-up version of the  ELDO/PAS  launcher. 
The  current estimate  stands at $103 million  (including  $25 
million for  launching),  spread over six years.  The  project  was 
warmly  supported at the  third European Space  Conference  in 
1968.  A final decision is to  be  taken in 1969. 
These  intensive studies in the  field of  communications  satel-
lites gave  valuable  experience  to  the  technical and scientific 
teams at ESTEC. 
3.8  Current  Programmes  and Prospects 
Using  funds  approved in November  1968  for  the  three  years 
1969-71,  the  following scientific satellite programmes  were 
started in March  1969: 
- HEOS  A/2  ($11  million,  including $5  million for  launching), 
ordered  from  Junkers,  the  makers  of HEOS  A/1;  it will be 
launched in December  1971; 
- ESRO  1/B  ($3.4 million,  including 2  million for  launching), 
ordered  from  LCT,  the  makers  of ESRO  1;  the  low  cost is due 
to  the  use  of  the  ready-made  second flight  model;  it will 
be  launched in October 1969; 
- ESRO  4  ($8  million,  including 2  million  for  launching), 
ordered  from  HSD,  the  makers  of  ESRO  2;  it is designed to 
take  over certain experiments  scheduled  for  the  cancelled 
TD2;  it will  be  launched in September 1972. 
551 These  relatively unambitious  short-term projects hand  out 
work  to  the  same  old  firms,  they are  not  beyond  the possibili-
ties of  a  national programme,  they  do  not  lead ESRO  into  the 
sector of applications  and  they fail to  promote  the  development 
and  use  of European  launchers.  A budget  of  some  $200  million 
(1968  values)  is  envisaged  for  the  three  year period 1972-74, 
with  emphasis  on  observatory-satellites and/or multi-experiment 
satellites to  be  decided  on  and initiated by  1970-71.  These 
commitments  beyond  the  expiry date  of  the  Convention in 1971 
have  led  ESRO  to  concentrate  exclusively  on  the  scientific 
sector,  whereas  greater flexibility  would  facilitate  the  for-
mation  of  the  unified Space  Agency,  as  was  urged at the Third 
European  Space  Conference. 
4.  GETS  (European  Conference  on  Communications Satellites) 
At  the  end  of 1962  the  US  started negotiations  to set up  the 
international  INTELSAT  system as  soon as possible,  while at 
the  same  time  creating the  private  COHSAT  corporation with  a 
monopoly  in  US  space  communications. 
The  European  side  was  represented by  CEPT  (European  Conference 
of Postal and  Telecommunications  Administrations),  to  whom  the 
US  presented their programmes  in December  1962. 
The  new  space  projects led 19  European  countries to set up 
CETS  (Paris,  22  May  1963). 
CETS  has  a  permanent  secretariat in London  and is open  to all 
members  of  CEPT;  its primary  object  was  to  coordinate  the 
positions of  the  various European  countries in view of the 
INTELSAT  negotiations. 
The  first  conditions  for  participation in the  talks were: 
(1)  Europe  would  only deal  with  the  US  through  GETS,  avoiding 
bilateral contacts; 
552 (2)  Europe  would  share in  the  design,  ownership,  operation 
and  procurement  of the  INTELSAT  system. 
The  first  condition  would  only  work if CETS  were  given supra-
national authority;  the  second  assumed  a  certain degree  of 
space  experience  in Europe,  which  scarcely existed at the 
time. 
To  face  the  strong private  commercial  firm  of  COMSAT,  backed 
by  the  US  government,  Europe  put  up  a  Ministerial Conference, 
a  purely coordinating  body  without  any real supranational 
power.  This  was  the  background to  the  INTELSAT  agreements, 
concluded  in Washington  on  20  August  1964,  though valid only 
for  a  provisional period  (until the  end  of 1969). 
Whereas  COMSAT  signed the  INTELSAT  agreements  in the  name  of 
the us,  it was  not  CETS  that signed  on  behalf of Europe:  the 
signatories  were  the  British Postmaster General,  the French 
Government,  the  Deutsche  Bundespost,  Telespazio Italiano,  the 
Regie  Belge  des  Telegraphes et Telephones,  the Netherlands 
Government,  etc. 
In October 1964,  the  Committee  on  Space  Technology  (CST),  set 
up  by  CETS  in July 1963,  submitted to  the  GETS  conference in 
Bonn  an initial five-year plan,  in  two  phases: 
(1)  in  the  three  years  1965-67  space  communications  R&D  would 
be  financed  by  each state  on  ~ national basis,  but  coordi-
nated  by  the  CST; 
(2)  in the  three  years  1967-69  the  European effort would  be 
conducted with multinational  funds. 
The  CETS  Conference  in Bonn  decided  to start off the  first 
phase,  urging  the  member  countries  to  implement it,  and  created 
a  Technical Planning Staff  (TPS)  to plan  the  operations for  the 
second phase.  As  ELDO  and  ESRO  were  by  then  functioning  in 
553 Europe,  the  TPS  was  able  to present  a  five-year  programme  at 
the  end  of 1965,  covering  the  following  projects  for  an 
expenditure  of  $74 million: 
(a)  use  of the  ELDO  F9  and F10  launchings  for  the  first tests 
on  communications satellites; 
(b)  design and  construction of a  more  advanced European experi-
mental satellite; 
(c)  design and  production of operational European satellites. 
The  TPS  programme  relied on  ELDO  for  launchers  and  on  ESRO 
for  the  production of satellites. 
When  the  ELDO  crisis was  solved in 1966  by  means  of the  sup-
plementary ELDO/PAS  programme  for  geostationary communications 
satellites,  a  GETS  conference  was  held  in The  Hague  in November 
1966. 
The  basic policies proposed  by  the  TPS  were  accepted and  a 
contract  worth  $0.3 million  was  placed  with  ESRO  for  feasibi-
lity studies  on  the  first experimental European  communications 
satellites. The  ESRO  study was  submitted  on  5  June  1967, 
giving  two  alternative proposals: 
(1)  GETS/A  satellite for relaying a  colour TV  programme  in 
Europe,  to  be  completed  in  four  years; 
(2)  GETS/B  satellite of  more  advanced  design,  but  taking 
longer  to  develop. 
Estimated expenditure  $104  million;  to  be  launched in 1971. 
The  initiation of  the Franco-German  Symphonie  project,  inspired 
by  the  delays in  GETS  decisions,  led to  a  review  of the  situa-
tion in mid-1967  in order  to  avoid useless  and  costly duplication. 
GETS  then  awarded  ESRO  a  contract  of $0.2 million for  a  further 
study: 
554 - along  the  lines indicated by  the  European Broadcasting 
Union  (EBU)  at the Second European  Space  Conference  (Rome, 
July 1967); 
- with a  ceiling expenditure  of  $90  million in five  years. 
The  new  ESRO  study was  submitted  on  4  December  1967,  proposing 
a  geostationary CETS/C  or EURAFRICA  satellite with  the  purpose, 
as specified by  the  EBU,  of relaying  two  TV  programmes  to  two 
areas:  Europe  and  Africa. 
The  CETS/C  project kept  within the  limit of  $90  million in 
five  years;  it envisaged a  satellite weighing  210  kg,  which 
was  just within the possibilities of  a  stepped-up  version  of 
the  ELDO/PAS  launcher. 
The  project  was  supported in the  Causae  Report  and  confirmed 
as  being  of first importance  to Europe  at the Third European 
Space  Conference  (November  1968);  the  current  cost estimate 
is $103 million,  including $25  million  for  launching,  to  be 
spent  over six years. 
The  operational phase  cannot  begin until 1975,  i.e.,  twelve 
years after the creation of  GETS. 
The  Third European Space  Conference  (November  1968)  also 
urged member  states to  follow  GETS  policies during re-nego-
tiation of the  INTELSAT  agreement,  which  must  be  concluded 
within 1969. 
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The space programmes of the United Kingdom and the 
member countries of the European Economic Community 
• 1 •  UNITED  KINGDON 
By  1955,  the  successful development  of nuclear activity in 
Britain posed,  as it had  for  the  US  and  USSR  some  years 
earlier,  the  problem  of having ballistic missiles armed 
with nuclear  warheads.  Work  then  began  on  the  IRBM  Blue 
Streak,  developed  on  the  basis of American  technology  by 
de  Havilland under  licence agreements  with General  Dynamics 
for  the  structure,  and  by  Ro~Royce, under similar agreements 
with  North  American Aviation,  for  the  liquid propulsion. 
A launch base  was  already available  from  1947  on at Woomera 
in Australia,  built in collaboration with  the  UK  at a  capital 
cost  to  Australia of about  $200 million.  A test centre  was 
fitted out  by  the Ministry of Aviation at Spadeadam  in  Cum-
berland. 
In 1957  the  final stage of development  had also  been reached 
for  the research rocket Black Knight,  designed  by  the  RAE 
with  a  view  to studies of the atmospheric  reentry of ballistic 
missile  warheads;  it was  used  for  this purpose  as  well as  for 
scientific missions  in 22  launchings,  all successful,  between 
1958  and 1964. 
The  solid-fuel sounding rocket Skylark developed in the  UK  in 
connection  with  the  International Geophysical Year  was  first 
launched in 1957  and  is still being used,  in an  improved and 
stabilized version,  by  ESRO  also. 
At  the  dawn  of  the  space  era  (4 October 1957)  the  UK  therefore 
had  an opportunity of making  itself the  third space  giant as 
it had  just become  the  third nuclear power.  Taking  Blue Streak 
as  a  first stage and Black Knight  as  a  second,  or at any rate 
the  latter as a  first stage,  might  have  resulted in useful 
launchers  for  civilian purposes.  Uncertainties as  to  the  cost 
of a  national space  programme  for  a  single  country,  small in 
559 comparison  to  the  US  and  USSR,  followed  by  the  advent  of 
solid fuel  IRBMs  and  ICBMs  which  robbed  the  liquid-fuelled 
Blue  Streak of much  of its military usefulness,  occasioned 
the  cancellation in April  1960  of this project,  on  which 
about  $235  million had  been spent. 
Shortly afterwards  began  the  long  drawn  out  negotiations  for 
ELDO,  based  on  finding  a  peaceful use  for  Blue  Streak at a 
European  level. 
Britain's good start  (alone  among  the  European  countries)  in 
space at  the  time  of  the first Sputnik  (1957)  was  endangered 
by  the  time  of the  first Vostok  (1961)  when,  instead,  it was 
France,  already  engaged  upon  military rocket  programmes,  that 
started its own  national space  programme  for  civilian require-
ments. 
Albeit  with  much  stronger political and military motivations, 
the  two  Soviet rockets  had  given an  exceptional boost  to  space 
progress  in the  United States. 
One  valid indirect space activity begun  by Britain in 1957  was 
the setting up  of a  ne~work of radar,  radio  and  optical satel-
lite tracking stations.  The  radio  telescope at Jodrell Bank 
(75  m in diameter)  has  been  an  invaluable auxiliary instrument 
for  both Russians  and  Americans  thanks  to its coordinated 
operation  with  other observatories  throughout  the  world. 
This  same  radio  telescope  went  on  to  establish tne  first space 
telecommunications  link between  the  US  and  the  USSR  through 
the passive satellite Echo  2  on  21  November  1964. 
Another noteworthy indirect space activity for Britain was 
the  establishment at Slough in October 1958  of  World  Data 
Centre  C  (Centre  A is at Washington,  and  Centre  B in Moscow) 
for  collecting and  transmitting satellite trajectory data 
and predictions. 
560 During 1961-63,  in the  absence  of national space  programmes 
and  pending  the  establishment of the  European  cooperative 
projects,  Britain signed  (September 1961)  an  agreement  with 
NASA  for  the  free  launching of three  Ariel satellites;  the 
first  two,  built in the  US  were  to carry British scientific 
experiments as passengers  and  were  successfully launched in 
April 1962  and March  1964;  the  third satellite,  entirely 
British in design and  equipment  and also intended  for  scien-
tific experiments,  was  launched in May  1967.  The  British 
outlay  on  this programme  breaks  down  as  follows  (millions of 
dollars): 
Satellite  Scientific payload  Total 
Ariel 1  0.56  0.56 
Ariel  2  0.66  o.66 
Ariel 3  3.50  o.66  4.16 
Total  5.38 
A fourth satellite in this series was  on  the  drawing  board in 
1968. 
In 1962  the  UK  established an  experimental centre at Goonhilly 
Down  for the  purpose  of the  communications satellite Telstar. 
In  connection with the  subsequent  INTELSAT  programmes  the 
station was  to  become  operational and  capable  of  communicating 
with geostationary satellites above  the  Atlantic and  Indian 
Oceans.  This activity,  more  commercial  than scientific in out-
look,  absorbed  $1.6  million in 1965-66,  $4.0 million in 1966-67 
and $6.5 million in 1967-68. 
Also  in 1962,  the Nassau agreements  gave Britain,  alone  among 
the rest of the  nations  of the world,  the United States' Polaris 
strategic missiles,  at a  cost  of $638  million  by  1966;  this 
figure  is around half the  whole  of United States world sales 
of missiles  (non-strategic,  however)  during the  same  period. The  purchase  of Polaris put paid to the British military 
missile  programmes,  an  end  foreshadowed  ever since 1960. 
There  was  a  genuine  resumption  some  time  later of the  national 
space  programme  for  peaceful purposes,  shortly after the start 
of European  cooperation in ELDO  and  ESRO,  and  the  first suc-
cessful firings at  Woomera  on  behalf of ELDO  of the Blue 
Streak lower stage. 
In September 1964  a  start was  made  on  the Black Arrow project 
for  a  three  stage launcher,  planned to  be  operational in 1969. 
This rocket  makes  use  of previous  experience  with the  Black 
Knight's  liquid propellant Gamma  motors.  The  total project 
cost  was  estimated at $28  million,  with  40%  for  the structure, 
and  33%  for  the  engines;  these  costs  were  spread among  the 
contracting bodies as  follows:  67%  to British firms  and  33% 
to  the  RAE:  the  1967-68  budget allocated $7.2 million to Black 
Arrow,  to  finance  completion of the  prototype  and  the first 
three  launchers. 
The  following  firms  collaborate in this project:  Westland 
Aircraft  for  the  structures of all three  stages,  Bristol 
Siddeley for  the  liquid-fuel engines of the  two  lower stages, 
and Bristol Aerojet  for  the solid-fuel motor  of the  third 
stage. 
The  programme  cautiously provided  for  one  satellite launch 
a  year  only  from  1969  onwards. 
The  general engineering of Black  Arrow  is similar to  that of 
the  two  upper stages of the  ELDO  vehicle,  i.e., it is capable 
of being mated to  the Blue Streak lower stage;  such  a  combi-
nation  would  form  an entirely British three-stage launcher 
competitive  with  ELDO's  Europa 1.  In 1965  Britain signed an 
agreement  with the  US  for  the  establishment  and  use  of the 
IDCSP  (Interim Defence  Communications Satellite Project) network  of military satellites;  by  mid-1966  the first seven 
satellites were  placed in orbit  by  a  single Titan launcher, 
followed  by  10  more  (placed in orbit by  only three  launchers) 
in 1967. 
The  UK  spent $38  million on  the  procurement  and  launching of 
two  satellites and associated ground stations.  The  British 
share  of this bilateral programme  goes  by  the  code  name  of 
Skynet. 
The  military budget  is almost  entirely swallowed up  by  the 
telecommunications  programme,  as  shown  by  the  following  table: 
Britain's Military Space  Budget 
(Millions  of dollars) 
Invest- Expend-
menta  itures1 
1967-1968 
IOCSP trials  programme  s.w  1.10 
IDCSP  ope rational use (Skynet  38,CO  16. £\) 
R&D  support  programme  I 
1.70  o.~ 
Total military telecommuni-
cations 
45.30  17,60 
Other  space  items  0.80  0,60 
Total military space activi- 46.10  18.40 
ties 
1  Estimate,  February 1967 
Source:  13th Report,  Estimates  Committee  (July 1967) 
A feasibility study is currently in hand  for  a  100%  British 
system to take  the  place  of Skynet in the  seventies. 
For purposes  of scientific space  exploration at national level 
development  programmes  are also proceeding  for  the  small and 
low-cost solid fuel  sounding  rocketsffirua  (cost  $2,000)  and 
Petrel  (cost $7,000),  less advanced  than Skylark but  capable I~ 
-
of  being  launched  from  British sites instead of having  to be 
transported to  Woomera. 
In  1965  again,  with  a  view  to  a  rational and  programmed  co-
ordination of space activity,  the  SBAC,  the  Electronic  Engi-
neering Association and  the  Telecommunication Engineering 
Manufacturing  Association  joined  forces  in the  NISC  (National 
Industrial Space  Committee),  which  became  the  sole represent-
ative  of British industry's  space  interests. 
At  government  level,  however,  there  is much  fragmentation  of 
responsibilities,  as  the  following  table  shows: 
Departn1ents Responsible  for Britain's Space  Programmes  up  to  1967 
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(July 1967 Only  the Ministry of Technology,  besides of course-the Treasury, 
is concerned in the  whole  range  of space activities. From  the 
beginning  of 1967,  the Ministry of Technology  took over respon-
sibility for  the  space activities of  the Ministry of Aviation. 
From  early 1968  Mintech started to  become  the  sole  coordinating 
body  for  Britain's space activities. 
Fr  u m  February 1966  to  May  1967  a  thorough survey of  "Space 
Research and Development"  was  conducted  on  behalf of the  House 
of  Commons  by  the Estimates  Committee,  whose  findings  were 
published in its Thirteenth Report  of July 1967. 
During  25  sessions and  numerous  visits to  research centres, 
representatives of all the  bodies  concerned in space activity, 
as  shown  in the  preceding table,  together with the Science 
Research  Council  and  National Industrial Space  Committee,  were 
given repeated hearings. 
Reviewing  the  whole  field of space activities past and  present, 
the  report  concludes,  with  the  utmost  candour:  "On  the  whole 
it has  been  a  story of wasted  opportunities brought  about  by 
lack of purpose  and  the  absence  of  any  coherent  organization". 
It goes  on  to acknowledge  the prior claims  of space  telecom-
munications in the  immediate  future,  also as  a  specific sector 
in which Britain can play a  leading technological role.  The 
report  ends  with  the  following  recommendations: 
(1)  A space  programme  with a  budget  of its own  should be 
framed  and agreed for  future  years; 
(2)  Mintech  should  assume  overall responsibility for  the 
space  programmes  ••• ; 
(3)  A firm  figure  should  be  set for  the  country's space 
budget  over  the  next  five  years; (4)  The  larger proportion of the total space  budget 
should be allocated to  the national programme, 
and  a  smaller share  to  international programmes; 
(5)  The  UK  should  oppose  any proposition to increase 
the  number  of ELDO/PAS  firings; 
(6)  The  UK  should not  take part in the  GETS  television 
relay satellite programmes; 
(7)  Project studies should  be  put  in hand  forthwith with 
a  view to producing a  British military telecommuni-
cations satellite  ~o replace  the  existing Skynet 
satellites in 1971; 
(8)  The  annual  expenditure  on  the  Black Arrow  should  be 
stepped up  from  $8.5 to  17  million and  an independent 
start be  made  on  a  development  programme  for  elec-
trical propulsion  ••• ; 
(9)  The  UK  should  ensure  that the  definitive agreement 
for  an  international system of telecommunications 
satellites after INTELSAT  includes  the establish-
ment  of an  international management  company  in 
place  of  COMSAT;  provides  for  abandonment  of the 
USA's  guaranteed minimum  share  of 50.6%;  and allows 
for regional and national systems  separate  from  and 
non-competitive  with the  global system. 
The  report has  annexed to it the  following  financial estimate 
for the  three years 1965-68,  in millions of dollars: 
566 Financial year  1965-66  1966-6?  196?-68 
International programmes  29.85  38.78  40.38 
{%)  (57.5)  (58.5)  ( 47 .5) 
National programmes  22.12  27.64  45.16 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
(42.5)  ( 41 .5)  (52.5) 
51.97  66.42  85.54 
(100.0)  (100.0)  (100.0) 
As  a  result,  Britain's spending  on  its national programmes 
would in 1967-68  already exceed  that  on  the  international 
ones  (as  was  becoming  the  case  in Germany  in 1967  and  occurred 
in France  from  1962). 
In 1963-64 and  1964-65,  expenditure  on  the  national programme 
did not  exceed  12%  of the  total spending  on  space. 
In an  ensuing systematic analysis  of  the  report,  the  NISC 
objected that for  the purpose  of estimating the  true  amount 
of  R&D  work  by  the British aerospace  industry the  following 
should  be  subtracted:  from  the  international programmes,  funds 
spent  on  INTELSAT  and  not  repatriated;  from  the  national pro-
grammes,  costs sustained in the  United States for  the  IDCSP/ 
Skynet  system;  corresponding  figures  are  inserted in the 
following  table  (in millions  of  dollars): 
Financial year  1965-66 
INTELSAT  0.39 
IDCSP  10.61 
Total expenditure in the 
United States  11.00 
1966-67 
3.36 
10.14 
13.50 
1967-68 
1.68 
20.89 
22.57 By  working  out  the  differences,  NISL  arrives at the  following 
table as representing Britain's true  R&D  effort in space: 
Financial year  1965-66  1966-67  1967-68 
International programmes  ($million)  29.46  35.42  38.70 
(%)  (72)  (67)  (61.5) 
National  programmes  ($million)  11.51  17.50  24.27 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
(28)  (33)  (38.5) 
($million)  4o.97  52.92  62.97 
(100)  (100)  (100) 
In  the  NISC  report  the  percentages  for  1967-68 are  wrongly 
given as  a  total of 38.70 +  27.78 = 66.48,  instead of 
38.70 +  24.27 = 62.97.  Nevertheless  the  true  expenditure  on 
national space  programmes  is growing,  both absolutely and 
relatively,  but still falls far short  of that  on  the  inter-
national programmes. 
It is interesting to  sum  up  the  preceding figures  in a  single 
table  of Britain's total space  expenditure:(.  .11.  f  ) 
~n m~  ~ons o  dollars 
Financial year  1965-66  1966-67  1967-68 
R&D  international programmes  29.46  35.42  38.70 
(?0  (57)  (53)  (45) 
R&D  national  programmes  11.51  17.50  24.27 
(96)  (22)  (26.5)  (28.5) 
Expenditure  in United States  11.00  13.50  22.57 
(%)  (21)  (20.5)  (26.5) 
Total  51.97  66.42  85.54 
(96)  (100)  (100)  (100) 
This  shows  the  high and  growing percentage  of direct  expend-
iture in the  United States,  not  far  short  of total R&D  ex-
penditures  for  national programmes. 
568 Seven  of  the  report's recommendations  are  substantially sup-
ported by  the  NISG,  which rejects,  however,  the  fifth and  sixth, 
already inaicating for 1967  a  disengagement  of Britain from 
ELDO  and  GETS. 
About  recommendation 5,  NISG  notes  that  the  ELDO  programme  is 
the  only  one  offering Europe  an  opportunity of independence 
from  total domination  by  the United States in space,  and  that 
only  more  launchings,  used,  however,  for  the  purposes  of ESRO's 
scientific missions  and  GETS  applications missions,  can  lower 
the  cost of launchers. 
About  recommendation 6,  NISG  points out  the  contradiction 
between  disengagement  from  GETS  and  the  acceptance  (explicitly 
stated in recommendation  9)  of the  principle of regional space 
communications  systems.  NISG  suggest  following the  example  of 
Franco-German collaboration on  the  Symphonie  project by  in-
viting other European  countries to  cooperate in an interna-
tional consortium in the vital space  telecommunications  sector. 
These  two  points of profound  disagreement illustrate the  con-
tinuing sharp conflict in Britain between industry and  govern-
ment  on  space  matters. 
The  NISG  papers  further argue  the  necessity of raising space 
expenditure  to an annual level of $85-100  million;  the  figure 
of $63  million  (less expenditure  in the  US)  for 1967-68  re-
presents  only about  one-third of Britain's nuclear expenditure, 
and  compares  unfavourably with  the percentages  for  the  same 
year  in France  and  the  United States: 
UK  France  us 
Space/GNP  o.08%  0.11%  0.95% 
Defence/GNP  6.90%  6.10%  9.20% 
Space/Defence  1.16%  1.80%  10.3~b The  annual  space  investment  of  $85-100  million would  represent 
3%  of  government  R&D  expenditure  and  would  not  only allow an 
active presence  to be  maintained and  augmented  in this sector, 
but  would  also staunch the  considerable brain drain,  estimated 
at an annual  wastage  of  $170 million,  corresponding to 2,000 
engineers,  scientists and  qualified technicians  emigrating to 
the  US,  where  they  find,  especially in  the  space  area,  more 
sophisticated and satisfying activities and  programmes,  not 
to  speak of higher pay. 
2.  FRANCE 
2.1  Hilitary Activity in the  Nissiles and Space  Area 
France's space  programmeshave,  albeit on  a  smaller  scale~ 
passed through  the  same  chronological sequence  as  the  US  and  . 
Soviet programmes: 
- liquid rockets,  V2  type 
- sounding rockets  and solid-fuel missiles 
- strategic and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads 
- civilian satellite launchers 
- scientific satellites 
- application satellites 
2.1.1  LRBA  (Laboratoire  de  Recherches  Balistiques et Aerodynamiques) 
In 1945-46  the  Direction  des  Etudes  et Fabrication  d 1Armement 
(DEFA)  of the  Delegation Ministerielle pour  l'Armement  (DMA) 
embarked  upon  a  research programme  in the  field of liquid 
propellant rockets  based  on  the  technology of the  V2.  For  the 
future  pursuit of this programme  the  Laboratoire  de  Recherches 
Balistiques et Aerodynamiques  (LRBA)  was  set up at Vernon, 
under  DEFA  auspices,  in 1949. 
The  first task assigned to  the  LRBA  was  development  of the 
liquid-fuelled Veronique,  of a  lower class  than  V2:  some  40 
570 Germans  cooperated  on  this project,  together with about  250 
French engineers.  The  LRBA's  staffing strength was  and still 
is about  1,000.  From  1950  to  1954 about  20  development  firings 
of Veronique  took place. 
Improved series of the  same  rocket,  Veronique  AGI  (L  1.0)1  and 
Veronique  61  (L  1.5)  were  launched as France's contribution to 
the scientific activity of the  International Geophysical Year 
in 1959,  and thereafter,  with the  Vesta rocket  (L  4.0)  for 
scientific missions  of  CNES  since 1962. 
An  upgraded Veronique  was  to inaugurate France's  new  equatorial 
civilian base at Kourou,  French Guiana,  in April 1968. 
During  1955-60  the  limitation of liquid-fuel rockets used 
for military purposes  and  the  superiority of solid propellants, 
more  practical and readily usable,  were  acknowledged. 
From  that time  on LRBA's  activity was  mainly  directed towards 
civilian rocket  engine  programmes: 
- in 1962  LRBA  initiated development  of the  motors  for  the 
French stage  Coralie  (L  10)  of ELDO's  Europa vehicles; 
- during  the  same  period,  R&D  work  began  on  the Vexin  thruster 
for  the  first stage Emeraude  (L  13)  of the  civilian satel-
lite launcher  Diamant  A; 
in 1967  R&D  work  was  begun  on  the  Valois  engine  for  the 
first stage  Amethyste  (L  17)  of Diamant  B. 
LRBA  currently owns: 
- a  space  laboratory 
- an inertial laboratory 
- an  environmental laboratory 
1  The  figure  preceded  by  L  indicates liquid propellant, 
by  tonnes. 
571 - a  hyperballistic tunnel 
- a  department  of advanced  studies  on  the  use  of liquid 
fluorine  as  an  oxidant  for  future  thrusters. 
LRBA  engages  in research,  prototype  development  and proving 
tests;  for production it relies on  the  military workshops  of 
Ateliers  de  Construction  de  Tarbes  (ATS)  with a  labour  force 
of 3,000 equipped  with up-to-date plant  for  the spinning of 
special steels. 
2.1.2 Tactical and  strategic missiles 
Around  1956  the  development  and  production of guided missiles1 
were  put in hand  by: 
- Engins-Matra:  Missile  R  511  (AA),  followed  during the  next 
decade  by  R 530  (AA)  and  Crotale  (GA); 
- Nord-Aviation:  Missile Entac  (AT)  and  AS  20,  followed  during 
the next  decade  by  AS  30,  SS  11,  SS  12,  AS  12 and Harpon  (GG). 
These  missiles  were  to  be  greatly in  demand  on  the  world  export 
market.  For  the  Navy,  Latecoere  developed  the Malafon  (Mks  1 
and  2)  and  the  Ruelle  Arsenal  developed the Masuroa. 
The  capability acquired in the  tactical missile sector yielded 
important international cooperation agreements: 
(a) 
between France,  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Germany  and Italy 
in the  SETEL  consortium  for  producing Hawk  missiles  for 
NATO  under  licence  (1959); 
(b)  between France  and  Germany  (Nord-Aviation/Boelkow 1963) 
for  the  production  of anti-tank missiles Milan,  Hot  and 
Roland,  now  in  the  industrial production phase; 
1  (AA)  =Air-Air;  (AG)  =  Air··Ground;  (GG)  =Ground-Ground 
(GA)  = Ground-Air;  (AT)  =  Anti-tank. 
572 (c)  between France  and Britain  (Matra/HSD  1964)  for production 
of the  Martel  (AG)  with anti-radar warhead by Electronique 
Marcel Dassault  (EMD)  now  in pre-operational testing phase. 
Preliminary studies  on  nuclear ballistic weapons  conducted  by 
the  Ministry for  the  Armed  Forces  during  1956-57  dissuaded 
France  from  independent action in this sector and  gave  the 
preference to the  supersonic strategic bomber:  by  this decision 
France's military air strength was  raised  from  1968  on  to 
62  Mirage  IVs  capable  of carrying a  6C  kt nuclear armament. 
Possibly the orbital flight  of the  first Sputnik  (1957),  but 
undoubtedly  the  assumption  of office  by President  de  Gaulle 
(1958),  spurr~d the French Government  to  extra effort and 
expenditure  in  the  nuclear field for military purposes  and 
in the  strategic missile sector.  A three-phased programme  for 
a  Force  Nationale Strategique  (FNS)  was  set up  for  developing: 
(a)  First generation:  the  Mirage  IV  strategic bomber; 
(b)  Second  generation:  ground-to-ground strategic ballistic 
missiles  (GGSB),  solid-fuelled,  with a  range  of about 
4,000  km  and  a  250 kt nuclear  warhead; 
(c)  Third generation:  sea-land strategic ballistic missile 
(SLSB),  solid-fuelled  (powder),  with  a  range  of about 
2,000  km  and  a  nuclear warhead  of 500 kt,  capable  of 
being launched  from  submerged  nuclear  submarines. 
For  the  execution of  this programme  based  on  new  technologies, 
the  SEREB  (Societe  d'Etudes  et Realisation d'Engins BalistiquesJ 
was  set up  at the  end of 1959. 
2.1.3 SEREB  (Societe  d 1Etudes  et Realisation d'Engins Balistiques) 
SEREB  is charged with central executive  management  of the 
strategic missiles  development  and  production programme. 
573 It comprises  the  three nationalized concerns:  Nord-Aviation 
and Sud-Aviation,  together with  three private undertakings: 
Avions  Marcel  Dassault,  Engins Matra  and  SEPR.  Each  of the 
six contributed a  capital of $0.2  million.  Government  policy 
provides  for a  balanced participation of  public  and private 
enterprise:  collaboration is efficient and productive. 
SEREB's  Board  of Director's includes representatives  of the 
government  bodies  CEA,  ONERA,  Direction  des  Poudres,  under 
DMA  supervision. 
Its staff,  drawn  mainly  from  the partner firms,  numbers  about 
1050,  of  whom  400  are  engineers;  they are  divided  among  the 
technical services at Puteaux and  the  Etablissement  d 1Aquitaine 
near Bordeaux.  SEREB  has  no  workshops  and laboratories,  but 
for  assembling  missiles  makes  use  of the  DMA  facilities at 
CAEPE  (Centre  d'Achevement  et d'Essais  des Propulseurs  d'Engins), 
at  Saint-M~dard. 
The  ballistic missile  programme  covers  a  ten-year period and 
is based  on  gradual  expansion criteria:  a  coherent  series of 
experimental rockets  for  basic ballistic studies  (Les Pierres 
Pr~cieuses) is first required  to  promote  step  by  step: 
- large solid propellant grain  technology; 
- swivelling motor  technique; 
- inertial guidance; 
- Vascojet steel technology; 
- glass  filament  winding; 
- space  electronics. 
Next  comes  work  on  the  GGSB  and  SLSB  missiles.  At  a  steady 
pace  the  following  were  put  on  the  stocks in 1960  and  sub-
sequently developed  by  SEREB: 
-the single-stage  Aigle  (P  0.9)
1 
launched in 1960-61; 
1  The  number  in brackets preceded by  P  indicates  tonnage  of 
solid propellant. 
574 - the  single-stage Agate  (P  2.3)  launched in 1961-62 
- the  single stage Topaze  (P  2.3)  launched in 1962-63 
The  large grains are  manufactured at the  military workshops 
under  the  Direction  des  Poudres at Saint-Medard;  the  motors 
are manufactured  by  SEPR;  Nord-Aviation  develops  the  struc-
tures,  SAGEH  and  SFENA  supply  the  ine:..  .. tial guidance  and  CFTH 
the  electronics.  Sud-Aviation produces  a  small solid stage 
(P  0.7)  in a  glass-filament  wound  container to  be  the  third 
stage  of  the  civilian rockets  Diamant  A and  B. 
SEREB  has  produced successively: 
(a)  the  two-stage Rubis  (P  2.3  +  P  0.7)  launched in 1964; 
(b)  the  single-stage liquid propellant  Emeraude  (L  13) 
using LRBA 1s  Vexin  motors  produced  by  SNECMA. 
Finally,  in 1965,  the  following  were  successfully launched: 
(a)  the  single-stage  Emeraude  (L  13)  in February; 
(b)  the  two-stage Saphir  (L  13  +  P  2.3)  in July; 
(c)  the  three-stage  Diamant  A  (L  13  +  P  2.3 +  P  0.7)  in 
November. 
Meanwhile  development  proceeded  on  the P  4,  P  10  and P  16 
stages of the  strategic missiles,  tested separately in 1966-67. 
The  first proving trials took place at the French base  of 
Hammaguir,  in Algeria,  but  since its evacuation under  the 
Evian  Agreements  in 1967  further  firings  have  been held at 
the  Centre  d'Essais  des  Landes  (CEL)  commissioned in the  mean-
time.  In July 1968  ground  firings  were  conducted at  CEL  of: 
-the complete  GGSB  (P  10  +  P  4); 
- the  P  10  +  P  10  version of the  SLSB  pending firings  in 
the  definitive  configuration of P  16  +  P  10,  scheduled 
for  1969. 
One  month after these  firings France's first experimental 
575 thermonuclear  device  was  exploded at the  Centre  d'Essais  du 
Pacifique,  again  within  the  framework  of the  FNS. 
Future military programmes  provide  for: 
- production of 27  GGSB  to be  installed in underground silos 
in Upper Provence; 
production of 16  SLSB  intended  for  equipping in 1971  the 
first nuclear missile-launching submarine  (SNLE),  the 
"Redoutable",  ready  for  sea trials in 1969; 
- similar armament  for  two  more  SNLEs:  Le  Terrible  (1973)  and 
Le  Foudroyant  (1975); 
- studies for  uprating GGSB  and  SLSB  to  make  them  adequate 
for "all azimuth"  defence. 
Still within  the  framework  of the  FNS,  mention  should  be  made 
of development  of  the  10-15 kt nuclear  GGTB  missile  (ground-
to-ground tactical ballistic)  named Pluton and  due  to  become 
operational in 1972 as  the basic armament  for France's tactical 
nuclear  forces;  the  Styx motor  is being  developed  by  SEPR, 
with  Nord- and Sud-Aviation supplying  the  structure  and  control 
system. 
On  the  basis of  the  two  "programme  laws"  of 1960-64 and  1965-
70,  and  recent  budgets  of  the  Hinistry  for  the  Armed  Forces, 
it may  be  estimated that a  quarter of  the military budget 
(or about  1.25%  of GNP)  will  be  allocated each year  to stra-
tegic nuclear  weapons  throughout  the  decade  1960-70.  Of  this 
share,  20%  (equivalent  to  0.25%  of GNP)  is earmarked  for  the 
GGSB  and  SLSB  missiles,  and  60%  (equivalent to  0.75~~ of GNP) 
for  the  nuclear  warheads  and  nuclear propulsion of the  SNLE. 
The  civilian launchers  have  benefited,  technologically as  well 
as  financially,  from  the  military investments  for  the  FNS. 
A total of  $22  million were  spent  on  Diamant  A,  half  by  DMA 
576 and half by  CNES,  but  the  cost  would  have  been  much  higher 
without  the  military backing. 
2.1.4 Military space  technology 
SEREB-directed activity,  under  DMA  supervision,  in the  stra-
tegic missile field,  has  been  developed  on  the basis of the 
country's  own  technical and scientific resources,  calling on 
the  whole  of industry - aeronautics,  propulsion and  electronics 
- in the  public and private sectors. 
The initial American  embargo  (1960)  on  Boeing and Lockheed 
licenses and  knowhow  in the  solid propellant technologies  used 
in Polaris and Minuteman  was  motivated  by  concern about  the 
proliferation of nuclear ballistic weapons  throughout  the 
world;  in France it slowed  down  and  added  to  the  cost of the 
FNS  development  programme. 
Having  identified the  small number  of keypoints  of technolog-
ical weakness,  French industry succeeded in obtaining by  a 
few  but  valid agreements  American  licenses and  knowhow,  specifi-
cally - according to American  sources  - on: 
- inLtial guidance  (SAGEM  from  General Precision); 
- tracking and  telemetry stations  (Compagnie  des  Compteurs 
from  Cubic  Corporation); 
- on  the  glass  filament  winding  process  (Sud-Aviation  from 
Rocketdyne); 
-on Vasoojet  steels  (from  Canadium  Alloys Steel Corporation). 
Interviews in France  showed  that in these  sectors French 
industry has  been  successful in developing  independent  capa-
bilities,  and in some  cases has  made  original technological 
advances;  there  has  been  complete  independence in the  develop-
ment  of a  capability in large grain technology,  now  equipped 
for  even larger projects than  the  current ones. 
577 2o1.5 Geographical  concentration of plants 
From  1960  to 1965  the  coordinated and  purposive activity of 
SEREB  had a  powerful  impact  on  the  planned industrial decen-
tralization of  the Paris area and  concentration in the  Bordeaux 
area of all military weaponry activities: 
- around  the  government  establishment Poudrerie  de St.  Medard-
en-Jalle,  with a  labour  force  of about  1,200,  there  have 
been  established: 
- CAEPE  (see  previous  mention)  - 400  employees; 
- a  glass  filament  winding  shop  of Sud-Aviation for  the  P  4 
stage  tanks  of  the  SLSB  missile  (labour force  800); 
- a  workshop  of Nord-Aviation and  SNECHA  combined  in the  NOID-1A 
consortium  for  producing  large structures of Vascojet  and 
Maraging  steel for  the  P  10  and P  16  stages  of  the  SLSB  and  GGSB; 
- a  SEPR  R&D  centre  for  propulsion units; 
- and  more  r~cently,  the  CNES  workshop  for integration of 
Diamant  B; 
- on  the  coast  there  has  been  established the  abovementione~ 
GEL,  which has  inherited the  equipment  from  Hammaguir  and 
is responsible  for  development  firings  of tactical and stra-
tegic missiles;  GEL  has at the  moment  a  staff of 2,400 
(1,300  civilians and  1,100 military)  compared  with a  planned 
strength of 3,000 in 1970;  for  its operations  CEL  has  a 
fleet  of three  DC  7s  and  the  Henri Poincare  floating labora-
tory,  specially equipped  for  tracking and  telemetry;  the 
latter establishments have  further  enhanced the  capability 
of France's electronic industry. 
A similar process  of geopraphical  concentration of laboratories 
and  research  centres in the Toulouse  area not  far  away  has  been 
578 planned and started during 1965-70  for  the unified development 
of civilian space activity. 
2.1.6  Other  military activities in rocketry and in space 
Outside  the  FNS  programmes,  the  DMA  has,· through its Direction 
des  Recherches  et Moyens  d'Essais  (DRME),  founded  in 1961, 
financed  SEPR  studies  on  the  H2o2  (liquid hydrogen  and  oxygen) 
cryogenic  motor;  120  technicians  have  been  engaged  on  the 
programme  since  1964;  the  motor,  bench-tested in 1967-68,  is 
extremely promising  for civil space  applications,  and  has 
interested ELDO  for  its second generation launchers;  the  1969 
budget  does  not  provide  for  any  further military funding. 
Besides  the  H2o2  motor  and  the  Styx motor  already referred to 
for Pluton,  SEPR  is engaged  in research and  study  on: 
- P  40  solid propellant motors,  in collaboration with  Nord-
Aviation; 
- small  motors  for  correcting the  trajectory of satellites, 
with  the  Italian firm  Oto-Melara; 
- the  use  of liquid fluorine  as an  oxidant  for  future  propellants, 
in collaboration with  LRBA; 
hybrid propellants  (lithergols~ in collaboration with  ONERA. 
Institutionally financed  by  DMA  through  DRME  are  the  government 
establishments  ONERA  (Office  National  d'Etudes et Recherches 
Aerospatiales)  and  SECT  (Service  d 1Equipement  des  Champs  de 
Tir),  which  have  pursued interesting space activities outside 
the  FNS  programme  on  the  interface between military and  civilian 
interests. 
ONERA  has,  since  1960,  developed  a  diversidied series of solid 
sounding rockets  for technological and scientific research pur-
poses: 
579 - the  four-stage  Berenice,  used  from  1962  on  for research 
into the  hypersonic atmospheric re-entry of warheads,  and 
into ablative materials; 
- the single-stage Tacite,  already launched in connection 
with  the  Cassiopee  technological mission in collaboration 
with  CNES;  ONERA  developed  the solar sensors and high-
precision star-pointing devicef 
- the  two-stage Titus,  produced  on  behalf of  CNES  and used 
for the Eclipse scientific mission to Argentina in 1966; 
- for research on  the  electrical effects of hypersonic re-
entry  (Operation Electra),  ONERA  is developing  the  rocket 
family:  two-stage Titus 2,  three-stage Tibere  and experi-
mental  two-stage  vehicle  Crapel; 
- for  studies of Mach  5  propulsion by  ramjet,  the  two-stage 
vehicle Sta  ta.l  tex was  produced,  with original telemetry 
developed  by  ONERA; 
for research  on  supersonic aerodynamics  of delta winged 
aircraft,  in the  framework  of the  Concorde  project,  the 
two-stage  vehicle  D 6  was  developed. 
Besides  this activity in the  field of solid-propellant sounding 
rockets,  ONERA  has  been  working  with SEPR  since  1964  on  hybrid 
propellants  (lithergols);  the  experimental rocket Lex  tested 
in 1967  proved ONERA's  capability in the  advanced  propulsion 
techniques sector. 
In 1966  SECT  launched a  programme  for  producing small aero-
logical probes  for  measuring  wind  and  temperature at varying 
heights.  Using  the  experiment  developed  on  Matra's Emma, 
SNECHA's  Aurore  and  CFTH's  Elan rockets,  a  family of probes 
called "Les  Dieux Gaulois"  (Epona,  Belisama,  Belenos,  Toutatis) 
were  manufactured and tested at the  beginning of 1968;  another 
580 called Taramis,  planned to  be  operational in 1972,  is under 
development. 
These  achievements  freed France  from  the  necessity of procuring 
Areas  rockets  from  the US  or Skuas  from  Britain;  designed with 
a  view  to  low selling prices,  these  rockets are  sued in meteo-
rology,  civil and military aviation and  on  space  launching 
bases. 
2.1.7 Military research 
France's notable activity in space  missiles has  been  coordinated 
on  the military side  by  a  coherent  and  programmed policy pursued 
by  the  Ministry for  the  Armed  Forces  through  the  DRME  directorate 
of  the  DMA  delegation. 
In 1968  the  DMA  had,  as it would  again in 1969,  a  budget of 
about  $80  million for research alone,  exclusive  of development 
expenditures distributed as  follows: 
* exploratory research  18% 
*  oriented research  52% 
*  development-tied research  30% 
The  DRME  administered a  share  of about  $32  million,  mainly in 
the latter two  sectors.  In aerospace  (subsidized together with 
electronics,  solid-state physics,  plasmas  and  computers)  DRME's 
typical action has  been  concentrated on  university departments 
and  on  government  bodies  such as  ONERA,  SECT,  LRBA  and  the 
Franco-German  fundamental military research institute at St. 
Louis  (ISL). 
2.1.8 Launcher prospects 
After  some  ten years  (1950-60)  of activity on  military projects, 
LRBA  had,  while still remaining  under military sponsorship, 
mainly directed its activities towards  civil launch vehicles 
581 (Coralie  and Diamant),  to  which it brought its considerable 
experience  of liquid propulsion. 
After a  decade  (1959-69)  of work  for  military purposes,  SEREB 
now  has  a  technological capability too  vast  to  be  confined 
to the military sector alone. 
Besides  expertise in systems  engineering and  sponsoring modern 
programme  management  techniques  (PERT,  etc.),  and  general 
qualification in electronics,  from  on-board  computers  to ground 
space antennas,  mention may  be  made  of the  specific case  of 
initial guidance,  taken over  from  strategic missiles and first 
adapted in the  military sphere  to nuclear submarines,  and 
thereafter in the  field of peaceful applications for steering 
Concorde:  such applications will gradually reduce  the  cost·of 
this system and  so  permit its wider application to all forms 
of navigation. 
A more  spectacular peaceful outlet proposed by  SERES  is the 
French satellite launcher Turquoise,  an alternative for  the 
ELDO/PAS  vehicle  making  use  of the  existing operational stages 
P  16  and P  4  (first stage  a  cluster of five  P  16  units;  second 
stage P  16;  third stage P  4).  Such  a  vehicle,  which  would  re-
peat  on  a  large scale  the  operation of converting Diamant  to 
peaceful uses,  would  be  capable  of placing in geostationary 
orbit satellites of 220  kg  by  1971  and  could  then  be  uprated 
by  means  of a  cryogenic  third stage of the  type  developed  by 
SEPR. 
Alternatively LRBA  proposes,  on  the strength of knowhow  acquired 
in liquid propellants,  a  cluster of  seven  Amethyste  rockets  or 
a  new  L  95  stage instead of the  Blue Streak in the  ELDO  vehicles; 
even  the  former  solution could be  operational by  1971;  the 
second would  above all make  possible  future  uprated versions 
of the  complete  launcher. 
582 These  projects have  developed  out  of the  ELDO  crises for 
fear of seeing  compromised  the  planned launching  in 1972 
of the Franco-German Symphonie  telecommunications satellite, 
regarded as  having absolute priority among  France's peaceful 
programmes. 
Independence  in the  space  communications  sector now  plays the 
role assigned ten years ago  to  the  will for  independence in 
the strategic nuclear weapons  area. 
2.2 Civil Space  Programmes,  National and  Cooperative 
2.2.1 ~  (Establishment  of the  Centre National d 1Etudes Spatiales) 
Whereas  shortly after the  flight  of the first Sputnik  (1957) 
France started its military strategic missile programmes, 
under  DMA's  management  for overall planning and SEREB's  for 
overall technical supervision,  the  flight of the first Vostok 
gave  the  starting signal for France's civil space activity 
under  the overall planning management  of  CNES  (Centre  National 
d 1Etudes Spatiales). 
DMA  and  CNES  correspond  on  a  French scale  to  the  DoD  and  NASA 
in the  United States. 
CNES  was  established by  an  Act  of 19  December  1961,  with 
responsibility to  the Minister  for Scientific Research  and 
Atomic  Matters,  for  management  and  coordination of the  whole 
of France's space activities,  national and  international. 
CNES  is a  public scientific and technical body fulfilling a 
role  of  industrial coordination.  It has  financial autonomy. 
Each year  CNES  has  to present to  Parlia~ent, before  the  vote 
on  the  budget,  a  report  on  its activity and results for  the 
past  twelve  months. 
It is a  centralized but  streamlined body  having its own  coherent and planned  programmes,  designed  to  foster  the  widest  possible 
range  of  space  capabilities in scientific laboratories and 
industry at large,  without  any  duplication of their structures. 
Collaboration with  laboratories and  universities is governed 
by  conventions,  while  industrial collaboration is based  on 
calls for  tender and  the  award  of contracts. 
2.2.2 The  space  centres of  CNES 
Centre Spatial de  Bretigny.  Exercises  central control over 
CNES's  test and  checkout  facilities:  space  simulation  chambers, 
computer  centre,  telemetry reduction department.  It is res-
ponsible  for  the  functioning  of the  French  space  communication 
networks,  operational since early 1966: 
the  Diane  tracking network set  up  by  CFTH,  comprising  the 
two  stations at Pretoria,  South Africa and  Kourou,  French 
Guiana; 
- the Iris telemetry and  telecommand  network,  set up  by  CSF 
and  comprising the  six stations of Bretigny,  Canary Islands, 
Ouagadougou  (Upper  Volta),  Brazzaville  (Congo),  Pretoria and 
Kourou. 
The  centre is also responsible  for  the  integration workshop 
of Diamant  B at St.  Medard. 
All  the  abovementioned  infrastructures are  operational.  At  the 
end  of  1967  Bretigny has  a  staff of 394. 
The  Centre Spatial  de  Toulouse.  Planned in 1963  and officially 
inaugurated  on  1  February 1968,  this will have  central control 
of the activities originally set up  at Bretigny: 
- Satellites Division 
- Balloons Division 
- Sounding Rockets Division 
- Experimental Hardware  Division 
584 Completion  of the  transfer is planned  for 1971,  with  a  staff 
of 550  CNES  personnel together with  250  recruited  from  industry. 
In  1970  the  Centre  will have  Europe's  biggest  space  simulation 
chamber  (about  350m3),  already ordered  from  the  same  firm, 
Societe  d'Etudes et  d 1Application Vide  Optique  Mecanique 
(SEAVOM),  who  built similar,  less  capacious  chambers  for 
Bretigny in 1963.  The  establishment  of the  biggest  CNES  oper-
ational centre at Toulouse  forms  part of a  vast planning 
operation for decentralizing research establishments  from  the 
Paris area,  involving the  progressive  transfer of: 
-the Ecole  Nationale Superieure  d'Aeronautique  (ENSA),  with 
a  new  headquarters  being built; 
- the  Centre d'Etudes et de  Recherches  de  Technologie Spatiale 
(CERTS)  founded  in 1967  by  agreement  between  CNES  and  DMA 
and in 1968  incorporated in the structure of ONERA,  with the 
task of liaising between universities and industry; 
-the Centre  d 1Etudes Spatiales  du  Rayonnement  (CESR); 
-the Laboratoire  d'Automatique  et Applications Spatiales  (LAAS); 
-the Centre  d'Etudes et Recherches  en Aerothermie  (CERAT); 
-the Ecole  Nationale  de  l'Aviation Civile  (ENAC). 
Between  1968-73  the  Toulouse  area is to  become  the  home  of 
civil space activity in a  highly industrialized environment 
in the  aerospace  sector,  just as  the  Bordeaux district has 
already  become  the  home  of military launcher activity. 
The  Centre Spatial Guyanais.  The  equatorial base  faces  east 
and is operationally ideal for achieving direct geostationary 
equatorial orbits for applications satellites:  there is no 
such base in the  US  or USSR. 
In 1966  the  converging interests of France's space  authorities and  the  European  ones  of ELDO  determined  the  installation of 
a  launch base at Kourou  in French Guiana.  The  opening  of the 
Guiana  coastline  over  the  whole  north-easterly sector of  the 
compass  also enables direct injection into polar orbits of 
interest to scientific research. 
The  work  has  entailed a  heavy  outlay of capital - the total 
cost is estimated to  be  some  $108  million,  of which  $25 million 
were  paid by  ELDO  for  the European  launch site and  $83  million 
by  CNES;  about  $54  million have  been spent  on  infrastructure 
alone  (roads,  bridges,  housing,  schools,  hospitals,  etc.). 
The  decision  to offer the  Kourou  base  to European  or  foreign 
space  bodies,  under  agreement  to  be  defined,  confers  on  this 
undertaking  the  character of a  geographical and  technical 
facility which is well-nigh unique  in the  world and  can  be 
placed at the  disposal of every nation. 
The  launch of a  Veronique  AGI  rocket  inaugurated the base  on 
9  April 1968,  while  the  construction work  is still proceeding. 
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- Delegue  general a la recherche  scientifique et technique 
- Directeur general of the  centre national  de  la recherche 
scientifique 
- Directeur of the Institut National  d'Astronomie  et de 
Geophysique 
- Directeur de  la DRHE  au Hinistere  des  Armees 
- four highly qualified scientists or industrialists 
four  senior civil servants appointed by  the  Prime Minister 
587 - the  Contr8leur d'Etat attends Board meetings. 
The  following  table  shows  the  annual  growth of CNES's  person-
nel establishment.  Executive  grades  and  technicians  have  an 
absolute  predominance. 
1903  1964  1965  19cn  1967 
Exoo~tive  66  181  225  280  386 
Technicians  8  108  10C  118  100 
Clerical  39  87  12S  126  162 
Operatives  5  ~5  21  15  16 
T 0  TAL  118  391  474  539  714 
Source:  CNES,  Rapport  d'Activite 1967-1968. 
By  departments  the  distribution is as  follows: 
1963  1'364  1965  1966  19o7 
PRESIDENCE  ET  DIRECTION  GENERAL  4  6  6  11  18 
OIRECTICJN  SCIENTJFIQUE  ET  TECHtdQUE  57  291  353  429  !)!30 
DIRECTION  ADMIN.  ET  FINANCIER£  33  61  78  67  78 
DIR.  DES  RELATIO~S EXTERIEURS  24  33  37  :52  ~ 
T 0  T A l  118  :591  474  539  714 
Source:  CNES,  Rapport  d'Activite 1967-1968. 
588 CNES  has  a  government  subsidy for operating coats and another 
for  capital investment;  the latter is intended to  cover  execu-
tion of  the national programme  and  to  finance  work  in respect 
of French pa1·ticipation in the international organizations. 
1962 
CNES  Budgets  (1962-6~ 
(Millions of dollars) 
1963  1964  1965  1956  1967  1958 
* 
Operating costs  0.35  1,25  2.83  4,56  5.43  8.43  18.90 
Investment: 
Authorization of programmes 
(a) national  9,44  21,80  32.20  39,25  44,00  78,35  86.10 
(b) International  8,60  13.00  19,80  20.60  28.00  30.25  :S:S,10 
T 0  TAL  18,04  34.80  52,00  59,85  72,00  108.60  119.20 
Payment  credits 
(a) national  8,26  15,38  25,00  33.85  38.66  66,55  81,90 
( b )  I n terna  t 1  on a 1  8,60  13.00  14.00  20,60  28.00  33,05  36.10 
T 0  TAL  16.86  28,38  39,00  54,45  66,65  99.60  118.00 
Source:  Rapport  d'Activite 1967-1968,  CNES 
*  The  1968  budget  includes the Symphonie  and Eole projects 
under national programmes. 
Expenditure  on  the  national programme  has  invariably and in-
creasingly exceeded that  on international programmes.  After 
being practically equal in 1962,  the ratio became  2.6 in 
payment  authorizations and 2.3 in payment  credits in 1968. 
This high ratio betokens realistic planningo  The  net budget 
increase  for  the  national programme  between  1968  and 67  was 
certainly due  to  the  successes of Diamant  A in 1965-66. Midway  in 1962-68  CNES's  budget  (i.e.,  for  the  whole  of 
France's peaceful space activities)  accounted  for  the 
following  percentage  of the  GNP: 
national programme 
international programmes 
Total 
0.04% 
o.o2jG 
0.06~GNP 
The  overall figure  is about  one-fourth of the appropriation 
for FNS  missile  launchers  (estimated at 0.25%  of GNP  for  the 
decade  1960-70). 
These  mean  values are rising sharply.  For  1968 the  amount  for 
peaceful activities was: 
national programme 
international programmes 
Total 
o.o8% 
0.03% 
0.11%  GNP 
For 1969  the  military budget  provides further appropriations 
for  FNS  missiles amounting  to  0.2~~ of GNP. 
2.2.4 Completed  programmes 
During  the early years  (1962-65)  the activity of  CNES  was 
oriented towards  the provision of infrastructure and  the 
development  of technical programmes  for  launchers and satel-
lites and their associated scientific missions. 
Since  1962  CNES  has  succeeded in carrying  out  operational 
programmes  in  two  sectors:  balloons  and  sounding rockets. 
Balloons  - Balloon activity was  able  to  make  use  of projects 
already  completed  by  the Service  Aeronomie  of the  CNRS;  CNES 
assigned to  that service  the installation of  a  balloon-
launching base at Air-sur-l'Adour. 
By  mid-1968  over 500  launchec had  been  made  for  scientific 
and  technological tasks:  182  between  mid-1967  and  mid-1968, 
590 with balloons  of 5,000  to 100,000  m 3  volume.  In this area  CNES 
has  an  expertise unrivalled in Europe,  for  a  moderate  capital 
cost  ($1.2 million in 1967,  2.3 million in 1968).  This  ex-
pertise,  combined  with that in satellites,  made  possible  the 
launching of the  Eole  programme,  now  in the  development  phase. 
Sounding  rockets  - In this area  CNES  has  been able,  since 
1962  to utilize LRBA's  liquid propellant rockets  and  the solid 
propellant rockets  developed  by  Sud-Aviation,  under  a  research 
programme  commissioned in 1957  by  CNET  (Centre National  d 1 Et~des 
de  Telecommunications). 
Sud-Aviation's  family  of rockets  for  civilian uses  has  been 
designed  for simplicity,  sturdiness,  safety and facility of 
transport.  In 1962  the  single stage Belier and  two-stage  Centaure 
were  operational,  followed  in due  course  by  the  two-stage  Dragon 
(1964),  single-stage Dauphin  (1966)  and  two-stage  Eridan  (1968). 
By  the  end of 1967,  CNES  had  launched a  total of 183 sounding 
rockets  for  a  great variety of scientific missions: 
- 30  Veronique  AGis,  13  Veronique  61s,  4 Vestas,  from  LRBA 
- 4  Rubis  from  SEREB 
- 2  Titus and  1  Tacite  from  ONERA 
- 8  Emmas  from  Matra. 
The  capability achieved in the rocket sector has  made  France 
ESR0 1s  chief supplier of sounding rockets  since 1964. 
Launchers  - In  May  1962  an  agreement  between  CNES  and  DMA  was 
concluded  for  the  manufacture  of France's first three-stage 
rocket,  Diamant  A,  derived  from  developments  of SEREB's  basic 
ballistic missiles.  CNES  and  DMA  contribute  $11  million each. 
Between  November  1965 and February 1967  there  were  four  suc-
cessful firings  from  the  Hammaguir  base;  the last three  placed 
in orbit the satellites Diademe  and  Diapason  1  and  2.  After a 
fresh period of study development  of  the  Diamant  B launcher 
591 began  in 1967  (using Amethyste  as  the  first stage  instead of 
Emeraude);  the  sole  contracting authority on this occasion is 
CNES,  which  expects  to spend  $11.4 million.  Diamant  B  will 
become  operational in 1969,  for  putting up  the satellite D2 
with  a  launching  from  Guiana. 
The  work  on  Diamant  B is distributed as  follows: 
LRBA:  proving and  qualifying the  Valois  motor 
Ateliers  de  Tarbes:  industrial production of the  Valois  motor 
Nord-Aviation:  development  and  manufacture  of  the  first stage 
(L  17);  manufacture  of the  second stage  (L  2.3) 
Sud-Aviation:  manufacture  of the  third stage  (P  0.7)  and heat 
shielding 
Matra:  equipment  bays 
By  the  end  of 1968  CNES  had  ordered  four  Diamant  Bs. 
Scientific satellites 
FR  1  - In February 1963  an  agreement  was  signed between  CNES 
and  NASA  for  a  free  of  charge  launching of France's first 
s~tellite. Nord-Aviation  developed  the  structure and 
CGE  the  electronics.  CNET  collaborated in the  passenger 
experiments.  Launched  by  NASA  with  a  Scout  rocket  on 
6  December  1965,  the satellite is still functioning. 
Diapason  - Prime  contractor l'Electronique Marcel  Dassault 
(EMD),  structure  by  Matra.  Launched  on  17  December 
1966  from  Hammaguir  by  a  Diamant  A rocket. Still 
functioning. 
Diad~me 1  and  2  - Prime  contractor EMD,  structure  by Matra. 
Launched  on  8  and  15  February 1967  from  Hammaguir 
by  a  Diamant  A launcher.  One  of  the  two  satellites 
is still functioning,  the  other is being  used as  a 
laser reflector. 
592 From  the  standpoint  of space  capability,  Diapason already 
shows  a  marked  progress  over FR  1,  with France  providing its 
own  launcher,  launch base  and  tracking and  telemetry network. 
In  the list of suppliers of the  on-board  telemetry,  American 
firms  have  given  way  to French undertakings. 
2.2.5  Current  programmes 
In 1968  it was  planned  to  launch,  by  1972,  two  scientific 
satellites  (D  2  and Roseau)  and  two  applications satellites 
(FR  2  for  meteorology,  Symphonie  for  telecommunications), 
while  longer-term studies  on  satellites to assist air navi-
gation  (Dioscures)  - 1973-75  - were  also  commissioned. 
D 2  - Scientific satellite,  launching  from  Guiana  by  Diamant  B 
rocket  planned  for  1969.  A collaborative effort by  the 
whole  French industry  (EMD,  Sud-Aviation,  Nord-Aviation, 
CFTH,  Matra,  etc.). 
Roseau  - A Franco-Soviet agreement  concluded in May  1967  pro-
vided  for  a  Soviet  launch of  the  scientific satellite 
Roseau  in 1971.  Owing  to France's financial position, 
the  programme  was  cancelled at the  end  of 1968.  A mere 
postponement  would  have  left it devoid of scientific 
interest,  in that it was  timed  to  coincide with the  high 
level of solar activity in 1971. 
The  applications satellite programmes  cover all three  space 
sectors considered the  most  promising  nowadays:  navigation, 
telecommunications,  meteorology. 
Dioscures project,  for navigational aid satellites,  planned 
to  be  operational in 1972-75,  and  studied  jointly by  CNES 
and  the Secretariat General a l'Aviation divil. It is based 
on  a  detailed analysis of the  trends  in air traffic over 
the  North Atlantic,  and of the  savings in fuel  and  flight 
593 time  obtainable  by  an accurate  space  control system. 
Eole  project,  combining French expertise in balloons and 
satellites. The  French satellite FR  2  will be  in radio 
contact with 500  balloons  launched in the southern hemisphere 
for  the  study  of  atmospheric  flows.  The  project attracted 
the  interest of  NASA  which,  on  the  basis of the  agreement 
signed with  CNES  in May  1966,  is to offer a  launcher and 
launching in 1971  (cost  to France  $30  million).  Preliminary 
trials have  already been held. 
Symphonie  project,  born of the  amalgamation of the French 
SAROS  and  German  Clympia  preliminary projects.  In view of 
the  slowness  of decision making  in  GETS  and  the  advisability 
of securing a  strong position for  the  renegotiation of the 
INTELSAT  agreements  in 1969,  France  and  Germany  agreed in 
June  1967  upon  the  manufacture  and  launching of geostation-
ary satellites for  telecommunications  experiments  to  be 
completed in 1972. 
One  prototype  and  two  flight  models  are  planned,  equipped 
for TV,  sound  broadcasting and  telephon7.  The  satellite 
weight  of about  175  kg  demands  a  launcher of ELDO/PAS  class, 
geostationary over  the  Central Atlantic and placed in orbit 
from  Guiana. 
France  and  Germany  have  ordered  two  such vehicles  for 1971. 
ELDO's  recent crises have  induced France  to study possible 
alternative choices  of  launcher,  granted the absolute pri-
ority given  to  telecommunications  among  the space  programmes. 
It is not  certain that procurement  of US  launchers  would  be 
possible. 
For the  management  of  the  Symphonie  project a  managing 
board with the  following  organization  chart has  been set 
up: 
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Organization Chart  for the  Symphonie  Project 
Managing  Board 
Executive 
Committee 
CNES 
CN E.T/ 
ORTF 
CNES  J 
Contracts  workl.nr  Groups  ContLcta 
, 
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Franco-German industrial consortia 
ARD/ZDF:  Deutsche  Rundfunk- und Fernsehanstalten  (Offices 
allemands  de  radiodiffusion et de  television -
1re et 2e  chaines). 
BMP:  Bundesministerium  fUr  das Post- und  Fernmeldwesen 
(Ministere  federal  des  pastes et  telecommunications). 
BHwF:  Bundesministerium  fUr  wissenschaftliche Forschung 
(Ministere  federal  de  la recherche scientifique). 
BFA:  Bundespresseamt  (Office  federal  de  la presse). 
CNES:  Centre  National  d 1Etudes Spatiales. 
CNET:  Centre  National  d'Etudes  des  Telecommunications. 
DVL:  Deutsche  Versuchanstalt  fUr  Luft- und  Raumfahrt 
(Organisation allemande  de  recherche aerospatiale). 
FTZ:  Fernmeldetechnisches Zentralamt  (Office  central de 
telecommunications). 
GfW:  Gesellschaft  fUr  Weltraumforschung  (Societe nationale 
de  recherches spatiales). 
ORTF:  Office  de  Radiodiffusion Television Franqaise. 
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out in January 1968.  Two  consortia were  set up,  CIFAS  (Con-
sortium Industrial Franco-Allemand Symphonie)  and Symcosat, 
as  shown  in the  following  chart: 
French  German  French  German 
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Given  the preponderance  in cost and  technical content  of the 
electronics,  the  managing  board  was  then to  "symmetrize"  the 
winning  consortium by  giving the loser a  share in the  electron-
ics.  At  the  beginning of 1968  the Belgian Government  agreed 
to  take  a  4%  participation in the  Symphonie  programme.  MBLE 
was  a  member  of  CIFAS,  and  ACEC  of Symcosat. 
The  absence  will be  noted of France's LCT,  Germany's  Lorentz 
and Belgium's Bell,  in which  ITT  has  holdings  of 99.96,  95.43 
and 99.99%  respectively. 
Taking  the realistic view  that access  to  American  knowhow 
was  unlikely,  France  and Germany  had previously put in hand 
and  financed  research and  development  on  the  technologically 
most  critical points:  counter-rotating antennas  and travelling 
wave  tubes. 
596 In October 1968  the  Managing  Board  of the  Symphonie  project 
selected the  CIFAS  consortium;  the  operations  for  "symmetrizing" 
the  electronics contracts are  proceeding.  The  cost of the sat-
ellites alone is estimated at about  $56  million.  The  satellite 
will be  tried out  either with  antennas  conforming  to  INTELSAT 
standards  (diameter  27.5  m)  or with  lower antennas  (diameter 
12-15  m)  to analyse  the  possibilities for  cutting down  ground 
infrastructure  costs. 
2.2.6 Industrial policy of  CNES 
The  distribution of  CNES's  major  expenditure  by  branches is 
shown  for  the last few  years preceding the  start of the  project, 
in  the  following  table: 
'i964  19&5  1955  19&7 
(%) 
Aerospace  (vehicles and  on-board electronj  34  25  :.'>8  20 
1CS 
Electronics  (ground  hardware)  31  33  19  15 
Scientific laboratories  9  15  11  12 
Purchases  from  abroad  7  5  2  0,7 
The  sharp  decline in purchases  from  abroad will be  noted;  the 
peak in 1965  for  the  ground electronics corresponds  to  con-
struction of the  Diane  and Iris networks.  The  apparent  decline 
in 1967  in expenditure in the advanced  technology sector is 
due  to a  general cut-back  owing  to the  capital costs of infra-
structure for  the  Guiana Space  Centre. 
In deploying its projects over a  wide  field  CNES  has  sponso~ed 
the latest techniques of system analysis and  programme  manage-
ment  (PERT,  etc.);  and has kept  the  door  open to every possible 
industrial collaboration in order  to  make  full use  of space 
597 capabilities  from  their infancy. 
Since  October 1967,  CNES  has  established an Industrial Policy 
Division in its External Relations Directorate to  improve  the 
efficacy of government  intervention in the industrial sector, 
where  the  space  technology potential is to  grow  and keep  pace 
with the parallel growth of  CNES  activities. 
3.  GERMANY 
3.1  Origins  and Organization of Space  Activity 
Unlike  what  happened in US  and  USSR  and,  on  the  European 
scale,  in France  and Britain,  the initial interest in space 
activity in West  Germany  was  not  a  byproduct  of post-war bal-
listic weaponry.  Only at the start of  the  long-drawn-out  nego-
tiations for  the  establishment  of  ELDO  and  ESRO  did the  German 
aeronautical industry,  through  the  BDLI  (Bundesverband  der 
Deutschen Luft- un  Raumfahrtindustrie)  and research  centres 
(AVA,  DFL,  DVL)  coordinated in the  DGF  (Deutsche  Gesellschaft 
fUr  Flugwissenschaften),  envisage  the  need  for  their  own  na-
tional peaceful space  programme. 
In  August  1961  the  BDLI  and  DGF  set up  a  joint commission 
called the  KfR  (Kommission  fUr  Raumfahrttechnik),  which  in 
July 1962  presented the  first  four-year  space  plan taking in 
industry and scientific research;  the  plan aimed  to  secure 
expert German  participation in European  space  programmes  and 
provided  for  the  creation of adequate  modern  infrastructures. 
The  four-year plan's financial proposals  break down  as  follows: 
(Millions of dollars) 
Year  Research  Industr~ 
~GNP  {DGF)  (89LI) 
TOT~~L 
1  9 6 3  10,8  20,7  31.5  0,03& 
1 9  6  4  12,0  37,5  ~9.5  0.054 
1 9  6 5  13,0  55,0  G8.0  0,072 
1  9  6 6  10.5  74.0  84,5  O.C85 
LQ.l...U.  46,3  187.2  23'3.5 
598 However,  at the political level it was  still not accepted 
that the  country had  to have  a  definite space  commitment  for 
peaceful ends;  the  following  table  compares  the  appropriations 
demanded  for  the  four-year  plan and actual government  expend-
iture on  the  national programme: 
(Millions  of dollars) 
1.t!jxpena-
fh  %  Year  Kfr plar  iture  Agreed  Spent 
1  9  G 3  :51.5  9.0  28.6  0.010 
1  9  6  4  49.5  13.8  2S.O  0.015 
1  9  6 5  68.0  17.5  25.7  0.019 
1  9  6 6  84,5  18.0  21.3  0.018 
As  early as  1963  the  KfR  realized that the  four-year plan had 
set its sights too  high both in absolute  figures  and  in growth 
rate,  and  a  more  realistic plan  was  worked  out  for 1964,  pro-
viding $5.1  million for  research and  $23.4 million for  industry 
(including $6.5 million  for  infrastructure). 
Not  even  this curtailed plan  ($28.5  million)  was  accepted by 
the  government  in 1964. 
That  was  the  year in which  ELDO  and  ESRO  began their official 
activity;  the  need  for expert German  participation stimulated 
the  establishment  of suitable government  agencies. 
The  Bundesministerium  fUr  wissenschaftliche Forschung  (BMwF) 
coordinates space activity as  a  whole,  and in 1964  set up: 
- Department  IV:  Space  Research,  assisted on  the  technical 
and scientific planes  by  the  DKfW  (Deutsche  Kommission  fUr 
Weltraumforschung)  and  DWR  (Deutscher  Wissenschaftsrat); 
599 - the  GfW  corporation  (Gesellschaft fur  Weltraumforschung 
GmbH)  an  operational body  financed exclusively by  the 
federal  government  and non-profit-making;  responsible  for 
supervision of industrial activity and research. 
The  KfR,  which  already coordinated the  space activites of 
BDLI  and  DGF,  was  the executive  counterpart of GfW.  The  fol-
lowing  operational  framework  was  the  result& 
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In 1965  KfR  drafted a  new  five-year plan (1966-70),  setting 
as  a  target  for 1970  a  sum  of $66.0 million which  under  the 
first four-year  plan  was  to  be  greatly exceeded already in 
1966).  The  1966-70  plan provided  for  a  total expenditure  of 
$236.5  million over  the  five-year period,  divided up  as 
follows: 
(a)  Research  19% 
(b)  Industry  44% 
(c)  Space  communications  21% 
(d)  Ground  equipment  16% 
600 This  fresh  KfR  proposal guided  the  Ministry of Research in 
drawing up  its medium-term  five-year plan  (1967-71),  for  a 
total expenditure  of $506  million,  broken  down  as  follows: 
1957  1958  19&9  1970  1971  TOTAL 
Basic national programme  29.7  40.0  55.5  67,0  69,5  261,7 
Supplementary national programme  - - 7.5  15,0  27,5  50.0 
Total national programme  29,7  40.0  6310  82.0  97.0  311.7 
Participation in 
international organizations  38.5  41.2  33,5  :58.3  37.8  ~94,3 
Grand 
Ratio 
total  68.5  81.2  101.5  120,3  134,8  505,0 
national/international  0,78  0,97  1.€3  2.09  2,57  1,60 
The  total capital expenditure  on  space  practically doubles 
every five  years,  with an  average  annual  increment  of 19%. 
In 1971  these appropriations will represent about  0.11%  of 
GNP. 
The  funding  of the  plan moves  towards  an  ever greater national 
commitment  compared  with  the  international one,  as  the last 
line in the  table  shows.  Actually,  already in 1967  and 1968 
the  figures  for  the  domestic  programme  were  slightly exceeded, 
while  those  for  the  international programmes  could not  be 
realized,  so  that the ratios of 0.78 and 0.97  were  in fact 
1.03 and 1.11. 
The  following table  compares  the  KfR  and  BMwF  financial 
plans with expenditures incurred to date  for  the national 
programme  alone  (millions of dollars): 
601 KfR  plan  BMwF  plan  ~fpend-
J.  ure 
on 
Year  -=>up~.Le- national 
1962  1954  1965  Basic men  ary  TOTAL  programme 
plan  plan 
1  9  6 3  31.5  9,0 
1  9  6  4  49,5  28,5  13,8 
1  9  6  5  68,0  17,5 
1  9  6  6  84.5  21,0  18.0 
1  9  6 7  36,5  29,7  0,0  29,7  35.0 
1  9  6 8  52,0  40,0  0,0  40,0  42,0 
1  9  6 9  61,0  55,5  7,5  63.0 
1  9 7 0  66,0  67.0  15.0  82,0 
1  9  7 1  o9.s  27.5  97.0 
A fresh stride towards  rationalization of efforts in aerospace 
was  made  in July 1968  with the  formation  of the  new  Institute 
"Deutsche Forschung und  Versuchsanstalt  fUr  Luft- und Raumfahrt" 
combining  the  three  research centres:  AVA  (Gottingen),  DFL 
(Brunswick)  and  DVL  (Potz-Wahn). 
The  new  Institute has  a  staffing establishment  of 2,500,  in-
cluding 800  scientists and  engineers,  and its initial allo-
cation for  the  first year of  operations  was  $23.2 million. 
Its basic purpose is to  coordinate  both  the State's and 
industry's aerospace  R&D  policy,  besides training new  scien-
tific and  technical recruits to  the  sector.  A government 
board supervises  the  new  Institute,  with representatives for 
politics,  science  and industry. 
3.2 Activity and Prospects 
Germany's  first space  achievements  were  programmed in detail 
in the KfR  plan  for  1963-66. 
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coordinated  by  DGF,  the  plan provided - still as part of its 
basic activity - for organic  expenditure  in the provision of 
infrastructures and centralized research or manufacturing 
plant.  In the latter direction the  following  have  been 
particularly active:  the  firm  of  IABG  (Industria-Anlagen 
Betriebs-Gesellschaft)  and  the  ASAT  Consortium  (Arbeitgemein-
schaft Satellitentrager)  formed  by  the  firms  of Boelkow  and 
ERNO  for the  ELDO  development  programme. 
The  same  KfR  plan  went  on  to set up  the  following  operational 
space projects: 
(a)  Project 621  - Recoverable  high altitude sounding rockets. 
Between  1962  and 1965  two  competitive projects  were  devel-
oped  by  the  Dornier-Lorenz-Telefunken group  and  Boelkow-
Junkers.  Subsequently,  in  view  of the  gradual  decline in 
costs of European  and  American  conventional rockets  and 
the high  costs of recovery  systems,  the  project  was  prac-
tically pigeonholed. 
(b)  Project  622  - High  energy propulsion systems.  The  studies 
and  experiments  of  the  firms  Boelkow,  ERNO  and  Nitrochemie 
in the  cryogenic propellant sector  were  started in 1963  as 
a  contribution to  the project  for  sophisticated upper  stages 
for  the  future  ELDO  launchers.  The  peak  funding  ($0.8  mil-
lion)  was  reached in 1964. 
(c)  Project 623  - Recoverable  space  transporter.  Backed  by 
EUROSPACE  as  a  possible programme  of  long-term European 
cooperation,  the project  was  worked  on  by  the  whole  of 
the German  aerospace  industry:  in particular Siemens-
Halske  contributed part of its own  finance;  other partic-
ipants were  Junkers,  Boelkow,  AEG  and  ERNO.  The  peak of 
funding  was  reached in 1963  ($0.85 million).  In 1964 
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though it was  by  then clear that it would  have  taken at 
least seven or eight years  to  develop  even  on  a  European 
collaborative basis. 
(d)  Project 624  - Non-chemical propulsion.  This project, 
originally centred on electrical and nuclear propulsion, 
was  later extended to  the  technology of on-board power 
sources  (solar cells,  fuel cells,  small nuclear reactors) 
and added to  the expertise of a  large part of Germany's 
aerospace  industry:  in particular Siemens-Schuckertwerke 
contributed part of its own  finance;  other participants 
were  AEGt  ERNO  and International-Atomreaktorbau.  Peak 
finance  was  reached in 1964  ($2.20 million). 
(e)  Project 625  - Scientific research satellites. The  prelimi-
nary studies,  mainly conducted  by  Boelkow,  Dornier and 
ERNO  in 1962-65,  were  oriented towards  definition and 
feasibility.  During  that period the  peak  funding  ($2.6 
million)  was  in 1964.  Only after signature  of the 1965 
agreement  with  NASA  for  free-of-charge  launching of German 
national satellites did the  programme  set its sights  on 
the  AZUR  satellite series. 
After the initial period  (1962-65)  of widely differing space 
activities,  the  programmes  focus  on  more  unified targets, 
while  the  government  agrees  to bear a  larger share  of the 
cost. 
The  BMfR  five-year plan  (1967-71)  realistically excludes any 
German  commitment  whatsoever  in the  manufacture  of sounding 
rockets,  a  sector where  there is now  too  much  competition in 
Europe  itself. In order to have  a  stake in the  sector,  the 
firm Dornier-System will collaborate with  Contraves  of 
Switzerland. 
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is ruled out,  an  option  by  which Germany  is committed  to  firm 
support of ELDO  and possibly,  to a  lesser degree,  to suing 
American  or  European national rockets.  Hence  expenditure  on 
propulsion and  launcher systems is systematically out back 
while  that  on  scientific,  technological and applications 
projects is substantially increased. 
(f)  Scientific missions  - The  1967-71  plan allocates about 
$20  million  for the preparation of scientific payloads 
to  be  put  up  by  rockets or balloons  in collaboration 
with France,  Canada  and ESRO,  or carried as passengers 
on  NATO  satellites. 
In this connection  DVL  completed in 1968,  a  campaign  of 
sounding rocket  launchings  from ESRO's  Kiruna  base. 
(g)  Scientific satellites - The  1967-71  plan provides for the 
manufacture  of three satellites:  625-Azur  1 1  625-Azur 2, 
625-Azur  3  of about  100  kg,  for  launching by Scout rockets 
supplied free  of  charge  by  NASA. 
The  estimated cost of the  three satellites is $10.5,  8.0 
and 5.5 million respectively. 
Azur  1  is ready  for  launching,  scheduled for  October 1969, 
into polar orbit. 
The  partners in the venture,  under  GfW  direction and  over-
sight,  are:  Boelkow  (prime  contractor for project manage-
ment  and satellite integration);  AEG  (on-board power  supply); 
Dornier-System  (stabilization and  thermal control);  ERNO 
satellite structure);  Lorenz  (guidance  system);  Telefunken 
(telemetry). 
Contracts  for  the  other two  satellites,  due  to  be  orbited 
after 1970-71,  have still to be  awarded. 
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for  joint research in interplanetary space. 
After preliminary studies carried out  jointly by  Boelkow 
and  the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of  NASA,  for  the  possible 
construction of a  Jupiter probe,  the  solar probe  project 
ISOS,  capable  of achieving a  heliocentric orbit one-third 
that of the  earth,  has  been  developed. 
This project,  absolutely original for  any  country in the 
world,  poses difficult engineering problems  of thermal 
shielding,  especially in the  case  of solar cells and 
antennas. 
The  project has greatly interested NASA,  which  is to 
supply  without  charge  the  improved  Centaur launch vehicle. 
Boelkow's project is at an advanced  phase  of preparation, 
and  the  launching may  be  expected in 1973-74.  The  1967-71 
plan earmarks  $24.0 million for  the  purposes. 
The  supplementary scientific programme  also includes  for 
1969-71,  with  a  lower priority,  a  large scientific satel-
lite  (625-B2)  of  400  kg,  and another solar probe. 
(i)  Space  technology  - $47.5  million are set aside in the 
1967-71  plan  for advanced  technologies,  of cardinal 
importance  for all future  space  projects,  in the special 
materials,  on-board power  sources,  propulsion,  on-board 
electronics and  data  transmission and  reduction areas. 
Great  importance is also attached to  the  extension and 
modernization  of research facilities and test equipment. 
The  supplementary programme  provides  for  only  one  possible 
technological satellite  (PT-B1),  for  trials of space 
components  and sub-assemblies,  after 1970-71. 
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meteorology,  navigation and  geodesy there are  only plans 
for limited studies of instrumentation and sensors.  The 
capital outlay under  the  plan 1967-71  is mainly oriented 
towards  space  telecommunications. 
Besides strongly supporting the  CETS  programme  since their 
inception,  BMwF  had  begun preliminary studies on  an  exper-
imental  communications satellite  (Olympia). 
In June  1967  Germany  and France  signed the  agreement  for 
the  joint construction of a  regional geostationary satel-
lite, Symphonie,  for  TV  and  sound  radio broadcasting and 
experimental  telephony. 
For  a  description of the  Symphonie  project,  see Section 2. 
Here  we  shall simply recall the  chief features  of Germany's 
contribution. 
The  1967-71  plan allocates $32.5  million for  the  project, 
inclusive of launch costs. 
The  managing  board  of  the  Symphonie  project  comprises, 
on  the  German  side,  BMwF,  BMP  (Bundesministerium  fUr 
Post und Fernmeldwesen)  and  BPA  (Bundespresseamt);  GfW 
is responsible  for  executive  control,  and  together with 
DVL,  FTZ  (Fernmeldetechnisches  Zentralamt)  and  ARD/ZDF 
Deutsche  Rundfunk- und Fernsehanstalten)  forms  the  German 
working  group.  Of  the  two  tenders  by  the  CIFAS  and 
Symcosat  consortia,  the  managing  board accepted the 
former  in October 1968.  Accordingly,  the German  firms 
helping to  produce  the  Symphonie  satellite are Boelkow 
and Junkers;  ERNO,  which  was  in the  second  consortium, 
is left out.  The  second  consortium also  included the 
electronics  firms  Siemens  and Telefunken,  which will, 
however,  be  awarded part of the  contract  on  the basis 
of the  "symmetrization"  clause,  which apportions  among 
607 the  Franco-German  firms  the  large  amount  of  work  on 
electronics,  requiring the  cooperation of all the  most 
advanced  capabilities in both countries. 
In 1962  interest began  to  switch to  space activities throughout 
the  German  aeronautical and  electronics industries.  The  labour 
force  engaged  on  space  numbered  about  3,000 in 1966  and  4,000 
in 19681. 
Particularly active in the  field  w~re: 
- the  firm  of Boelkow,  with widely diversified interests 
in everything to  do  with aircraft,  rocketry and  space, 
and with  a  notable  international outlook fostered  by  the 
financial participation of Nord-Aviation and Boeing; 
- ERNO,  exclusively interested in space  since it was  con-
verted in 1967  from  a  consortium grouping  VFW  and  HF 
to  ERNO  Raumfahrttechnik GmbH,  with a  head  office in 
Bremen  and  wholly German  capital  ($2.5 million:  60%  VFW, 
40%  HF).  In 1968  it had  a  sta.ff of 900. 
With  the  development  of the  Symphonie  project and  work 
carried out also  by  German  electronics  firms  on  the  ground 
stations  for  INTELSAT,  especially by  Siemens  and  Telefunken, 
German  industry's space  capability is growing. 
1  Including those  employed  by  electronics  firms. 
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4.1  Origins of Space  Activity 
Public interest in space activity in Italy dates  from  1959-60, 
when  the  CNR  (Consiglio Nazionale  delle  Ricerche)  allocated 
$0.5 million for preliminary studies of scientific space 
programmes.  Having  examined propositions  by  the  various 
institutes and  research  centres,  the  CNR  decided in 1962 
to concentrate its intervention  on  the  San  Marco  project, 
developed  by  the  CRA  (Centro Ricerche  Aerospaziali)  of Rome 
in 1961. 
For an  expanded  programme,  an  Italo-American  cooperation 
agreement  was  signed  on  5  September  1962,  whereby  NASA  was 
to  supply  free  of  cost~ Shotput  rockets  for sub-orbital 
launchings,  together with  technical assistance  on  the  project 
and  training for  Italian personnel.  This  agreement  preceded 
by  two  years  the  official start on  European  space  cooperation 
in ELDO  and  ESRO. 
4.2 Organization of Space  R&D 
The  CNR,  an  offshoot  of the  Prime Minister's office,  promotes 
and  coordinates  government  activity in  fundamental  and applied 
research.  In  the  space  sector it has  a  technical and  scien-
tific advisory body,  the  Commissione  Ricerche Spaziali,  and 
an executive  body,  the  Istituto Ricerche Spaziali. 
The  Commissione  Ricerche Spaziali draws  up  scientific and 
technical plans,  whether  for  the national programme  or for 
Italy's participation in ESRO;  its work  is supported by  the 
following  sub-committees: 
- Physics and astrophysics 
- Astronomy 
Geophysics  and  surveying 
609 - Space  vehicles 
- Electronics 
- Biology 
which  operate at the  level of state institutes,  laboratories 
and  observatories. 
- The  Istituto Ricerche Spaziali,  created on  20  April 1963, 
is presided over  by  the  Chairman  of  CNR.  On  the  management 
committee  are representatives of the  ministers of Foreign 
Affairs,  Defence,  Industry and  Commerce,  state enterprises, 
Posts and Telecommunications,  the Treasury and Scientific 
and Technical Research.  The  Executive Secretariat coordinates 
the  work  of the  Italian  delegat~on to ELDO,  ESRO  and  GETS; 
it administers  the  relevant  contracts placed in Italy and 
supervises,  technically and  financially,  their execution 
at national laboratories and in industry. 
The  following also  contribute to  CNR's  space activity: 
- Centro Nazionale  per la Fisica dell'Atmosfera  e  la 
Meteorologia,  with headquarters  in Rome; 
- Commissione  di Studio per le Telecommunicazioni  a  mezzo 
di Satelliti Artificiali,  which  coordinates  the  activity 
of university departments  in telecommunications. 
During 1962-68,  CNR  allocated in all $15.8  million to  space 
activity,  approx.  80%  ($12.6 million)  for  the  San Marco  pro-
gramme  and approx.  20%  ($3.2 million)  for  research at national 
laboratories. 
The  Ministry of Defence  contributed to  space  R&D  by  means  of: 
- subsidies and loans of technical personnel to  CRA; 
- extraordinary subsidies to  the  San  Marco  project; 
- running and  expanding  the  Salto di Quirra base in Sardinia 
for  the  launching of sounding rockets  (Italian,  foreign,  or 
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were  laid out  on this account; 
- starting up  its own  research and  development  programmes, 
e.g.,  national sounding rockets  ($4.3 million in the  two 
years 1963-64,  1964-65),  meteorological programmes  ($1.3 
million during the  same  years)  and preliminary studies for 
a  new  rocket  of 7  t  thrust  ($0.3 million in 1967). 
In 1965,  the  Italian aerospace  industry  formed  the  Compania 
Industriale Aerospaziale  (CIA)  with a  capital of $0.11  mil-
lion; its members  aret  Bombrini-Parodi-Delfino,  Breda,  FIAR, 
FIAT,  Finmeccanica,  Montecatini-Edison,  Selenia. 
CIA  coordinates,  at industrial level,  Italian supplies  for 
the  European  programmes.  It acts as Italian prime  contractor 
for  the  ELDO/PAS  programme. 
4.3 National Programme 
As  has  been stated,  CNR  has  invested $3.2 million in the 
programmes  of the National Laboratories  coordinated by  the 
Commissione  Ricerch~ Spaziali.  More  precisely,  the  following 
funds  were  allocated:  $0.5 million in 1965  and $2.7  million 
for  the  two  years  1967-68.  These  modest  outlays  were  mainly 
devoted to the  preparation of scientific payloads  for  mounting 
on:  - Italian and  ESRO  sounding rockets; 
- ESRO  and  NASA  satellites. 
The  major  finance  ($12.6  million  from  1962-68)  was  earmarked 
by  CNR  for  the  CRA's  San Marco  project,  which also benefited 
from  funds  from  the  Aeronautica Militare. 
CRA  was  set up  in its present structure in February 1963  with 
a  convention between  the  University of  ~orne and  Aeronautica 
Militare.  It occupies  a  site of 28,000  m 2  on  the  Rome  City 
Airport,  and  has  a  current establishment of 300,  detached 
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Militare and partly from  CNR. 
In  1960  the  Centre  was  equipped with intermittent aerodynamic 
tunnels: 
- supersonic  up  to  mach  4,  cross-section 1  x  1  m; 
- hypersonic  up  to mach  8,  cross-section 30  om  in diameter; 
- hypersonic  up  to mach  12,  cross-section 30  om  in diameter. 
Subsequently  CRA  was  equipped with: 
- another intermittent hypersonic  tunnel,  with electric arc 
(Hot  Shot)  capable  of speeds  up  to mach  19  in a  section of 
60  em  diameter; 
- a  space  simulation  chamber  of about  30  m 2  capacity for 
ground tests of satellites of dimensions  up  to 2  m; 
- a  vibration table  for  analysing stress loadings of satel-
lites during  the  launching phase; 
- a  dynamic  balancing unit  for satellites. 
CNR  has at present: 
- an electronics laboratory for  R&D  on  space  components  and 
integration of satellites; 
- a  computer  and data-processing centre  equipped with  two 
IBM  1620  and SDS  920  computers; 
- a  physics laboratory; 
- a  mechanical  workshop; 
- a  documentation  centre. 
During  the  three years  1961-63,  CRA  carried out  from  the 
military base  in Sardinia 15  firings  of Nike-Cajum  and  Nike-
Apache  rockets  for  the  exploration of atmospheric  density  by 
means  of sodium  and  lithium  clouds. 
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lite San Marco  A,  developed in agreement  with  NASA  in September 
1964,  took place in April and  August  1963  from  the  NASA  base 
on  Wallops  Island. 
In the  meantime  development  work  proceeded  on  the  original 
floating  launch platform: 
- Santa Rita,  a  triangle of 700  m 2,  constructed by  converting 
a  Scarabeo oil-ring transferred from  ENI  to  CNR  and adapted 
at the Taranto  Dockyards; 
- San Marco,  a  rectangle  of 30  x  100  m,  constructed by  con-
verting a  floating harbour  sold  by  the  US  to  CNR  and  adapted 
at the La  Spezia Dockyards. 
The  two  mobile  platforms  were  anchored  on  the  Equator off the 
territorial waters  of Kenya  in the  Indian Ocean.  Before  the 
establishment of the Guiana  Base  with launching pads  for 
French and  ELDO  rockets,  the  Italian platforms constituted 
the  only base  in the  world  for direct launchings into equa-
torial orbits,  capable  of reaping the  benefit of easterly 
launches. 
In March-April 1964  the Santa Rita platform was  used for 
launching three  Nike-Apache  rockets;  then,  when  the San Marco 
platform  was  fitted out  with launch pads  for the Scout  vehicle, 
Santa Rita became  a  support  base  with  a  launch  control room, 
radars and  telemetry  equipment.  The  infrastructure for  the 
mobile  base  is supplemented  by  a  telecommand  and  telemetry 
station,  also mobile  on  three  trucks  with electric generator 
sets,  at present stationed at Nairobi. 
On  25  December  1964  the  San  Marco  satellite  (San  Marco  A 
before  the  launching)  was  placed in orbit  by  an  Italian team 
at NASA's  Wallops  Island base,  using a  Scout  launcher.  This 
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weighing  about  80  kg,  was  equipped  with  a  resistance balance 
for  estimating atmospheric  density  on  an inclined orbit. 
The  satellite stayed in orbit for  nine  months.  In 1965-66 
work  on  the equatorial base  was  finished and  the  second 
satellite San Marco  B  (San  Marco  2  after launching)  developed, 
once  again equipped  for  density measurements  but  in equatorial 
orbit. 
On  26  April 1967  San Marco  2  was  launched by  an Italian team 
using a  Scout rocket  from  the  San Marco  mobile  platform.  The 
satellite remained in orbit for  six months.  San Marco  c, 
weighing 160  kg,  is now  in the  development  phase,  once  more 
intended  for  exploring atmospheric  density in equatorial 
orbits. It will carry as  a  passenger a  NASA  spectrometer 
for  chemical analysis of the  atmosphere.  Its launching  from 
the Italian equatorial platform is scheduled for  the  end of 
1969,  by  means  of another Scout rocket presented free  of 
charge  by  NASA. 
4.4 Survey of the  National Programme 
Excluded,  like Germany,  Belgium and  Netherlands  from  any 
kind of initiative in the sector of national launchers,  Italy 
is planning for  a  sizeable space effort programmed  for the 
three years 1969-71  in more  diversified areas  than hitherto. 
For the  launchers,  direct agreements  with  NASA  are  in hand. 
The  1969-71  programme  covers: 
- launch of the  abovementioned San Marco  C satellite; 
- maintenance  and  development  of the  equatorial platform, 
offered to  NASA  for  launching  two  small standard satellites 
by  1971;  these  will be  the  first American  firings  from  a 
non-American base; 
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lites for  launching  from  the  San Marco  platform; 
- development  and  construction of the Sirio satellite for 
SHF  telecommunication experiments  (12-17  Gc/s)  intended 
for educational TV  broadcast between  the  US  and Europe 
and between European countries.  In this manner,  Italy's 
experience  on  ELDO's  experimental satellites can  be  put 
to use,  and Italy will recover at national level the  portion 
of the  ELDO/PAS  programme  cancelled by  ELD0 1s  1968  austerity 
plan. 
The  satellite of  some  300 kg,  including 190  for  the  apogee 
motor,  is to be  launched in late 1971  into geostationary 
orbit over  the  eastern Atlantic  (long.  15° W)  by  an  improved 
Thor-Delta vehicle purchased  by Italy in the US. 
The  satellite will carry six passenger scientific experi-
ments  from  the  national laboratories and  may  possibly also 
be~uipped for  meteorological observations. 
The  overall programme  involves  an expenditure  of: 
- $24.5 million for  the  national laboratories'  programmes 
during 1969-71; 
- about  $21  million for  the Sirio project in the  two-year 
period 1970-71,  including satellite,  apogee  motor,  cost 
of the  NASA  launcher and  launch  costa  in the  US. 
This will bring Italy's capital investment  in the national 
programme  in 1969-71  to about  the  same  level of expenditure 
as  for  the  ELDO  and  ESRO  European programmes:  an average  of 
about $15  million per annum. 
A five-year  space  programme  for 1971-75  is under study. 5•  BELGIUM 
Belgium has  no  real national space  programme  of her  own. 
Expenditure  in this respect has  consequently been modest1, 
and mainly  concentrated on  infrastructure  (space  simulation, 
vacuum  and  low  temperature  chambers,  anechoic  rooms,  vibra-
tion tables and  impact  tables)  and studies,  carried out  by 
the  firm  of Belgonucleaire,  on  on-board isotopic power 
sources. 
From·January 1968,  and  with  government  consent,  Belgian 
industry agreed to bear a  4%  share  in the  Franco-German 
experimental  telecommunications satellite Symphonie  (to a 
total estimated cost of about  $65  million). 
The  Belgian firms  concerned are  MBLE  for  the  CIPAS  (Consortium 
Industrial Franco-Allemand Symphonie)  consortium and  ACEC  for 
the  Symoosat  consortium. 
In October 1968,  the  Managing  Board  for  the  Symphonie  project 
accepted the  CIFAS  tender  (of.  French civilian space  programmes). 
Participation in  th~s multinational project offers Belgian 
industry a  precious opportunity of acquiring a  space  capability 
in an applications area whose  future,  European  and  worldwide, 
is assured. 
Since  the  injection into orbit of the  Symphonie  satellite 
relies on  the ELDO/PAS  launch vehicle,  Belgian support  for 
ELDO,  already whole-hearted,  has  been  further strengthened. 
For a  coordinated and  controlled participation in space 
programmes,  Belgian industry created the  Association Belgospace, 
whose  members  are aeronautical  firms  (SABCA,  Fairey)•  electron-
ics firms  (MBLE,  Bell,  ETCA,  Cobelda,  SAIT),  electrical 
1  $3.75 million during 1964-68. engineering  concerns  (Belgonucleaire). 
While  not having  a  genuine  national programme,  Belgium has 
still managed  to  secure  a  footing in bilateral and  European 
collaboration.  In particular,  Belgium  played a  delicate role 
as  coordinator of European  space policies in 1968  at the 
ELDO  Ministerial Conference  and European Space  Conference 
(Lef~vre Mission,  Aug.-Sep.,  Spaey Report,  Oct.). 
6.  NETHERLANDS 
Like  Belgium,  Holland also lacks a  real national programme. 
Consequently  expenditure  in this field has  remained modest, 
mainly  concentrated  on  infrastructure  (space  simulation 
chambers,  impact  tables)  and scientific experiments  to  be 
entrusted to  the  NASA  satellites OGO  and  OSO. 
From  the  beginning  of 1968,  a  study has  been in hand  for  a 
national scientific satellite intended  for  the University of 
Utrecht's planned astronomical  research,  and its associated 
ground receiver station;  engaged  on  the  project are  the  firms 
of Fokker  for  the satellite structure and Philips for  the 
on-board and  ground electronics. For  launching it is proposed 
to  use  a  NASA  rocket  from  an  American  base,  under agreements 
to be  defined. 
Studies  have  also been  begun  on  experimental ground stations 
for  space  telecommunications. 
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Conclusions and further outlook 1.  SPACE  EXPENDITURES  IN  THE  MEMBER  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
CONMUNITY,  CONPARED  WITH  THOSE  IN  BRITAIN  AND  THE  UNITED 
STATES 
The  EEC  countries'  expenditures  on  space activities are  shown 
in the attached Table  2/B-8,  in comparison with the  correspond-
ing figures  for  the  United Kingdom  and the United States. 
The  figures refer to the  five-year period 1964-68  following 
the  establishment of the  European.space  organizations  ELDO 
and ESRO;  this is also  the  period of massive  civilian spending 
in the  US  on  the  Apollo  programme  (1966)  and  a  steadily growing 
military expenditure  in. the  space area.  It is therefore  clear 
that a  revealing  comparison with the  US  deserves  further 
analysis. 
Table  2/B-9  shows  the  cumulative  figures  for  the five  years 
1964-68;  the  leading position in Europe  of France,  followed 
by  Germany,  stands out.  US  expenditure is 43  times  that of 
the  EEC;  NASA  alone  spends  31  times  as  much  as  the  EEC. 
If NASA  expenditure  for  1964-68  is broken  down  between manned 
and  unmanned  programmes,  the  respective totals are $17,000 
and 8,000 million;  the latter figure  is still ten times  the 
total space  expenditure  of EEC  member  countries  for  the  same 
period,  whereas  the ratio of national incomes  is 2.3 to 1. 
Table  2/B-10  shows  Europe's  space  investment related to  GNP 
(both as totals for the  five-year period 1964-68),  with 
details of  the  amount  and  year  of peak expenditure. 
For all the  EEC  countries,  expenditure  rose steadily from 
1964 to 1968;  for Britain,  on  the  contrary,  the  peak of 
spending  was  reached in 1966. 
Britain's average  and  maximum  figures  are  lower  than the 
EEC  average. 
621 Since  the years  1964-68  were  substantially the initial period 
of space activity for  the  EEC,  it has  been  deemed  advisable 
to  quote  for  the  US  as well  the  figures  for  their corresponding 
initial period  (1959-63). 
From  the  figures  shown it is seen that total NASA  investments 
in the  United States exceeded  in both periods  (1959-63  and 
1964-68)  those  of DoD;  they represented  43%  of the total for 
1959-63  and  only  24%  in 1964-68,  thanks  to  the  explosive 
growth of peaceful expenditure  by  the  US  on  the  Apollo pro-
gramme. 
Seeing that the  space  expenditures of the  EEC  countries  show 
only those  for  peaceful purposes,  and  that for  the  EEC  no 
manned  programmes  are  foreseeable at any rate this side of 
1980,  a  reasonable  comparison  would  be  between: 
- the  0.046%  of GNP  invested by  the  EEC  in the initial five-
year period 1964-68,  and 
- the 0.093%  of GNP  invested by  the United States in its 
peaceful,  manned  programmes  alone,  during  the initial 
years 1959-63. 
A "simultaneous"  comparison  between  EEC  (0.046%  of GNP  in 
1964-68)  and  the  US  (0.235%  of GNP  in 1964-68)  should among 
other things allow for  the  fact  that  during  the  second  five 
years of America's  space effort,  unmanned  programmes  not yet 
within the reach of EEC  technologies  were  deployed,  such as 
automatic planetary probes,  highly sophisticated scientific 
and applications programmes,  R&D  on  nuclear propulsion,  and 
so  on. 
We  may  sum  up  the  matter by  saying that economically ex-
pressed in terms  of GNP  and historically related to similar 
initial five-year periods,  the  EEC  space investments  were 
one  half those of the us. 
622 Yet  considering only peaceful and  unmanned  projects,  which 
in the United States have  amply  reaped  the benefits of other 
forms  of space  inveotment,  there is in the  final analysis a 
very serious,  but  not  unbridgeable  technological gap. 
2.  EUROPE'S  LAG 
As  in the US  and  the Soviet Union,· so in Europe,  especially 
in France  and Britain,  space activity was  originally governed 
by military missile  programmes,  up  to  about  1960.  The  first 
Soviet  space  achievement  (October 1957)  had  no appreciable 
impact  in Europe,  whereas  in the  United States it very 
rapidly triggered off a  radical redistribution of military 
and civil tasks,  the  foundation  of NASA  and  the  launching 
of the  Mercury project. 
During  the  first space  period  (1957-61)  interest was  beginning 
to wane  in Britain for  having its own  independent strategic 
missile  force,  while  interest for peaceful space activities 
was  beginning to take  shape  in Europe. 
Only in France,  where  the  wish  to  have  its own  strategic 
missiles  was  gaining strength in the  meantime,  was  a  unified 
civilian body,  CNES,  set up,  furnished  with integrated pro-
grammes  for  space launchers,  science  and applications. 
The  Soviet Union's  second space  success  (April 1961)  did 
not  speed up  in Europe  the definition of cooperative plans 
for the  two  separate organizations ELDO  and ESRO,  whereas 
in the United States the unified body  NASA  had an answer 
ready in the  launching of the Gemini  and  Apollo  programmes, 
besides  fresh military initiatives in space. 
It took Europe  practically four  years  of laboriOU3  negotiations 
(1960-64)  to breathe life into  ELDO  and  ESRO  at a  time  of exu-
berant  growth  for a  new  advanced  technology which  ought  to have 
623 called for  promptitude  and  flexibility of decision-taking. 
At  a  time  and  in  a  sector of less  dynamic  growth  the  nego-
tiations  for  the  creation of the  European establishments 
CERN  and Euratom  had not  been  so slow.  Europe's  tardy decision-
making  not  only  widened  the  technological  gap  but  induced 
some  countries  to  develop their own  national programmes  and 
bilateral collaboration with  the  US;  European  apace  coopera-
tion still labours under  the effects of this. 
Britain renounced  the  development  of her  own  strategic mis-
siles,  using the  now  obsolescent  liquid propellant  technology, 
and  the  United States authorized the  procurement  of Polaris 
missiles;  the  ex-military Blue Streak would  become  the first 
stage  of an  ELDO  launcher;  even  in other space activities, 
Britain came  to  lean  on  the  United States:  for  launching the 
scientific Ariel satellites or setting up  the  Skynet military 
communications  network. 
Italy started up  its San Marco  space  project relying on  the 
US  for  launchers  and  launching,  under  direct agreement  with 
NASA  (1962). 
In 1961,  Germany  established the  KfR;  this body  framed  the 
first  four-year  plan  for  space,  which  proved over-ambitious 
in aiming at an efficient and  qualified European  collaboration 
without  entering  upon  bilateral negotiations with  the  United 
States.  In 1964  the  operational activities of ELDO  and  ESRO 
were  officially started:  ELDO  comprises six European States 
plus Australia,  ESRO  10 European States.  The  fear  of possible 
military applications of  launcher activity and less interest 
on  the  part of  the  smaller countries  were  the  reasons  for 
ELDO  having  a  smaller membership  than ESRO,  in which scientifib 
interests predominate. 
624 More  expeditiously than  for  ELDO  and  ESRO,  negotiations  for 
the  establishment  of  CETS,  Europe's third space  body,  solely 
concerned with  communication satellites,  lasted a  single year, 
from  mid-1963  to mid-1964.  Undoubtedly  the  greater speed in 
reaching  a  decision  was  due  to  the  fact  that  CETS  is only  a 
ministerial conference  and that it was  an  offshoot  of the 
existing CEPT. 
It must  be  added,  however,  that a  further  factor  in speeding 
up  negotiations  was  the  United States haste  to set up  Intelsat 
while  Europe  was  still in its infancy in space. 
In Intelsat the  United State is represented by  the  powerful 
and unified private  company  Comsat,  which  has  an absolute 
majority of votes,  whereas  Europe  is represented by  a  minis-
terial conference  of countries with disparate aims. 
3.  EUROPE'S  INDUSTRIAL  POSTURE 
From  1960  onwards  the  world  of industry had  shown  itself 
much  readier and  more  sensitive  than  the  politicians;  having 
seen and assessed the  long term  technical and  economic  impli-
cations of  space  activity,  European  industry in 1961  gave 
birth to  the  consortium  Eurospace,  comprising the  industries 
of nine  countries:  aeronautics,  electronics,  chemistry and 
metallurgy,  public  and private  concerns  having  concrete  space 
applications  programmes,  together with a  few  banks. 
In recent  years  Eurospace  has  sponsored  the  foundation  of a 
semi-public undertaking Eurosat,  formed  early in 1969,  and: 
- capable  of presenting a  united front  to  Comsat  in Intelsat; 
- capable  of  coordinating Europe's  space  effort at industrial 
level; 
- prepared to agree  to  spread the  financial hazards  of space 
activity over industries and  governments. 
625 This promptitude  and  open-mindedness  on  the part of industry 
must  not,  however,  be  allowed  to  obscure  the  average attitude 
in Europe  of  minds  absolutely set against  American-type  con-
tracting procedures. 
When  European  industry develops  R&D  with public  funds,  it 
usually regards  the  knowhow  thus  gained as  private property. 
Apparently politicians in Europe  have  neither the  strength 
nor the  willpower nor sufficient interest to  impose  on  industry, 
in matters of intellectual property,  at any rate  the  rules 
industrialists themselves  impose  on  their own  subsidiaries. 
One  of the  factors in the· popularity of  space activity in 
the  US  incidentally on  the  wane  despite  the  spectacular and 
admirable  successes  scored,  has  been  the  practice of keeping 
the  tAxpayer  informed of the  use  made  of his money  in costly 
enterprises like  space  ventures. 
The  mere  publication of the list of principal suppliers,  to-
gether with  their turnover  figures,  regularly issued each 
year  in the  US  by  NASA  and  even by  DoD  (without  false  screens 
of secrecy)  is still unthinkable  in Europe  at national or 
international level. 
Interviews  with  European industrialists have  demonstrated 
that  a  change  in attitude  could only be  brought about  by  a 
coherent  and  long-term commitment  by  governments  to  the  space 
sector;  it would  also help  to renovate  business practice if 
international European  companies  could  be  formed  to  consolidate 
experiments  in cooperation already carried out  by  fits and 
starts in multilateral consortia  for  the  development  of partic-
ular military programmes  or certain of ESRO's  space  programmes. 
626 4.  US/EUROPEAN  RELATIONS 
Europe  has  found  the  fullest  support in NASA  for national 
launchings  of scientific satellites: Italy's San Marco  1  and 
2,  Britain's Ariel 1,  2,  and  3  and France's FR  1;  the  same 
collaboration continues  for San  Marco  3,  Germany's  Azur  and 
a  Dutch national satellite,  and has  been extended into the 
field of weather satellites:  NASA  is to  cooperate  with France 
for  the validated Eole  programme.  Still in the scientific 
field,  there has  been extremely active  cooperation between 
NASA  and  ESRO,  as  witness not  only  the  volume  of ESR0 1s  pur-
chases in the  US  but also  American assistance especially from 
Lockheed  and  TRW  in the  construction of Europe's first satel-
lites  (ESRO  2,  HEOS/A)  and  NASA's  offer of cooperation to 
ESRO  for  development  of the  LAS  project,  free  launchings of 
ESRO  1  and  2  and paid launchings of other scientific satel-
lites.  American  support  for  ELDO  has  been less forthcoming; 
apart  from  the  licences already acquired by  Britain in 1960 
from  General  Dynamic  and  North  American  for Blue Streak,  the 
second  and  third stages and  PAS  system have  mainly had  to 
rely on  Continental technologies.  SETIS  did not  even secure 
the  old  US  licence  for the  catalyst of hydrazine  decomposition 
for  booster rockets. 
In  the  communications satellite area,  there  have  been  two 
concurrent  phenomena: 
- following  the  success of  the Intelsat 1  and  2  systems, 
entirely American in technology,  European  resentment  was 
voiced  concerning "fair returns";  in tendering for  Intelsat 
3  and  4,  American  firms  vied with  one  another in seeking 
extra-American  collaboration,  sometimes  even accepting the 
penalty of higher costs. 
TRW  produced  the Intelsat 3  system with European assistance, 
and this is even more  the  case  for Intelsat 4,  whioh is 
627 being produced  by  Hughes; 
- for Europe's first regional experimental  communications 
satellite Symphonie,  being built by France,  Belgium  and 
Germany,  no  American assistance  is foreseen  or  foreseeable. 
Nor  are  any  of the  European  electronics  firms  with  a  sub-
stantial participation of American  capital taking part in 
the  project,  although they  were  very actively engaged in 
ESRO  programmes  and  the  last Intelsat tenders. 
The  impossibility of recourse  to  American  technology in 
potentially competitive  sectors like  launchers  or  communi-
cations satellites is primarily a  sign  of vitality and  com-
mercial acumen  in these  areas. 
The  technological history of the  development  of French stra-
tegic missiles nevertheless  goes  to  show  that an  embargo  may 
end  up  by  being a  powerful  technical incentive  and  worth 
more  than any  licence,  albeit at the  cost  of greater expend-
iture and  more  development  time,  because it is backed  by  a 
firm  determination to  succeed.  With  ELDO  and  GETS  Europe  has 
not yet  been able  to  demonstrate  such a  firm  determination 
in a  civilian and  peaceful undertaking. 
5.  THE  PRESENT  SITUATION 
After  five  years'  cooperative effort in ELDO,  ESRO  and  GETS, 
Europe  is substantially split into  two  camps: 
- France,  Germany,  Belgium and Netherlands are strongly com-
mitted to carrying  on  with the  programmes  for  future  in-
dependent  European  launchers;  a  particular incentive  for 
the  first three  of these  countries is the  necessity of 
completing as  a  top priority the  Symphonie  experimental 
space  communications  programme; 
- Britain and Italy practise a  policy of disengagement  from 
ELDO;  Italy has also withdrawn  from  ESRO's  current major 
628 programme  (TD),  whereas  Britain strongly supports ESRO. 
It should be  noted that,  with the  development  of Black 
Arrow,  Britain is now  able  to rely upon  its own  launch 
capability, .especially by  mating it with Blue Streak, 
while  Italy definitely relies upon  American  launchers 
for  its short  term  programmes. 
This state of affairs has  come  about  not  only  due  to  "habits" 
fallen into during  1960-64 as  a  byproduct  of the  long-drawn-
out  negotiations  for  the establishment of ELDO  and  ESRO,  but 
a  prime  consideration has also been  the successive  cuts in 
both organizations'  programmes,  which  have  induced  individual 
countries to  "salvage"  the  R&D  work  already put in at national 
level on  European projects subsequently cancelled. 
ELDO  and  ESRO  have  had  to  live  from  hand  to  mouth  between 
alternate budget  increases and  operational programme  cutbacks. 
From  an initial forecast  of $196  million in 1962,  ELDO  moved 
on,  with the  supplementary programme  added  in 1966,  to  an 
estimate  of $626  million  (to  be  spread over eight years); 
there  followed  in 1968  a  drastic  cut  in programmes  to keep 
within that ceiling. 
In  the  case  of ESRO,  after a  modest  original estimate  of 
$306  million in 1961,  a  ceiling of expenditure  of only $321 
million  (spread over eight years)  was  set in 1968;  there  have 
been  continuous  cutbacks  in operational programmes  and, 
especially earlier on,  frequent  cancellations of contracts 
in course  of execution. 
At  the present time,  having  the  divergent attitudes of the 
European  countries  towards  the necessity of having an in-
dependent  launch capability,  and  considering European soli-
darity on  the scientific and applications programmes,  in 
view  of the  urgent  need  to unify the  three  organizations 
629 ELDO,  ESRO  and  GETS,  the Third European Space  Conference at 
Bad  Godesberg in November  1968  has  framed  future  cooperative 
space  programmes  up  to  1980  on  the  basis  of the  proposals 
in the  Spaey  Report  (October 1968),  updating and  recasting 
the  carefully thought-out proposals in the  Causae  Report 
(December  1967). 
The  basic programme1  provides  for  a  ceiling of expenditure 
of $150  million a  year for the  twelve  years  1969-80. 
Within this ceiling: 
- work  on  the  launchers Europa  1  and  2  will be  completed; 
- a  launcher for satellites of 500  kg  will be  produced 
(1969-78); 
- development  will be  started on  a  launcher  for satellites 
of 700  kg  (1966-82). 
The  programme  for  these  launchers provides  for an  overall 
cost of  $717  million spread over  twelve  years. 
Acceptance  of this  launcher  programme  need  not  be  unanimous; 
unanimity is required at least for  the  "minimum"  scientific 
and applications  programme,  which provides  for an  overall 
expenditure  during  the  twelve  years  of $1,037 million,  broken 
down  as  follows: 
(a)  40.4%  organizational costs,  logistics and infrastructure 
(b)  3.4%  oriented research 
(c)  28.9% scientific space  research  programme 
(d)  27.3% applications satellites programme. 
The  last item,  $283  million,  takes  the  form  of three  suc-
cessive projects of gradually increasing cost,  for  communi-
cations satellites for  direct TV  broadcasting  (E1,  200  kg, 
1  See Table  2/B-11. 
630 $50  million;  E2,  400  kg,  $90  million;  E3,  700  kg,  $143  million; 
including launch  costs). 
Joining the  "minimum"  programme  is a  necessary condition for 
acceding  to membership  of the  Unified European Space  Organi-
zation. 
It would  be  desirable  to  endow  the  Unified European Space 
Organization with powers  for  coordinating national programmes 
too,  to  derive  maximum  benefit  from  the  modest  resources 
Europe  will be  able  to  devote  to space  in the  seventies. 
6.  GROWTH  HYPOTHESES  FOR  THE  1970'S 
The  expenditures  by  EEC  member  countries,  and  of these  to-
gether with the United Kingdom  in the  initial five  year 
period of European  space activity (1964-68),  are  tabulated 
below  (in millions of dollars): 
EEC 
EEC  +  UK 
1964 
95 
124 
122 
164 
1966 
138 
204 
211 
276 
1968 
236 
280 
Linear trends  (least squares method)  are as  follows: 
EEC 
EEC  +  UK 
$86  million in 1964 +  $37  million a  year 
$125  million in 1964 +  $42 million a  year 
Extrapolating the  EEC  curve  for 1964-68,  we  get for  1980 an 
overall space  expenditure  of  $680  million  (Table  2/B-12). 
Considering the  annual rise of $37  million in 1968  and 
comparing systematically with growth of GNP  in $million at 
values  ($360,000 million  in 1968  and  annual  growth rate of 
5.4%)  we  arrive at a  figure  for apace  expenditure in 1968 
of 0.1%  of GNP. 
This target was,  it will be  noted,  attained and exceeded in 
1967  and  1968  by France,  i.e.,  the European  country most 
631 heavily engaged in space. 
0.1%  of GNP  is little more  than  what  the  US  allocated to the 
first five  years  of its space activity  (1959-63)  and rather 
less than half the  figure  allocated in the  US  during the 
succeeding five  year period  (1964-68)  to unmanned  civilian 
programme  alone. 
Hence it may  be  said that  such  a  target figure  (prognosticated 
by  the  Causae  Report  for  1975)  represents a  "minimum"  target 
for  an activity rationally limited to Europe's  most  essential 
and urgent  needs. 
Table  2/B-12 also  gives  an  extrapolation to  1980 of the per-
centage  distribution between national  (57%)  and international 
programmes  (43%)  in the  EEC  countries in 1968. 
Among  the  international programmes  the  Spaey Report's  "basic 
programme"  is broadly slotted in at an  overall expenditure  of 
$1,800 million over  12  years. 
Such a  programme  would  absorb all the  space  resources  earmarked 
for  international collaboration up  to  about  1973;  only  during 
the  succeeding period would it be  possible  to  fix any  growing 
availability of  funds  for  future  developments.  Adding  up  the 
projections  shown  in Table  2/B-6  for  the  whole  12-year period 
1968-80,  we  get  the  following  volume  of expenditure: 
EEC  International programmes  $2,364 million (incl.  countries 
only  1,800 million for 
Spaey's basic pro-
gramme)  (43%) 
programme  $3,132 million  (57%) 
Total  $5,496  million  (100%) 
which  could be  distributed as  follows: 
632 $1,900  million for the  aeronautics industry  (35%) 
$1,900  million for  the  electronics industry  (35%) 
$1,696  million for other industries,  administrative 
costs and university research  (30%) 
The  inclusion of Spaey's  "basic  programme"  among  the inter-
national programmes,  with  a  margin  beyond  1972,  helps to 
demonstrate  the  force  of the  hypothesized 0.1%  of GNP  target, 
leaving moreover  each  country's  hands  free  for its national 
programmes. 
Let  us  examine  the hypothesis  of the  "minimum"  target of 
0.1%  of GNP  being reached in 1980  by all the  EEC  countries 
plus  the United  Kingdom  (Table  2/B-13). 
The  total GNP  ($473,000  million in 1968,  with an  annual 
growth rate of  4.8%)  will by  1980  reach the  $84o,ooo  million 
mark  (at 1968  prices). 
The  target of $84o,ooo  million in 1968  would require an an-
nual growth  of expenditure  of $47  million,  appreciably higher 
than  the  average  recorded during  the  five-year period 1964-68. 
Table  2/B-7  shows  an  extrapolation to  1980  of the  breakdown 
between national programmes  (50%)  and  international ones  (50%) 
for  the  EEC  countries plus  the  UK  in 1968.  Among  the inter-
national programmes  the  Spaey  Report's  "basic programme"  is 
roughly slotted in about  1970.  Adding  together the  projections 
in Table  2/B-13  for  the  whole  decade  1968-80,  we  arrive at 
the  following  volume  of  space  expenditure: 
EEC 
countries 
+UK 
International programmes  $3,324 million  (incl. 
1,800 million for 
Spaey's basic pro-
gramme  (50%) 
programme  $3,396  million  (50%) 
Total  $6,720  million  ( 1 0096) 
633 which  can  be  estimated as distributed in the  following 
manner: 
$2,350  million  aeronautics  (35%) 
$2,350 million  electronics  (35%) 
$2,020  million  other industries,  organi-
zational costa and  organi-
zational research  (30%) 
7.  TECHNICAL  ACTION 
The  Third European Space  Conference  (ESC~ held at Bad  Godes-
,  1 
berg  from  12 to 14 November  1968  drew  up,  on  the  basis of 
the Spaey Report  and  some  delicate technioo-political nego-
tiations presided over  by  the  Belgian Minister T.  Lefevre, 
the  minimum  European space  programmes  and the  tasks to  be 
set for  them. 
The  deliberations of  the  third ESC  constitute a  coherent  and 
integrated fresh start in the  three space  sectors of launchers, 
science and applications. 
Implementation  of the  programme  demanded  urgently: 
- the  desired unification of the  European  space  bodies; 
- a  firm  collective long-term political commitment  capable 
of giving a  decisive  boost  to industry and  the research 
centres.  The  story of America's  space  venture  shows  that 
the  firmer  the  programmed  commitment,  the  more  severe  and 
exigent  the political leaders are likely to  be  towards 
industry,  which is thus being afforded the  chance  to  achieve 
such a  clear cut expertise  in technology and  management. 
If on  the  strength of the  foregoing  investment  growth  hypo-
theses  there proves  to be,  from  1973  for  the  EEC  or  from 
1  See  text in Annex. 
634 1970 for  the  EEC  +  UK,  a  further availability beyond  the 
Spaey  programme,  consideration may  be  given  to programmes 
for  weather satellites or air traffic control satellites; 
or,  to avoid  a  wearisome  and  constantly ill-starred policy 
of  tagging along behind the  US  programmes,  a  direct transi-
tion to satellites for analysing earth resources.  As  in the 
telecommunications area,  in the  earth resources area too,  the 
stimulus  of  economic  independence  plays  a  part as  well as 
profitability. 
Another  investment area  for  European  international programmes 
might  be  a  committed start on  space  collaboration between 
the  US,  the  USSR  and Europe. 
B.  SPACE  EXPENDITURE  IN  RELATION  TO  TOTAL  R&D  EXPENDITURE 
Lastly  we  must  show  how  the  space  target of 0.1%  of GNP  in 
1980 is by  no  means  incompatible  with public  R&D  expenditure 
even disregarding the  possible returns  from  commercialized 
space activities in Europe  by  1980. 
A realistic estimate  for  1980 is of a  public  R&D  investment 
of  2.5%  of GNP,  either in the  EEC,  or  even  more  so,  in the 
EEC  +  UK. 
In that  case  the  postulated space  investment  of 0.1%  will be 
4%  of R&D  expenditure. 
Without  arguing the merits  of other advanced technologies, 
it is,  however,  obvious  that another  four areas for investment 
like space  might  be  developed  by  assigning to  conventional 
technologies  2%  of GNP  or 80%  of  R&D  expenditure. 
If the  0.5%  of GNP  could in this way  be  devoted in 1980 to 
the  advanced  technologies,  about half on  the national plan 
and about half on  European  cooperative projects: 
635 it would  be  much  easier to  find  country  by  country a 
solution to  the  problems  of fair returns,  which  otherwise 
remain unthinkable  on  a  sector by  sector basis; 
- it would  ensure  a  general technological upgrading  which 
would  in particular benefit  the  space  sector,  so  eminently 
interdisciplinary. 
Among  the postulated five  advanced sectors that might attract 
investment  of 0.1%  of GNP,  it would  be  advisable  by  a  European 
agreement  to  ensure  that at least one  should  be presently re-
leased  from  commitments  and ready in advance  to take  up  the 
next  technological challenge  without  the  delays that have 
always  hampered  European initiative. 
Indeed,  it behoves  the Europeans  from  now  on  to  open their 
eyes  in time,  like their wide-awake  transatlantic cousins,  to 
future  possibilities of cooperation with full public  support 
at supranational level. 
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657 Table  2/B-1 
t=:ISCAL  YEAR 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196.3 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968  E 
"'E•  estimate 
USA  - Military,  Nuclear and Space  Expenditure (1954-68) 
(Millions  of dollars) 
GNP  DoD  %GNP  AEC  %  GNP  NACAINASA 
362,100  45,090  12.5  1,895  0,52  90 
378,600  38,840  10.3  1,857  0.49  74 
409~400  39,070  9,6  1 ,65'!  0,40  71 
431,300  41,380  9.6  1,990  0.46  76 
4.10,300  41,770  9.5  2,2G8  0.51  89 
469,100  43,940  9.4  2 ,!i41  0.54  146 
495,200  43,070  8.7  2,62:;;  0.53  401 
506,500  44,780  8.8  2,713  0,53  744 
542,100  48,300  9,0  2,806  0.51  1,257 
573,400  so,ooo  8,7  2,758  0.4B  2,552 
612,200  51,420  8,4  2,765  0.45  4,171 
653,500  47,540  7.3  2,625  0,40  57093 
718,700  55,380  7.7  2,390  0.33  579:33 
763,100  68,330  8.9  2,254  0,30  s,~23 
817,000  74,220  9.1  2,333  0.28  ~.,ao3 
Source  :  THE  BUDGET  OF  US  GOV.  F'Y  1969. 
641 
%GNP 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0,03 
0,08 
0.14 
0,23 
0,44 
0.68 
0,78 
0.82 
0,71 
0,59 Table  2/B-2  US~ - Space  Budget  - Appropriations  (1962-69) 
Thousand million dollars 
l\.0 
'7,0  __  E:3  Other~s  __________  ~~--~~7~,c~--~--7--.c~,--------------- ___  ..,;6.6 
6,0 
(Z3  Defence 
- D  t~/,::A 
s.o 
4,0 
3.0 
2.0 
1,0 
1,8 
0 
1902  1963  19G4  1%5  1966  1967  1%8 
Space  Budget  - Expenditure  (1962-69) 
Thousand million dollars 
8,0 
7 ,o  _  c:J Others  ____________  _ 
~Defence 
G,O  - c:J  NASA 
s.o 
4,0 
2,0 
1,0 
1,2 
0 
1962  1963  1964  1%5  19CG  1967 
Source  REPORT  TO  THE  CONGR[~S USA  AERCN.  AND  SPACE  ACT I VI T1 ES  19(,7. 
642 
1969  1969  Year Table  2/B-3  USA- Space Expenditure  (1957-69) 
FISCAL  YEAR  TOTAL  NASA 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968  E 
1969  E 
E·  estimate 
Source : ASFF  1968. 
76 
89 
146 
4a1 
744 
1,257 
2,552 
4,171 
s,c93 
s,933 
s,42:S 
4,803 
4,573 
(In millions  of dollars) 
SPACE 
NASA  DoD  AEC 
n.a.  48  19 
n.a.  1:56  20 
59  341  33 
329  518  41 
694  710  64 
1,226  1,029  130 
2,517  1,368  181 
4,131  1,564  220 
s,o:ss  1,592  2:52 
s,a58  1,638  188 
51337  1,673  184 
4,672  1,870  151 
4,455  2,100  151 
643 
Others  Total 
7  n.a. 
4  n.a. 
1  434 
- 888 
- 1,468 
2  2,387 
13  4,079 
15  s,930 
27  6,886 
35  7,719 
43  7,237 
37  6,750 
40  6,826 Table  2/B-~  USA  - Breakdown  of  NASA  Expenditure  by Final Use  (1959-69) 
(Total  NASA  expenditure  =  100) 
Admin is- ~a~!P- trative 
FISCAL  YEAR  expenses  R &  0  expend-
iture 
%  %  "  -· 
1959  60  23  17 
1960  23  64  13 
1961  21  66  13 
1962  17  74  9 
1963  16  75  9 
1964  10  79  11 
1965  11  79  10 
1966  10  80  10 
1967  12  83  5 
1968  13  83  4 
1969  14  84  2 
Souree  : AlA:  AEROSPACE  FACTS  AND  FIGURES  1968. 
NASA:  SEMIANNUAL  REPORT  TO  CONGRESS  (various years) • 
644 Table  2/B-5  USA  - Breakdown  of  NASA  Expenditure  by Programme  (1962-69) 
S P A C E 
FISCAL  YEAR 
tMNNED  UNMANNED 
1962  44  56 
1963  57  43 
1964  67  33 
1965  70  30 
1966  68  32 
1967  66  34 
1968  63  37 
1969  56  44 
Source  :  NASA:  SEMIANNUAL  REPORT  TO  CONGRESS  (various years). 
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 Table  2/B-7 
FISCAL  YEAR 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1965 
19S7 
1968  E 
196'::1  E 
E.•  estimate 
1  •  2+3 
~ •  4+5+6 
USA- DoD  Expenditure  on Guided Missiles  (1960-69) 
(!n millions  of dollars) 
R &  D,  Procurements 
TOTAL  TES.T  & 
EVALUATION  Total  Air Force  Navy  Army 
1  2 
'I'  4  5  6  .J 
5,086  2,059  :s,o21  2,021  423  583 
5,997  3,025  2,972  1,922  493  557 
6,219  2,777  3,442  2,385  593  464 
s,oss  2,241  3,817  2,676  718  4'">":0  ,_;j 
s7<J29  2,352  :s,577  2,101  92.1  40·~  .,o 
3,997  1 ,w1  2,095  1,~20  821  254 
3,870  1 ,so1  2,069  1,313  512  244 
4,432  21502  1,930  1,278  432  220 
4,562  2,438  2,124  1,320  390  4~4 
5,267  2,597  2,670  1,550  550  560 
Source  :  DoD  Rep  FAD  584585  .Danua:ry1968-. 
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 Table  2/B-9  EEC  Countries,  UK  and  USA  - Cumulative  Space  Investment in the 
Five-Year Period 1964-68 
(In millions  of dollars) 
% 
National  ELDO  ESRO  TOTAL 
(UfC·100) 
GEI?MANY  126.30  100,55  37,10  263,9::  32,9 
BELG lui"\  3,75  14,84  6,24  24,83  3,1 
FRANCE  279,90  101,47  30,96  412,33  51,4 
ITI,L "f  12,20  44,68  18,06  74.94  9,3 
Nl  5,47  14,34  6,44  26.25  3,3 
f!e<:.  427,62  2/5,88  93:80  802,30  1CO,O 
(53.3%)  (34,4%)  (12,3~)  (100,0%) 
UK  69,80  140,15  37:36  247,31  30,8 
(28,2~)  (56,7%)  (15,1%)  (100 c;n 
NASA  DoD  Others  Tot<sl 
USA  25,033  s,337  1,132  34,502  47:soo.o 
(72 .5%)  (24.2%)  (3.~%-)  (100,(1~) 
649 Table  2/B-10  EEC  Countries,  UK  and  USA  - Percentage  of Gross  National Product 
Allocated to Space Expenditure  (1964-68) 
Average  I 
Maximum 
( 1964-68) 
GmMAf~y·  0,044  0,062  in  1S68 
BELGiuM  0.026  0.03G  in  1968 
FRANCE  0.078  0.104  in  19:-.a 
I T!.ll"  0.024  0,029  in  1968 
NL  0.024  0,036  in  1958 
EEC  0.049  0.06(:  in  "1908 
U K  0,046  O,C61  in  196o 
USA  Average  1959-1953  Average  1964·1968 
NASA  (unmanned)  0.093  0,235 
NASA  (manned)  0,093  0.480 
DoD  0,154  0.235 
Others  0.018  o.o~ 
T 0  T A l  0.3~  0,980 
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 Resolutions adopted at the third ESC 
(Bad  Godesberg, 12-14 November 1968) RESOLUTIONS  ADOPTED  BY  THE  EUROPEAN  SPACE  CONFERENCE 
At  the  ministerial meeting  of the European  Space  Conference 
held at Bad  Godesberg  on  12-14 November  1968,  five  resolutions 
were  adopted.  The  text of these  resolutions is given  below, 
with the  exception of the  preamble  to  some  of them,  which  is 
omitted for  the  sake  of concision,  and  most  references  to 
working  documents,  also  omitted to  make  easier reading.  The 
voting results are given after each resolution. 
Resolution No.  1  - Space  programme 
The  Conference  pronounces itself,  pending a  decision  on  a 
minimum  and basic  programme  for  a  new  and single organization, 
in favour  of the  following provisions: 
1.  Scientific and research programme 
ESRO  shall continue  within  the  provisions  of its Convention 
a  scientific research programme,  the  financial value  of 
which  shall,  for  the  period of 1969-71,  correspond to a 
firm  ceiling of  172 million u.a.  (at  summer  1968  prices). 
The  provisional ceiling for  the  period 1972-74  shall be 
determined  by  the  ESRO  Council,  it being understood that 
any  commitments  for  individual projects  ~hat would  extend 
beyond  1971  can  be  authorized by  the  Council. 
2.  Space  applications  programme 
A space  applications  programme  will  be  executed by  ESRO 
on  a  preliminary basis  up  to  the  next  European Space  Con-
ference,  in close  consultation with  ELDO  where  appropriate, 
and  by  taking the  advice  of the  Committee  of Senior Offi-
cials. 
This  programme  consists in undertaking,  in consultation 
with prospective users,  studies leading to  economic  and 
657 technical assessments of application satellite projects 
such as meteorological satellites, satellites for air and 
sea traffic control,  and satellites for  other purposes, 
the  financial value  of these undertakings not  to exceed 
on  average  1  million u.a.  per year,  in preparation of 
timely decisions  to  be  taken on  the  execution of such 
projects.  The  first studies shall be  prepared by  31 
December  1969. 
It is intended to carry out  a  CETS  experimental television 
relay satellite programme,  the  cost of which is estimated 
at 103 million a.a.  Some  governments  have  announced their 
interest in principle in such a  project.  The  interested 
governments are invited to express their opinion as to 
the  decision  on  their participation by  1  March  1969  and  to 
forward it to  the  Director-General of ESRO  and  the President 
of CETS.  A governmental  conference  of the  interested States 
will take  place  in March/April  1969 in order to reaoh a 
decision  on  the  execution of the project on  the basis of 
the  economic  and  technical information available. 
3.  Launcher  development  programme 
The  Conference  takes  due  note  of the Resolution adopted by 
the  ELDO  Ministerial Conference  on  11  November  1968  (of. 
Press release under  the subtitle "News  of ELD0 11). 
The  Conference  also refers,  in respect  of the production 
and use  of the  launchers,  to its Resolution No.  5. 
The  execution of the  launcher programme  will be  pursued 
during  the preliminary phase  up  until the  next  European 
Space  Conference  by  ELDO  in close  consultation with ESRO 
where  appropriate and taking the advice  of the  Committee 
of Senior Officials. The  Conference  invites the  Member  States of the  Conference to 
instruct their national delegations to the  Councils  of ESRO 
and  ELDO  and to  GETS  to  take  the  necessary decisions in the 
technical,  financial,  legal and administrative fields,  in 
order to  ensure  completion of the  programme  described above; 
Decides  to hold its next session in Brussels early in 1970 
on  a  date  to be  proposed  by  the  Committee  of Alternates. 
Voting results: 
Section 1  (Scientific research programme) 
11  in favour 
1  reservation  (Netherlands) 
1  abstention  (Norway) 
Section 2  (Space  applications programme) 
10 in favour 
1  ad  referendum  (Sweden) 
1  reservation  (United Kingdom) 
1  abstention  (Norway) 
Section 3  (Launcher  development  programme) 
9  in  favour 
1  ad referendum  (Italy)** 
1  reservation  (United Kingdom)* 
2  abstentions  (Norway  & Switzerland) 
NB.  Netherlands and Sweden  have  since  withdrawn  their reser-
vations. 
*  See  Annex  1. 
**  The  position taken by  Italy relates to the Resolution of 
the  ELDO  Ministerial Conference  of 11  November  1968,  which 
Italy only supported ad referendum.  (See Press Release  on 
this Conference,  under  the subtitle "News  of  ELDO~) 
659 Resolution No.  2  - Institutions 
The  Conference  considers that the  implementation of a 
European  space  programme  may.be  more  efficiently secured 
by  means  of a  single European  space  organization committing 
the solidarity of the participating States until the achiev-
ment  of the  objectives,  and  designed to allow great flexibil-
ity of participation in its projects. 
Decides,  in order to proceed in due  course,  if agreed,  to 
the  amalgamation of the existing organizations in a  single 
body,  to instruct a  Committee  of Senior Officials to work 
out  the procedure  and  the  text of a  Convention for  a  single 
Organization,  by  1  October 1969.  This text shall be  examined 
during a  Governmental  Conference  of the participating States. 
This  Committee  shall take into account all relevant proposals 
made  so  far,  in particular the reports  made  by  the  Causae, 
Bannier and  Spaey  Committees. 
Voting results: 
12 in favour 
1  abstention  (Norway) 
Resolution No.  3  - Europe's position towards  international 
communications  systems 
The  Conference  takes  note  of the  report  of the  Chairman of 
the  European  Conference  on Satellite Communications  (CETS), 
and  in particular of the  recommendations  made  by  that  Con-
ference  with regard to the  further negotiations  on  the defin-
itive arrangements  and the  participation of European States 
in a  definitive telecommunications  system. 
Invites the  participating States to give their representatives 
in the negotiations on  the  definitive arrangements  the neces-
sary instructions for  the  implementation  of  the  recommendations 
set out  in that  document. 
660 Voting results: 
13 in favour 
Resolution  No.  4  - Principles of European  cooperation in space 
The  Conference,  noting that there exists in Europe  a  general 
desire  to  build competitive industrial structures by  means 
of durable  consortia backed  by  long-term programmes  of techno-
logical and scientific cooperation,  notably in the  space  field; 
Recognizing  the  fact  that,  among  the  European  countries,  there 
are  different  opinions about  the necessity of  the  development 
of European  launchers; 
Considering that this difference  of  conception is not  of a 
nature  to prevent  the association of  the  European  countries 
for  the applications programmes,  the scientific programmes, 
the  relevant  infrastructure and  long-term research,  provided 
that any  divergences  of interest arising between these  coun-
tries in connection with the  use  of European  launchers are 
covered  from  the  outset  by satisfactory arrangements; 
Considers 
1. That  the basis of cooperation between  the  European  countries 
should be  the  distinction of  a  minimum  programme  within a 
basic programme,  the  status of Member  State resulting  from 
recognition of the  basic  programme  and  from  effective partic-
ipation in a  minimum  programme  to  be  defined in detail in the 
Convention; 
2.  %at the  basic  programme  should  be  the  subject of a  detailed 
study with the participation of all the  interested countries 
and after thorough  technical and  economic  studies; 
3.  Thatthe principal objectives of the basic  programme  could 
be: 
661 (a)  to construct,  launch,  experiment  and put into operation 
a  synchronous satellite capable  of re-transmitting tele-
vision programmes  to individual receivers;  a  two-ton 
satellite to  be  launched in the  1980s  could be  the last 
stage in the  achievement  of this objective if,  however, 
such a  stage appeared viable and necessary; 
(b)  to  develop  a  scientific research programme,  for carrying 
out  in particular mis-sions  that surpass national possibil-
ities;  maximum  possible use  should  be  made  of the  results 
of the scientific programme  for  the  applications programme 
and vice  versa; 
4.  That  the  initial adoption of the  basic  programme  and  of  the 
minimum  programme  being secured by  unanimity  upon  signature 
of the  Convention,  the  solidarity of Member  States should be 
committed until achievement  of the  objectives and that the 
decisions  on  successive  stages should  then  be  made  according 
to the rules (still to  be  decided after further negotiations) 
which  the  Convention shall determine  and  on  the  basis of a 
detailed study of the validity of these  successive stages in 
the light of the  overall programme. 
Instructs the  Committee  of Senior Officials set up  by Resolution 
No.  2  to  carry out  the  studies referred to above. 
Voting results: 
11  in favour 
1  reservation  (United Kingdom)* 
1  abstention  (Norway) 
*  Cf.  Annex  1. 
662 Resolution No.  5  - Production and use  of European  launchers 
The  Conference,  having agreed that: 
1.  The  funds  expended  by  the European  governments  for  the purposes 
of European  space  research in  joint organizations should  be 
predominantly used inside Europe  with a  view  to strengthening 
Europe's  technological  capacity; 
2.  With  a  view to  consolidating and  extending  cooperation  among 
the European  governments  in all areas  of a  European space 
activity,  mutual  use  should  be  made  of the  development  results 
of individual sectors; 
3.  Insofar as it is possible  for  the  aims  of  the  individual pro-
grammes  to be  accomplished,  the  projects of the  different 
fields should be  brought into harmony; 
Resolves that: 
1.  European States interested in the  field of launcher develop-
ment  will continue  with the  development  of a  European launcher, 
with a  view  to  making  such a  launcher available for European 
application satellites (including those  forming part of test 
programmes)  and,  as  far as mission and  payload requirements 
allow,  scientific satellites; 
2.  Such States will continue  with the  development  of the European 
launcher either within the  framework  of ELDO  or within the 
framework  of the  new  research and  development  organization 
referred to in Resolution No.  2.  It is assumed  that,  over the 
period 1972-76,  the European  countries will undertake,  on 
average,  two  launchings  per year; 
3·  As  regards  the  European scientific programme,  it is,  however, 
essential neither to  make  undertakings  that will prejudice 
the scientific value  of the  programme  nor  to  omit  the  use  of 
the European launcher  where  this is compatible  with the 
663 scientific mission.  On  the basis of  the  outline programme 
proposed  on  the  understanding of  financial limits set out in 
the  report  by  the  Director-General of ESRO,  it is clear that 
at least one,  and at the  most  two  European  launchers,  can 
be  used  by  1976; 
4.  The  launchings with  proven  launchers shall be  supplied at a 
reasonable  price,  based  on  their economic  value  and their 
cost price,  by  applying the  following  formula: 
(a)  the  price of the  European  launchings shall be  compared 
with the price at which  comparable  non-European launchings 
could be  purchased  on  the  basis  of a  genuine,  durable  and 
commercial supply.  The  latter supply is one  which is not 
subject to any  conditions  of a  prohibitive character; 
(b)  any price difference will be  divided in equal parts between, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  producer  member  countries and,  on  the 
other hand,  all the  countries  taking part in the satellite 
project, it being understood that in no  case  the latter 
will  be  asked  to  pay  a  difference higher than  25%  of the 
price of comparable  non-European  launchings. 
Voting results: 
8  in favour 
1  reservation  (United Kingdom)* 
4 abstentions  (Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden  and Switzerland) 
*  Cf.  Annex  1. 
664 Annex  1  - Resolution  concerning  the  principles of European 
cooperation in space,  proposed  by  the  Belgian 
Delegate  (United  Kingdom  reservation) 
The  United Kingdom  acceptance  of Resolution No.  4  involving 
its commitment  to  the  minimum  programme,  which will permit 
its wholehearted participation in the  applications  programme, 
the  long-term technological research programme  and  the  proposed 
launcher use  arrangements  (in addition to its declared  commit-
ment  to the  expanded scientific research programme)  is condi-
tional upon its release  from  its existing financial  commitments 
to ELDO. 
NB.  Although this reservation is maintained,  the United 
Kingdom  has  since  the  Conference  notified its readiness 
to  contribute in 1969  to  the  special budget  for appli-
cation studies  (cf.  Resolution  No.  1,  Section 2 2  second 
sub-paragraph). 
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